The risk that asset price bubbles pose for financial stability is still not clear. Drawing on 140 years of data, this column argues that leverage is the critical determinant of crisis damage. When fuelled by credit booms, asset price bubbles are associated with high financial crisis risk; upon collapse, they coincide with weaker growth and slower recoveries. Highly leveraged housing bubbles are the worst case of all.
Ya think?
Conclusions: Bubble trouble
In this column, we turned to economic history for the first comprehensive assessment of the economic risks of asset price bubbles. We provide evidence about which types of bubbles matter and how their economic costs differ. Our historical analysis shows that not all bubbles are created equal. When credit growth fuels asset price bubbles, the dangers for the financial sector and the real economy are much more substantial. The damage done to the economy by the bursting of credit boom bubbles is significant and long lasting.
In the past decades, central banks typically have taken a hands-off approach to asset price bubbles and credit booms. This way of thinking has been criticised by some institutions, such as the BIS, that took a less rosy view of the self-equilibrating tendencies of financial markets and warned of the potentially grave consequences of leveraged asset price bubbles. The findings presented here can inform ongoing efforts to devise better macro-financial theory and real-world applications at a time when policymakers are still searching for new approaches in the aftermath of the Great Recession.VOX.eu
Leveraged bubbles
Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, Alan Taylor
ht Lambert Strether at Naked Capitalism
It's an interesting paper (I am referring to the underlying NBER paper, and not the summary). It's conclusions match what you would expect from reading Minsky, but it is done in a relatively straightforward quantitative framework. (It is straightforward when compared to the DSGE dreck, but it does take math skills to follow.)
ReplyDeleteIt is good to see intuition (based on post-Keynesian models) matching empirical tests. They were not formally testing post-Keynesian theories, but they might as well have been.