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Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Links — 4 May 2021

Dances with Bears
THE NEW NAVALNY INDICTMENT – WHY ARTICLE 239 PROSECUTION IS WORSE FOR THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REGIME-CHANGE OPERATION THAN ARTICLE 275 (TREASON)
John Helmer

Intel Today ("an act of war")
BREAKING NEWS — Havana Syndrome — White House Official Confirms Microwave Attacks [UPDATE — Former Pentagon Chief: “It’s an Act of War!” // Press Review]
Ludwig De Braeckeleer

Reminiscence of the Future
Ships Are Just Platforms.
Andrei Martyanov

3 comments:

  1. Gotta move those U.S. nukes out of Turkey. Pronto.

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  2. The whole area around Taiwan already today is an exclusion zone for any type of a surface force, simply on the merit of China having enough "weight" in salvo to effectively overwhelm any current sea-based air-defense and this capability, augmented in the nearest future with the hypersonic capability (and, most likely, Russia-provide targeting), makes no difference in terms of actual power projection, which, as a viable concept in peer-to-peer scenario, ceased to exist at least a decade or two ago.

    Something similar I read in an article:

    "ASBMs (anti-ship ballistic missiles) may not need to produce mission kills against the surface fleet to complicate U.S. plans. They only need to reach the fleet's defensive envelope for the Aegis to engage the incoming threats, thus forcing the defender to expend valuable ammunition that cannot be easily resupplied at sea under combat conditions. Even inaccurate ASBMs, then, could compel the Aegis to exhaust its weapons inventory, leaving it defenseless against further PLA actions. Used in conjunction with conventional ballistic missile strikes against U.S. bases and other land targets across Asia — strikes that would elicit more intercept attempts — ASBM raids could deprive the United States and its allies of their staying power in a sea fight."

    From the same article, this time about Iran:

    "Iran could deploy its land-based ASCMs (anti-ship cruise missiles) from camouflaged and hardened sites to firing positions along its coastline and on Iranian-occupied islands in the Strait of Hormuz while placing decoys at false firing positions to complicate U.S. counterstrikes. Hundreds of ASCMs may cover the Strait, awaiting target cueing data from coastal radars, UAVs, surface vessels, and submarines. Salvo and multiple axis attacks could enable these ASCMs to saturate U.S. defenses…salvos of less capable ASCMs might be used to exhaust U.S. defenses, paving the way for attacks by more advanced missiles."

    Missile Defense’s Real Enemy: Math

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