Diane Coyle — The weirdness of economists

I open at random to an essay by Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson, which sets out the (usually implicit) framework of normative economics: economics appraises outcomes (not processes), using a single appraisal perspective, looking at the consequences for individuals (not groups or ‘society’) in terms of their welfare (not freedom or rights), welfare being defined as the satisfaction of preferences and assessed in terms of market outcomes and the Pareto criterion. We economists are early socialized into this approach and forget how weird it seems to others.

Bonkers in the eyes of many philosopher. 

This is especially true of traditional social and political philosophers that accept the fundamental issue of social and political debate as the meaning of living a good life in a good society and approach this not only as a speculative question but also as a social and political objective that promotes optimal unfolding of the potential of human nature inherent in all, along with expressing individual uniqueness and diversity.

Of course, this issue is approached differently by various economists and the above characterization is of the conventional approach. However, it is this approach that is dominant in the profession and is largely taken for granted in teaching economics. That's what's weird, especially when it is claimed that there is no alternative worth discussing since the matter is now settled.

The Enlightened Economist
The weirdness of economists
Diane Coyle | freelance economist and a former advisor to the UK Treasury. She is a member of the UK Competition Commission and is acting Chairman of the BBC Trust, the governing body of the British Broadcasting Corporation