The great debate continues. What is becoming obvious, or should be becoming obvious, is that the problem with mainstream economic modeling is the presumption of a natural order inherited from the 18th century worldview and the metaphysics and epistemology on which it is based. In the 19th century scientists began to abandon this worldview and the metaphysical epistemological presumptions on which it is based, and the early 20th century buried it.
However, even Albert Einstein refused to believe that "God plays dice," which is a near perfect expression of the natural order position. He could not accept the notion of a probabilistic world due to what behavioral psychologists now call anchoring bias, one of the strongest and most prevalent of the many cognitive biases, along with confirmation bias. Modern marketing and advertising are largely based on anchoring. Even great scientists are susceptible to cognitive biases.
Rather than natural order, contemporary social scientists take behavior as the basis of behavioral science. Increasingly, behavior is being explained in terms of cognitive science. This is looked at within the overall framework of evolutionary science.
Read it at Lars P. Syll's Blog
Gods and idiots may share Wren-Lewis model, but it certainly isn’t my model!
by Lars P. Syll | Professor, Malmo University
Also see Lars, Economics quote of the century — an extremely embarrassing quote of Robert Lucas in 2003. It, too, is based on a natural order presumption. It amplifies on "idiots" in the title of Lars's post, "Gods and idiots may share Wren-Lewis model...."
30 comments:
Great articles by Lars P Syll!Well if there was any justice Robert Lucas should return his Nobel Prize!Could not one write a complain to king of sweden or who it is that spread that silly award?Do you know how one do reclamation request Tom?
Wren-Lewis and Syll keep going on about the micro foundations of macro. That strikes me as nonsense in that the laws of macro are in many cases entirely different from micro. E.g. cut the price of apples, and you’ll sell more apples. But the cut the price of labour and the result will not necessarily be an increase in aggregate numbers employed. But you’d never deduce that from examining supply and demand.
Or have I missed something?
The great debate continues. What is becoming obvious, or should be becoming obvious, is that the problem with mainstream economic modeling is the presumption of a natural order inherited from the 18th century worldview and the metaphysics and epistemology on which it is based. In the 19th century scientists began to abandon this worldview and the metaphysical epistemological presumptions on which it is based, and the early 20th century buried it.
However, even Albert Einstein refused to believe that "God plays dice," which is a near perfect expression of the natural order position. He could not accept the notion of a probabilistic world due to what behavioral psychologists now call anchoring bias, one of the strongest and most prevalent of the many cognitive biases, along with confirmation bias. Modern marketing and advertising are largely based on anchoring. Even great scientists are susceptible to cognitive biases.
Speaking of anchoring biases, you clearly have the anchor bias of the Whig Theory of history, which holds that there is only a positive correlation between time as it moves forward, and intellectual enlightenment. As such, you overly rely on the relative ages of each philosophy when critiquing them. You put too much emphasis on this, which is why you are post hoc going out of your way to convince me and others that my philosophy is wrong and yours is superior.
You clearly tend to argue for your case and against other people's cases by referencing the relative ages of when said cases were "popular" among philosophers. I think Kant is right that there exists true synthetic a priori propositions and that these are the foundation of economic science of human action. You believe I am wrong because "that is 18th century thinking that nobody takes seriously anymore." That is a cognitive bias on your part.
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In this latest post, you present the philosophy of a natural order as being progressively abandoned throughout the 19th century, as if the mere fact that time has passed and the popular philosophy became social control once again, that the newer thinking is correct, or at least superior to prior ideas.
The reason I know you're biased in this way is not just because of your constant references to the ages of philosophies as if it even matters for their truth value, but also, and more importantly, I know that history, i.e. "empirical evidence", is not consistent with the Whig thesis. It is an empirical fact that ideas ebb and flow throughout time. Good ideas are often forgotten, and bad ideas from the past often make a re-appearance.
In your case, your epistemology and philosophy in general is even older than 18th to 19th century philosophy. Your philosophy of social economic control harkens back to literally millenia ago. This ancient creed made a very pronounced re-appearance with Hegel and his followers. Your philosophy is a combination of Left-Hegelianism and ancient Skepticism from the Greeks. You try to dress it up in modern verbiage of "systems", and other technocratic babble that conjures up "modern" images of circuitboards and scientific authority, but you're really just a philosopher of ancient creeds and bad ideas making a re-appearance.
Rather than natural order, contemporary social scientists take behavior as the basis of behavioral science. Increasingly, behavior is being explained in terms of cognitive science. This is looked at within the overall framework of evolutionary science.
Natural order does not preclude evolution, it in fact presupposes it. It also does not preclude cognitive science.
Progress in knowledge is not possible unless the previous foundations are certain, and that can't happen unless Rationalism is presupposed and Skepticism is abandoned.
"Falsification", as Thomas Kuhn pointed out, "near enough, has been falsified."
MF, I was a natural order person most my life owing to culturally "inherited" cognitive bias. It took quite a bit to convince me in grad school that my position was not defensible.
Several of the professors with whom I felt more in tune were natural order people, but they were people with a strong background in history and not in logic or philosophy of science. Those whose specialty was logic and philosophy of science won me over, and I became more convinced as time went on that the analytic position was superior to the natural order position.
The natural order position looks to be objective, but it is inherently subjective, being based on "self-evidence," hence basically normative, i.e., based on stipulation of rules If you want to acknowledge that, I am fine with it. Otherwise, I don't think you have a defensible argument about objectivity.
The analytic position is that all worldviews, which philosophies articulate as logical constructs, are normative in the sense of being rule-based. People disagree over what those rules are, which makes for the differences among worldviews and the ideologies that rationalize them in terms of basic norms functioning as criteria.
The worldview of most people — "the man in the street" — is based on the common sense view of the world. The common sense view of the world is always decades if not centuries behind the edge of the envelope of human knowledge as it develops, since discoveries filter down slowly.
This is an issue, for instance, with the neo-classical view based on a representative agent acting rationally in terms of knowledge that is independent of uncertainty and subjective biases.
Human beings do not possess absolute knowledge based on absolute criteria. The scientific approach is to take tentative positions based on advancing knowledge through research instead of erecting absolute criteria based on indefensible assumptions.
Even if one accepts the Kantian view, so-called objectivity comes subjective in the sense of being structured in logical categories that characterize the human mode of knowing rather than the external world. A case can be made that Kant's insights were a forerunner to the development of cognitive science, but they are not scientific, nor have they be confirmed as scientific law.
There is considerable evidence that all human beings do not categorize as Kant thought. He is generalizing from his own case and observing Europeans of that age in his environment. That is a special case rather than a general one, and Kant's analysis was not done in a way that would exclude subjective bias in examining it, which is basic to the scientific method.
Knowledge goes on, and the universe of discourse of rigorous thinkers has moved beyond natural order as self-evident to focus on an evolutionary understanding of human development and interaction based on study of cognition and behavior.
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Tom Hickey:
MF, I was a natural order person most my life owing to culturally "inherited" cognitive bias. It took quite a bit to convince me in grad school that my position was not defensible.
If there was a clincher argument, what was it?
Why can't there be a natural order based on the presuppositions you are making concerning convictions themselves?
How do I know you were so convinced, if I can't observe your consciousness?
Several of the professors with whom I felt more in tune were natural order people, but they were people with a strong background in history and not in logic or philosophy of science. Those whose specialty was logic and philosophy of science won me over, and I became more convinced as time went on that the analytic position was superior to the natural order position.
I don't think those two are in opposition to each other. They aren't mutually exclusive. You can have both positions consistently.
The natural order position looks to be objective, but it is inherently subjective, being based on "self-evidence," hence basically normative, i.e., based on stipulation of rules If you want to acknowledge that, I am fine with it. Otherwise, I don't think you have a defensible argument about objectivity.
You just inferred an ought from an is. You inferred from "is" inherently subjective, a "norm" of certain optional rules. Pure subjectivism carries no norms associated with it. It just is.
The analytic position is that all worldviews, which philosophies articulate as logical constructs, are normative in the sense of being rule-based. People disagree over what those rules are, which makes for the differences among worldviews and the ideologies that rationalize them in terms of basic norms functioning as criteria.
Disagree according to what standard? If it's merely consensus, if it's merely convention, then there is no grounds for analytic philosophy to conclusively refute, say, the Rationalist position.
The worldview of most people — "the man in the street" — is based on the common sense view of the world. The common sense view of the world is always decades if not centuries behind the edge of the envelope of human knowledge as it develops, since discoveries filter down slowly.
....or rejected as foolish pedantry from arm-chair intellectuals who don't understand the world they claim to be explaining, or, worse, foolish pedantry being adopted by the man on the street, which is what I claim where we are in this age. Like I said before, I do not subscribe to the Whig Theory of history. I know it's possible that the quality of ideas can ebb and flow, where good ideas are sometimes forgotten, and bad ideas abandoned sometimes make a reappearance.
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Tom Hickey:
This is an issue, for instance, with the neo-classical view based on a representative agent acting rationally in terms of knowledge that is independent of uncertainty and subjective biases.
Praxeologists reject neo-classical "rationality". Praxeologists only speak of the absolutely certain logical boundaries of human life, such as means, uncertainty, costs, ends, profits, and losses. All subjective biases, no matter what they are, cannot possibly overturn any of these categories, since subjective biases are always manifested in actions.
Human beings do not possess absolute knowledge based on absolute criteria.
Should I take it then that this statement you just made, that human beings do not possess absolute knowledge based on absolute criteria, is itself not absolute knowledge based on absolute criteria? That you could be wrong and I could be right about the existence of absolute knowledge based on absolute criteria?
Did you peer into the heads of every last person on Earth to make that statement an empirical one?
Or is it an a priori true statement, in which case it is self-defeating, because you just made a claim to an absolute knowledge based on absolute criteria?
The scientific approach is to take tentative positions based on advancing knowledge through research instead of erecting absolute criteria based on indefensible assumptions.
So...same question. Is that statement you just made, a tentative position based on advancing knowledge through research, in which case you can't rule my position out, or is it an erecting of an absolute criteria?
What you described is the POSITIVIST approach. It is not "THE" scientific approach. You seriously need to stop conflating the two and pretending that positivism has a monopoly on all things science.
Praxeology is a science that explains real world phenomena. It's not mere analytical manipulations of symbols. You can't say I am absolutely wrong, without belying your own thesis.
Even if one accepts the Kantian view, so-called objectivity comes subjective in the sense of being structured in logical categories that characterize the human mode of knowing rather than the external world.
Ah, but there is no gap there. As Mises showed, the logical categories of thought are really logical categories of action, and so all idealistic assumptions that are often charged against Kantianism, melt away.
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Tom Hickey:
A case can be made that Kant's insights were a forerunner to the development of cognitive science, but they are not scientific, nor have they be confirmed as scientific law.
You mean they are not positivist propositions. I agree.
Even positivists have to admit the validity of these logical categories, because they presuppose them in the very philosophy of science pronouncements they are making.
There is considerable evidence that all human beings do not categorize as Kant thought.
There is zero evidence of human beings able to find that out without presupposing praxeological constraints in the very process of their learning.
He is generalizing from his own case and observing Europeans of that age in his environment.
Polylogist nonsense. You could not even make the claim his ideas are only applicable here but not there, or a special case but not a general one, unless Kant was utilizing general concepts that you understand. You can't say he's wrong UNLESS you presuppose the categories.
That is a special case rather than a general one, and Kant's analysis was not done in a way that would exclude subjective bias in examining it, which is basic to the scientific method.
What bias is there in praxeology? Even you making the argument that Kant is right or wrong, you are presupposing, and I can only understand you to be, intending to do doing something. Or else, why should I not treat your words as random symbols? If you present your words as having meaning, then right away that means you're acting, and all the categories of action apply to you. You used scarce means (your computer, time, etc) to accomplish a desired end (convince me of something, enjoy yourself, convince others, etc), where it is possible that the outcome of your action is either a success (you convince me, you enjoyed yourself, you convinced others, etc) or a failure (you don't convince me, you don't enjoy yourself, you don't convince others, etc).
Knowledge goes on, and the universe of discourse of rigorous thinkers has moved beyond natural order as self-evident to focus on an evolutionary understanding of human development and interaction based on study of cognition and behavior.
Again, evolutionary development is not mutually exclusive with natural order philosophy. They are rather like two sides of the same coin.
Knowledge goes on? Is that an a priori true statement, or is it something that has only been true up to this point, whereby it is possible that starting tomorrow, human actors will cease incurring costs altogether, in which case you should have said "Knowledge has heretofore went on, but I am not sure if it will continue, even if humans continue to exist"?
Tom Hickey:
Do you hold that if philosophy A is more popular in the present time than philosophy B which was popular during a prior time, then philosophy A is superior to philosophy B?
Or, more specifically, if philosophy of science A is more recent than philosophy of science B, does that mean philosophy of science A is superior to philosophy of science B?
MF: "Why can't there be a natural order based on the presuppositions you are making concerning convictions themselves?"
Anything is possible and anything conceivable or imagined can be posited. But what distinguished belief and opinion from knowledge is evidence. In purely formal systems, proof is in terms of showing a "logical pedigree." In descriptions of the world the evidence an "empirical warrant for particular descriptions and for general descriptions is formulation of testable hypotheses that withstand falsification under experimental scrutiny.
General descriptions of how things stand can never be shown to be true in that a counterinstance calls them into question.Mounting empirical evidence that speaks for key hypotheses leads to a hypothesis being accepted as a scientific law. But every scientific "law" is still subject to possible falsification.
There is no such thing as a "natural law" in science, since that assumes natural order, and scientists no longer make that presumption as matter of scientific method. Similarly, logicians no longer use the expression "laws of thought" as presuming natural order. Logicians no longer think of logic and math as discovering the laws of thought based on a natural order foundation.
Why this bias against natural order. Because it is not provable based on publicly available criteria that all can agree to, as is shown by the many competing versions of what natural order.These are simply different worldviews with different foundations, which those holding such views assert as natural order, natural rights, and natural laws.
Since the discovery of quantum mechanics the "mystery" is how statistical invariance rises from randomness, that is, order from chaos. To posit natural order adds nothing and only gives the semblance of knowledge.
Scientists are well aware that natural order as a cultural phenomenon of the West held back discovery and adoption of the scientific method for centuries and blocked its adoption for centuries more based on that presupposition.
There is nothing in between logical pedigree and empirical warrant that rigorous thinkers recognize as adequate criteria for distinguishing true knowledge from opinion, in that there are no other publicly available criteria. Criteria for assertions not based on publicly available criteria are always subjective norms in this view. No one has been able to convince logicians and scientists of any other way to establish genuine knowledge than be appeal to either logical pedigree or empirical warrant. Not that there aren't issues here too. So far the skeptics hold the day. Dogmatists, not so much.
This is basically about criteria of knowledge, which is an epistemological issue. It has been debated for millennia and the debate remains inconclusive in my view. while humanity is always learning more, we have a long way to go as a species in understanding ourselves and our world.
A major problem that humans face is a string penchant for certainty in an uncertain world. Certainly is only possible in a formal system in terms of the rules that rule certain thing in and others out. In two-value true or false logic the probability of tautologies is one and the probability of contradictions is zero. In two-value logica applied to the world the probability of description lies between zero and one.
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Tom Hickey:
MF: "Why can't there be a natural order based on the presuppositions you are making concerning convictions themselves?"
Anything is possible and anything conceivable or imagined can be posited.
Anything is possible? I disagree. I think it is impossible for contradictions to exist in reality. As a corollary, I think it is impossible for you to refute the praxeological categories of human action, of means, costs, gain, loss, etc, because any attempt to refute it will presuppose action and the praxeological categories. For I would have to consider your words as intending to do something (refute a proposition), and not just typing meaningless symbols.
I don't see how this can ever be undone.
But what distinguished belief and opinion from knowledge is evidence.
What form does evidence take? Observations only? What about that which is presupposed in the concept of observation itself, that makes it a valid method of knowledge discovery? The validity of observations cannot, of course, depend on observations, for that would be circular logic. The validity of observations, then, must be grounded in something outside observation.
In purely formal systems, proof is in terms of showing a "logical pedigree." In descriptions of the world the evidence an "empirical warrant for particular descriptions and for general descriptions is formulation of testable hypotheses that withstand falsification under experimental scrutiny.
What of that pronouncement itself? Is it is a falsifiable pronouncement? If so, then it's just a hypothesis that could be wrong, and cannot be used as conclusive against Rationalism. If it isn't, then it is self-defeating.
General descriptions of how things stand can never be shown to be true in that a counterinstance calls them into question. Mounting empirical evidence that speaks for key hypotheses leads to a hypothesis being accepted as a scientific law. But every scientific "law" is still subject to possible falsification.
How do you know that every scientific pronouncement is subject to falsification, before you have heard them all? Sounds like you're making a priori statement that is supposed to be true forever more.
What you are talking about is not science per se, but a particular branch within science called positivism. Do you deny that we can know a priori synthetic truths about reality? If so, then you made an a priori synthetic statement, for you are speaking of what is universally possible. If not, if you say they're possible, then you can't say all true propositions must be falsifiable.
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Tom Hickey:
There is no such thing as a "natural law" in science, since that assumes natural order, and scientists no longer make that presumption as matter of scientific method.
I disagree. Scientists in the course of using the scientific method, i.e. positivism, PRESUPPOSE the natural law that the truths of reality don't change over the course of time. That is a hypothesis is advanced today, and data is collected tomorrow, and a final confirmation or falsification is done on the third day, the very concepts of falsification and confirmation rest on the natural law proposition that the truths on the first day, are the same as they are on the third day. For if they were not the same, then one could not even say that a past hypothesis was falsified or confirmed, because the first day truths could be incommensurable with third day truths.
Similarly, logicians no longer use the expression "laws of thought" as presuming natural order. Logicians no longer think of logic and math as discovering the laws of thought based on a natural order foundation.
I don't care. What I know to be true and false does not derive from what the opinions of a majority happens to be.
Logicians who delve into purely formal, abstract symbol manipulations, divorced from praxeological constraints, are speaking gibberish, akin to theologians speaking of purely formal concepts such as God. If a logician or mathematician cannot show how his thoughts are consistent with the logical constraints of action, then they are not talking about the real world.
Why this bias against natural order. Because it is not provable based on publicly available criteria that all can agree to, as is shown by the many competing versions of what natural order.
I disagree. I think the very debating and argumentations themselves presuppose a universal natural order that everyone engaged in debating and argumentation tacitly agree to, by virtue of their debating and agreeing in the first place. They don't even have to agree with the CONTENT of such arguments. It's the fact that they are arguing at all, which proves a universal common grounding of what it means to put forward arguments, what it means to intend to convince others, and so on.
This "proto-logic" is universal among all acting entities, and it is provable. You and I for example disagree quite strongly on the content of the other's arguments, but the fact that we are arguing at all is only possible because the existence of a common ground between us that we both, explicitly or not, agree to. Actually it is even more strong than "agree." It is necessary that this common ground exist if meaningful argumentation and debating is to take place at all.
This is why you don't argue with a rock, but other actors like me. It's because there is in fact an objective common ground that makes practical affairs like arguments even possible. You could not deny this, without implicitly presupposing the same common ground.
These are simply different worldviews with different foundations, which those holding such views assert as natural order, natural rights, and natural laws.
You also could not even say they are different worldviews, without presupposing the law of non-contradiction, which is derived from your knowledge that you are not your surroundings.
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Tom Hickey:
Since the discovery of quantum mechanics the "mystery" is how statistical invariance rises from randomness, that is, order from chaos. To posit natural order adds nothing and only gives the semblance of knowledge.
I disagree. I think natural order is also presupposed in quantum mechanics. For example, the double slit experiment is held as a "natural" result from the same experimental set up and same experimental process. Every time, the diffraction pattern emerges. Not a single experiment has ever failed to produce the same pattern.
In addition, the discovery of quantum phenomena presupposes classical mechanics, for the scientists depend on equipment constructed according to classical mechanics. Quantum mechanics cannot possibly refute classical mechanics. It can only ADD to it. The only way quantum mechanics can refute classical mechanics is if some scientist were able to use non-classical mechanically derived equipment, using non-Euclidean derived experimental set ups, using non-praxeological bodily behavior. In a word, impossible.
Scientists are well aware that natural order as a cultural phenomenon of the West held back discovery and adoption of the scientific method for centuries and blocked its adoption for centuries more based on that presupposition.
I disagree. I think it is the exact opposite. I think natural order is what has been the foundation for all scientific progress. We can't possibly accumulate knowledge over time, in a non natural order universe.
There is nothing in between logical pedigree and empirical warrant that rigorous thinkers recognize as adequate criteria for distinguishing true knowledge from opinion, in that there are no other publicly available criteria.
I disagree. I am a rigorous thinker and I think there are true propositions that are derived neither by formal logic alone, nor by observation.
Tom Hickey:
Criteria for assertions not based on publicly available criteria are always subjective norms in this view. No one has been able to convince logicians and scientists of any other way to establish genuine knowledge than be appeal to either logical pedigree or empirical warrant. Not that there aren't issues here too. So far the skeptics hold the day. Dogmatists, not so much.
I disagree. I am a logician and I have become convinced of another way to gain knowledge than the method you describe.
This is basically about criteria of knowledge, which is an epistemological issue. It has been debated for millennia and the debate remains inconclusive in my view. while humanity is always learning more, we have a long way to go as a species in understanding ourselves and our world.
I disagree. The very statement you made that the debate is "inconclusive", presupposes an objective foundation for true and false proposition making, for the very statement of "inconclusive" itself, presupposes a common ground of propositioning as such.
A major problem that humans face is a string penchant for certainty in an uncertain world.
Are you certain of that? If you are, then the statement undercuts itself. If you are not, then you can't claim to be saying something certainly true.
Certainly is only possible in a formal system in terms of the rules that rule certain thing in and others out. In two-value true or false logic the probability of tautologies is one and the probability of contradictions is zero. In two-value logica applied to the world the probability of description lies between zero and one.
I disagree. I think differentiated multi-value logic is not an alternative system of logic that is incompatible with two value logic. I think multi-valued logic is just the introduction of gradations within the older meaning of "not". But refinement of the old logic is not an abandonment of it. For example, it is still true that the color I saw yesterday was either a determinate shade of blue or not, even though the "not" may cover a multitude of approximations, and even though I shall never know which was the shade I saw.
Tom Hickey:
You know what I notice? I notice that you tend not to engage in systematic logic. You prefer to talk OF systematic logic, of who said what, of what is popular and what is not, and so on. You're telling me your judgment of the state of science and logic of today and yesterday. You're not really going in to the details of why you are right. You're kind of just floating around, dabbling in this and that.
I have not yet seen any real rigorous explanation of a defense of your position. The only thing I see is you saying something to the effect of "I follow the popular views, even though I don't really understand them deeply."
@ MF
As I've said, if you folks choose to function in your own universe of discourse and think you are correct in your views, that is is a choice you are free to make. All ideologues do this. Taking norms that functions as criteria as being self-evident is how ideology works. Nothing new to see here.
But if you want to interact in terms of the current debate, which is taking place in the prevailing universe of discourse, you will have to produce criteria that are publicly available.
Tom Hickey:
As I've said, if you folks choose to function in your own universe of discourse and think you are correct in your views, that is is a choice you are free to make.
We're not in a "separate universe of discourse." The very fact that we are having a debate in the first place, and my constant references to the common ground that makes it possible, shows that I am actually making it clear to you that we're in the same universe, you're just not getting it because you're more worried about appearances to your perceived masters.
All ideologues do this.
To be frank, all ideologues do what you do, which is refuse to change one's ideas even in the face of arguments that show one's ideas to be untenable in their own right, popular views notwithstanding.
There is such a thing as "ad populum" ideologues, you know.
But if you want to interact in terms of the current debate, which is taking place in the prevailing universe of discourse, you will have to produce criteria that are publicly available.
I set my own debates. There is no "current debate" outside the debates of individuals. You're just asking me to join the borg without first convincing me why the borg is right and I am wrong.
Besides, my posts on this blog are "publicly available."
Are you awake?
MF: "Scientists in the course of using the scientific method, i.e. positivism, PRESUPPOSE the natural law that the truths of reality don't change over the course of time."
Scientific method holds that that future events are uncertain and no amount of past empirical evidence can ever guarantee that the probability of an affirmative general description is one. If scientists presuppose causation it is as a heuristic rather than a self-evident principle that is not analytic. Others would say that causality is nominal, that is, accountable in terms of definitions of logical operators wrt conditionality.
In science, causation is stated in terms of necessary, sufficient and necessary and sufficient conditionally, as well as contributory conditions that are neither necessary nor sufficient. Conditionality is defined in terms of logical operators (rules) using truth tables, for example.
Moreover, there is huge controversy over the particulars of causation in science, but it is safe to say that virtually no scientists accept a logical principle of causality based on the structure of the mind. That would have to be shown scientifically in terms of a testable hypothesis since it is an assertion about human cognition.
Scientists might accept that a crude or "naive" belief could be an cultural artifact of possible evolutionary use, however. But I have never run into a rigorous discussion of that.
The problem is framing it in such was that distinguished pre-human notions from human. I suspect that evolutionary theorist would be interested in the evolutionary advantage to organisms of acting as though the future will resemble the past as a heuristic device. In the case of high probability events, this would provide an evolutionary advantage, and those organisms that employ this heuristic would become dominant over time.
The problem with proposing causality as an part of a fundamental explanation is that causation is a problematic that requires explanation. It is still not a well understood concept, and there are a lot of issues with that are quite specific to actual cases.
Hume surfaced the problem of causality in terms of accounting for causal links based on observation. No one has surmount that obstacle successfully. Kant realized that causation is logical and developed his theory of transcendental categories of understanding. But this is either just a fancy way of saying that causation is purely formal, or else it appeals to an explanation that is speculative in the philosophical sense rather than substantiated based on evidence.
Now Neo-Kanatians may be willing to accept a Kantian explanation as sufficient, necessary or even necessary and sufficient, most people today are not.
The issue really is metaphysical and epistemological. There are two major views that have contended throughout Western history, the realist view that the objective world is real and separate from the observer and the idealist position that consciousness is the sole reality and there is no external world separate from the observer. Rather the external world is the objective pole of consciousness as the single reality. (Another view is skepticism, but it has not been a major view.)
Kant sought to have it both ways, but came down on the side of idealism in that the epistemology he developed posits an external world as given but holds that humans do not know it directly but only infer it. Realists don't much like that view.
(continued)
(continuation)
Fichte immediately took Ockham's razor to Kant's unknowable things-in-themselves, ushering in the subsequent proliferation of idealism. Husserl's phenomenological method also led to a full-blown idealism.
Realists rejected this for obvious reasons. Moreover, the analytic tradition was beginning through the work of Frege, Russell and Whitehead (Principia Mathematica), and Wittgenstein. Anglo-American philosophy developed in this direction.
I happen to like idealism, however, especially as it is found in the East, and I also realize that it is very difficult to state a view coherently without an appeal to self-evidence.
The problem here is that there are many competing idealistic explanation and they can't all be correct since they differ significantly. Since they all appeal ultimately to self-evidence, and self-evidence is not publicly available, there is an obvious problem.
What happens is a splintering of groups that are marginalized since they don't fit into the prevailing universe of discourse that agrees on logical pedigree and empirical warrant are the only universally agreed up criteria that are publicly available.
However, there are huge problems in the way of realism also, since no one has figured out how to bridge the gap without appealing to intellectual intuition, as Aristotle did.
Empiricism, on which scientific method is based, stems from Hume and is basically skeptical, although by making sense observation fundamental it is involved the knotty problem of knowledge of the external world that Kant acknowledged and attempted to overcome.
Wittgenstein held that all philosophical problems are pseudo-problems involving failure to understand how the logic of the language actually works and such "problems" disappear under rigorous analysis. He held, with science, that there is no causal necessity, only logical necessity. Causality is basically giving reasons that might or might not be found to be true.
Wittgenstein viewed causation in science is basically the logical form of scientific laws, which are stated formally in terms of conditional operators. The necessity is the validity of the logical expression, but as far as specific instances are concerned, this involves the uncertainty of future events.
Wittgenstein held that this can be stated rigorously without appeal to mental categories or events, which add nothing substantial to the analytic explanation.
Tom Hickey:
Scientific method holds that that future events are uncertain and no amount of past empirical evidence can ever guarantee that the probability of an affirmative general description is one.
That's the POSITIVIST method. Positivism is science (for non-action phenomena). Science is not necessarily positivism (e.g. for action phenomena).
If scientists presuppose causation it is as a heuristic rather than a self-evident principle that is not analytic.
It's not heuristic, because it is presupposed in the positivist method itself. It is not borne out of observation, because causality cannot be observed.
Others would say that causality is nominal, that is, accountable in terms of definitions of logical operators wrt conditionality.
They presuppose causality in the very argument they make that it is only definitional.
In science, causation is stated in terms of necessary, sufficient and necessary and sufficient conditionally, as well as contributory conditions that are neither necessary nor sufficient. Conditionality is defined in terms of logical operators (rules) using truth tables, for example.
In better science, causation is understood as a necessary prerequisite to action.
Moreover, there is huge controversy over the particulars of causation in science, but it is safe to say that virtually no scientists accept a logical principle of causality based on the structure of the mind.
It is irrelevant what the majority believes when it comes to the truthfulness (or lack thereof) of propositions.
That would have to be shown scientifically in terms of a testable hypothesis since it is an assertion about human cognition.
Testable how? Remember, one cannot observe causality.
Scientists might accept that a crude or "naive" belief could be an cultural artifact of possible evolutionary use, however. But I have never run into a rigorous discussion of that.
Which scientists? Why them and not other scientists?
The problem is framing it in such was that distinguished pre-human notions from human. I suspect that evolutionary theorist would be interested in the evolutionary advantage to organisms of acting as though the future will resemble the past as a heuristic device. In the case of high probability events, this would provide an evolutionary advantage, and those organisms that employ this heuristic would become dominant over time.
There is a difference between the future resembling the past, and the future having truths of reality as such resembling the past. The process of evolution could not make sense unless causality and constancy in truths is assumed.
Tom Hickey:
The problem with proposing causality as an part of a fundamental explanation is that causation is a problematic that requires explanation. It is still not a well understood concept, and there are a lot of issues with that are quite specific to actual cases.
It is a well understood concept, if you know where to look.
Hume surfaced the problem of causality in terms of accounting for causal links based on observation. No one has surmount that obstacle successfully. Kant realized that causation is logical and developed his theory of transcendental categories of understanding. But this is either just a fancy way of saying that causation is purely formal, or else it appeals to an explanation that is speculative in the philosophical sense rather than substantiated based on evidence.
False. You keep trying to categorize all propositions as either analytical or empirical, as if this is an a priori truth concerning all propositions, where there cannot be any propositions that are neither yet still say something true about reality.
The very pronouncement you are making that Kant's propositions, and all propositions, have to be either analytical or empirical conjectures, if you're right, would itself have to be either analytical or empirical. But if it's analytical, then it's just hot air. If it's empirical, then you're just making a conjecture that might be false (it is false BTW).
Now Neo-Kanatians may be willing to accept a Kantian explanation as sufficient, necessary or even necessary and sufficient, most people today are not.
Fallacy of ad populum. My my, you sure are worried about fitting in, aren't you?
The issue really is metaphysical and epistemological. There are two major views that have contended throughout Western history, the realist view that the objective world is real and separate from the observer and the idealist position that consciousness is the sole reality and there is no external world separate from the observer. Rather the external world is the objective pole of consciousness as the single reality. (Another view is skepticism, but it has not been a major view.)
There are now more than two views.
Kant sought to have it both ways, but came down on the side of idealism in that the epistemology he developed posits an external world as given but holds that humans do not know it directly but only infer it. Realists don't much like that view.
Common misconception of Kant. He argued we can know direct reality, space and time. Mises built on Kant and bridged the gap between mind and reality, and showed that the logical categories of thought are logical categories of action.
@ MF
Mises begins Human Action with the following:
HUMAN action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego's meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person's conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life. Such paraphrases may clarify the definition given and prevent possible misinterpretations. But the definition itself is adequate and does not need complement or commentary.
"Human action is purposeful behavior" is a general assertion of the type, For all humans without qualification, if a human being behaves the behavior or always for a consciously intended end."
What about acting on whim? Or by fancy? By definition is behaving without reason or purpose. There are many examples of people acting on whim out of fancy, impulsively and "irrationally." Moreover, some people are characteristically whimsical, others fanciful, and other impulsive. Do you include that under purposeful? Or are they exceptions to the rule?
"Human action is purposeful behavior" is either an empirical claim, or it functions are rule, e.g., as a definition of human behavior. In no case it is certain apriori and additive to knowledge about behavior. In the former case it is stipulated (logical) and in the latter a claim about how things stand (empirical).
My examples show that if it is a general proposition is asserting bow things stand, it is false, and if it is a rule, it has exceptions.
Tom Hickey:
Fichte immediately took Ockham's razor to Kant's unknowable things-in-themselves, ushering in the subsequent proliferation of idealism. Husserl's phenomenological method also led to a full-blown idealism.
Actually, Fichte sought to overcome the constraints that Kant expounded, by asserting man's unbounded domination over Being, and his complete independence of any pre-existing order. In this sense, Fichte is actually an influence in your philosophy.
Realists rejected this for obvious reasons.
What reasons are you referring to?
Moreover, the analytic tradition was beginning through the work of Frege, Russell and Whitehead (Principia Mathematica), and Wittgenstein. Anglo-American philosophy developed in this direction.
Wittgenstein is actually quite in line with my own philosophy. Frege's critique of psychologism is also very much in step with my philosophy.
I happen to like idealism, however, especially as it is found in the East, and I also realize that it is very difficult to state a view coherently without an appeal to self-evidence.
It's actually impossible. People are just not good at pointing out incoherent positions, for example the position that human actions are past causally determined. See Newcomb's paradox.
The problem here is that there are many competing idealistic explanation and they can't all be correct since they differ significantly. Since they all appeal ultimately to self-evidence, and self-evidence is not publicly available, there is an obvious problem.
They can't all be correct since they differ? Don't look now, but you just asserted that the logical law of non-contradiction is inherent in reality.
What happens is a splintering of groups that are marginalized since they don't fit into the prevailing universe of discourse that agrees on logical pedigree and empirical warrant are the only universally agreed up criteria that are publicly available.
Those who are more right than others are always in the fringe.
However, there are huge problems in the way of realism also, since no one has figured out how to bridge the gap without appealing to intellectual intuition, as Aristotle did.
False. Mises bridged that gap with praxeology. He discovered the missing link between idealism and realism.
Empiricism, on which scientific method is based, stems from Hume and is basically skeptical, although by making sense observation fundamental it is involved the knotty problem of knowledge of the external world that Kant acknowledged and attempted to overcome.
Mises overcame it.
Wittgenstein held that all philosophical problems are pseudo-problems involving failure to understand how the logic of the language actually works and such "problems" disappear under rigorous analysis. He held, with science, that there is no causal necessity, only logical necessity. Causality is basically giving reasons that might or might not be found to be true.
Wittgenstein could not have advanced his thesis without presupposing causality as a necessity.
Wittgenstein viewed causation in science is basically the logical form of scientific laws, which are stated formally in terms of conditional operators. The necessity is the validity of the logical expression, but as far as specific instances are concerned, this involves the uncertainty of future events.
Yes, positivists do consider scientific laws as If A Then B statements. But what of the grounding of that claim itself? If it's purely formal, then how can we explain the success of mathematics in the natural sciences? Isn't that a little too coincidental?
Wittgenstein held that this can be stated rigorously without appeal to mental categories or events, which add nothing substantial to the analytic explanation.
I disagree. His actions, upon which they are based, were events.
In the end, we are back to where all argumentation like this eventually go to rest — disagreement over fundamentals and lack of agreed upon criteria. When people do not agree over fundamental criteria, debate ends. This is why logic (math) and science rule in rigorous discourse, because differences are decidable based on publicly available criteria.
Tom Hickey:
In the end, we are back to where all argumentation like this eventually go to rest — disagreement over fundamentals and lack of agreed upon criteria.
Perhaps you did not read my last serious of posts. As I explained in the post titled (stupidly) "2/2":
"Debating and argumentations themselves presuppose a universal natural order that everyone engaged in debating and argumentation tacitly agree to, by virtue of their debating and agreeing in the first place. They don't even have to agree with the CONTENT of such arguments. It's the fact that they are arguing at all, which proves a universal common grounding of what it means to put forward arguments, what it means to intend to convince others, and so on."
"This "proto-logic" is universal among all acting entities, and it is provable. You and I for example disagree quite strongly on the content of the other's arguments, but the fact that we are arguing at all is only possible because the existence of a common ground between us that we both, explicitly or not, agree to. Actually it is even more strong than "agree." It is necessary that this common ground exist if meaningful argumentation and debating is to take place at all."
"This is why you don't argue with a rock, but other actors like me. It's because there is in fact an objective common ground that makes practical affairs like arguments even possible. You could not deny this, without implicitly presupposing the same common ground."
So we're not actually disagreeing with fundamentals. We are disagreeing over the content, and specifically, you are not recognizing the existence of this common ground that you yourself are presupposing in the very act of debating with me.
The concept of "agreeing to disagree" is perhaps the starting point that you might want to look into.
When people do not agree over fundamental criteria, debate ends.
Wouldn't debates end if people agree? I think disagreement is implied in debating. People who agree with each other cannot debate each other. They can communicate, as are we.
This is why logic (math) and science rule in rigorous discourse, because differences are decidable based on publicly available criteria.
Decided how exactly? A majority vote? Please. That's not science. That's group think.
Tom Hickey:
Mises begins Human Action with the following:
I recommend you read more than the beginning. I also recommend that you read the epistemological works from Hoppe and Mises.
What about acting on whim? Or by fancy? By definition is behaving without reason or purpose.
Acting on a whim is still acting. Acting on a whim us still intentional. It is intentional to the extent of the content of the whim. Think of examples in your mind of acting on a whim. Whatever you think of, you'll soon understand that even if it is as trivial as wanting a cheap psychological thrill, the action MUST be characterized by choices made, where the whim in question implies all other possible actions cannot be done, and are hence ranked lower. Even whimsical action requires means, costs, and will have an outcome that the actor perceives as a gain or loss.
You have to be careful not to conflate Mises' conception of "rational" behavior with the Randian conception of "rational" behavior. To Mises, it is purely subjective, and includes all whimsical behavior, whereas Rand would say whimsical behavior is not rational.
There are many examples of people acting on whim out of fancy, impulsively and "irrationally."
Even action done for fancy, impulsively, and irrationally, are actions. Out of fancy is intentional.
Moreover, some people are characteristically whimsical, others fanciful, and other impulsive. Do you include that under purposeful? Or are they exceptions to the rule?
Mises explains:
"The opposite of action is not irrational behavior, but a reactive response to stimuli on the part of the bodily organs and instincts which cannot be controlled by the volition of the person concerned. To the same stimulus man can under certain conditions respond both by reactive response and by action. If a man absorbs a poison, the organs react by setting up their forces of antidotal defense; in addition, action may interfere by applying counterpoison."
and then:
"In this sense we speak of the subjectivism of the general science of human action. It takes the ultimate ends chosen by acting man as data, it is entirely neutral with regard to them, and it refrains from passing any value judgments. The only standard which it applies is whether or not the means chosen are fit for the attainment of the ends aimed at. If Eudaemonism says happiness, if Utilitarianism and economics say utility, we must interpret these terms in a subjectivistic way as that which acting man aims at because it is desirable in his eyes."
"Human action is purposeful behavior" is either an empirical claim, or it functions are rule, e.g., as a definition of human behavior.
I disagree. That is just you AGAIN asserting, without justification, that all propositions have to be either analytical or empirical.
Human action is a true synthetic a priori proposition, that is, it is neither purely formal, nor is it observable, but says something true about humans.
Tom Hickey:
In no case it is certain apriori and additive to knowledge about behavior.
I disagree. I think it is a certain a priori truth that adds to our knowledge. Any attempt to refute it, verifies it.
In the former case it is stipulated (logical) and in the latter a claim about how things stand (empirical).
I disagree. It is neither merely stipulated nor is it observable.
You yourself presupposed it when you answered my questions concerning what David Sloan was doing. You interpreted his behavior as a series of actions.
Tom Hickey:
My examples show that if it is a general proposition is asserting bow things stand, it is false, and if it is a rule, it has exceptions.
I disagree. Your examples are either behaviors that are not actions, or actions. The action axiom doesn't mean every single bodily motion is purposefully directed. Just that humans do act. They don't act in a coma, nor do they act when they have muscle spasms. But when they act on a whim, they still act.
Mises writes further:
"The proof of the fact that only two avenues of approach are available for human research, causality or teleology, is provided by the problems raised in reference to the serviceableness of instincts. There are types of behavior which on the one hand cannot be thoroughly interpreted with the causal methods of the natural sciences, but on the other hand cannot be considered as purposeful human action. In order to grasp such behavior we are forced to resort to a makeshift. We assign to it the character of a quasi-action; we speak of serviceable instincts."
"We observe two things: first the inherent tendency of a living organism to respond to a stimulus according to a regular pattern, and second the favorable effects of this kind of behavior for the strengthening or preservation of the organism’s vital forces. If we were in a position to interpret such behavior as the outcome of purposeful aiming at certain ends, we would call it action and deal with it according to the teleological methods of praxeology."
"But as we found no trace of a conscious mind behind this behavior, we suppose that an unknown factor—we call it instinct—was instrumental. We say that the instinct directs quasi-purposeful animal behavior and unconscious but nonetheless serviceable responses of human muscles and nerves. Yet, the mere fact that we hypostatize the unexplained element of this behavior as a force and call it instinct does not enlarge our knowledge. We must never forget that this word instinct is nothing but a landmark to indicate a point beyond which we are unable, up to the present at least, to carry our scientific scrutiny."
"Biology has succeeded in discovering a “natural,” i.e., mechanistic, explanation for many processes which in earlier days were attributed to the operation of instincts. Nonetheless many others have remained which cannot be interpreted as mechanical or chemical responses to mechanical or chemical stimuli. Animals display attitudes which cannot be comprehended otherwise than through the assumption that a directing factor was operative."
"The aim of behaviorism to study human action from without with the methods of animal psychology is illusory. As far as animal behavior goes beyond mere physiological processes like breathing and metabolism, it can only be investigated with the aid of the meaning-concepts developed by praxeology. The behaviorist approaches the object of his investigations with the human notions of purpose and success. He unwittingly applies to the subject matter of his studies the human concepts of serviceableness and perniciousness. He deceives himself in excluding all verbal reference to consciousness and aiming at ends. In fact his mind searches everywhere for ends and measures every attitude with the yardstick of a garbled notion of serviceableness. The science of human behavior—as far as it is not physiology—cannot abandon reference to meaning and purpose. It cannot learn anything from animal psychology and the observation of the unconscious reactions of newborn infants. It is, on the contrary, animal psychology and infant psychology which cannot renounce the aid afforded by the science of human action. Without praxeological categories we would be at a loss to conceive and to understand the behavior both of animals and of infants."
Thorsten Polleit also deals with the "whim" challenge you bring up:
http://mises.org/daily/5514
MF: " recommend you read more than the beginning. I also recommend that you read the epistemological works from Hoppe and Mises."
Mises: "HUMAN action is purposeful behavior.... But the definition itself is adequate and does not need complement or commentary."
Mises himself calls this a definition. and one that is sufficient in itself for understanding. In logical analysis, definitions are rules. To be rigorous, that is, as logic and science are technical terms must be defined operationally, that is, in terms of criteria for validation or verification.
Anything that lacks validation criteria in terms of a logical pedigree is not analytic apriori, and and thing that is not synthetic a posteriori is a stipulation, such as an axiom or postulate of a formal deductive system or an assumption in an empirical one.
Proposition that are "synthetic apriori" don't fall into the basket of either logic including math, or science. They are philosophical.
Now if you want to admit Mises was not doing science but philosophy, then that is fine with me. That happens to be be my view.
There are loads of philosophical explanations that are undecidable on publicly available criteria of logic or science. Which may be correct is undecidable based on logic or science. None of them may be correct. The fact is that there is a whole range that is beyond the ability of humans to know on the basis of Hume's fork, logic and empirical observation.
All claims of irrefutability are based on self-evidence. Different people take different starting points as being self-evident. Self-evidence is subjective, and publicly available criteria are objective.
(continued)
(continuation)
Hayek got this as Lord Keynes pointed out:
“I became one of the early readers [sc. of Karl Popper’s Logik der Forschung, 1934]. It had just come out a few weeks before …. And to me it was so satisfactory because it confirmed this certain view I had already formed due to an experience very similar to Karl Popper’s. Karl Popper is four or five years my junior; so we did not belong to the same academic generation. But our environment in which we formed our ideas was very much the same. It was very largely dominated by discussion, on the one hand, with Marxists and, on the other hand, with Freudians. Both these groups had one very irritating attribute: they insisted that their theories were, in principle, irrefutable.Their system was so built up that there was no possibility – I remember particularly one occasion when I suddenly began to see how ridiculous it all was when I was arguing with Freudians, and they explained, “Oh, well, this is due to the death instinct.” And I said, “But this can’t be due to the [death instinct].” “Oh, then this is due to the life instinct.” … Well, if you have these two alternatives, of course there’s no way of checking whether the theory is true or not. And that led me, already, to the understanding of what became Popper’s main systematic point: that the test of empirical science was that it could be refuted, and that any system which claimed that it was irrefutable was by definition not scientific. I was not a trained philosopher; I didn’t elaborate this. It was sufficient for me to have recognized this, but when I found this thing explicitly argued and justified in Popper, I just accepted the Popperian philosophy for spelling out what I had always felt. Ever since, I have been moving with Popper” (Nobel Prize-Winning Economist: Friedrich A. von Hayek, pp. 18–19).
So if you want to say that that what you are doing is philosophy rather than scientific, so be it. I am a philosopher. Most of what I do is philosophy, not science.
I happen to think that some things are self-evident through intellectual intuition in that consciousness is reflexive and experience is experience of consciousness. Several Western philosopher got this, but did not draw the correct conclusion about it. Speculative philosophers thought that the task was to continue the explanation, and they got sidetracked on one hand and generally garbled the explanation on the other.
Practical one realized that the task before explanation was experiencing consciousness as such. That led to "mysticism" and the elaboration of perennial wisdom.
As you know, Mises rejects the Eastern approach in "The Vegetive Man" (HA, p28-29) as not pertaining to human action perhaps apparently he does not understand the significance of "doing without doing" (Chinese wei wu wei), that is, acting from the empty state. This is a state without self-interest or "human purpose," which are oriented toward satisfaction. Having realized fulfillment as transcendental joy, a sage acts spontaneously.
Mises simply dismisses this entire dimension of human experience and action reports of which extend into prehistory and which is arguably the most important dimension of human life since it shows limitless human possibility.
Mises is taking his own experience and generalizing from a narrow slice of possible experience based on his own capacity and circumstances. Apparently those that agree with him share this experience and outlook and are therefore attracted to this explanation of it.
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