Naming, Discussing and Solving Specific Innocent Frauds, and the Specific Social Catalysts That Will Undo Them

commentary by Roger Erickson

To proceed, we need to specifically name some key hurdles, so they can be more widely discussed. Only then is it clear what catalysts prompt faster adoption of methods driving better results.

Consider: The USAID Virus, or "The International Campaign to Destabilize Bolivia," and then let's jump to MMT & fiscal policy.

Reasoning by Analogy.

An analogy is used, comparing a US Gov agency to a virus, given that both trigger "systemic toxicities" in the afflicted host. At some point, it doesn't matter how true the specific allegations are. There is a better way, for both virus & host.

Anyone observing the intersection of policy & monetary operations knows that the hurdles are very distributed. Therefore, lets consider some distributed background. If we're going to mention hosts & viruses, note that every known species & it's viruses exhibits diverse, competing cultures or variants. For example, each of our nation states, as a variant, has also developed a cloud of significant institutions or practices that define that culture. Also note that each institution itself develops a cloud of "species-specific" protest groups.

Ultimately, however, all institutions & their protest cults develop considerable institutional momentum, and all lack adequate situational awareness of how to adapt to an unpredictable future.  Progress occurs largely through unpredictable, indirect recombinations across or outside existing institutions.

How do we know that past methods always fail? Simply because we've been unable to extract any predictive power by extrapolating from past trends. The result is an accepted rule in all system sciences: "For every intractable problem, there is a solution, and that solution always involves yet another layer of indirection." It is that novel class of new & indirect solutions which cannot be predicted - and hence cannot be supplied by existing institutions or their protest clouds.

Learning not to fear viruses. 

Even initially threatening viruses can eventually be beneficially utilized by a clever recipient, by repurposing either the content or the viral methods. Viruses open up indirect pathways which cannot be accessed by existing hosts or source-institutions sharing existing "paradigm momentum" - nor by the "species-specific" protest groups sharing the same paradigm-momentum, even if in opposition!

Simultaneously, the machinery used by one host to generate & redistribute viruses can also be tuned to benefit both source & recipient. Indirection and indirect options are all around us. Re-purposing them in novel ways is where all the opportunity is - decidedly NOT in joining any aspect of any of them, as is.

There is always an even better way. Finding that better way fast enough to matter, requires situational awareness. Recklessly acting anyway, without at least minimal situational awareness, defines Innocent Fraud.

At their deepest levels, the premise of the USAID-virus articles is that institutional momentum will generate collateral influence, incidentally. We know that, and have options.  Exploring those options is what counts.

Using Viral Methods to Explore Options Faster

Since no subset of actors can wield enough knowledge to adequately predict the consequences of it's own actions, they must fall back on adjustments as reported results rolls in. In that case, the ratio of success vs failure depends entirely upon feedback sampling, and the latency between feedback, adequate analysis and further action.

Throwing caution to the winds and stubbornly proceeding based on ideology alone produces, at best, Innocent Fraud.

Being overly cautious and waiting for certainty before action only cedes discovery and momentum to those generating the range of actions defining success & failure, and is therefore also a failure - by definition - in an adaptive race.

The well known path to success, the very thing that drives evolution, is better/faster/leaner "parsing" of the information cloud incidentally generated by any group in any situation. Simply put, when HP quickly listens to all of HP, it's always clear what to do next. The trick is to find better/faster/cheaper methods allowing HP to listen to all of HP, and then to also parse that information cloud so that all parts of HP can align to accomplish whatever HP needs to do next.

Experience has proven that better/faster/cheaper tuning of input/analysis/response cycles depend largely on "what & how you ask" and "what & how you answer." Asking the precisely right question goes a long way towards getting the shortest, most valuable answer, soonest. Our decision cycle shrinks as all discussants learn how to keep useless information from cluttering & slowing the group decision process.

Making the jump to better/faster/leaner monetary operations - and then going farther.

Viruses, Options and Continuous Development.

If we apply the same cross-discipline analogy to monetary operations, then MMT exposes multiple, well known systemic toxicities affecting policy development. 

We already know where we'd like to be, and we know what constraints are holding us back. That means all attention should be focused on methods for overcoming the constraints, not just publicizing them. 

Methods drive results. If better methods are known but not widely used, then we fall back to catalysts for driving faster adoption of better methods. The best ways to learn are by trial & error, or by example if possible.

Our general problem? We have populations growing faster than their group awareness is growing? You don't say!

That defines a "teratology," i.e., a disorganized system. Teratology was coined to describe mal-development of a recognized system, specifically abnormalities of physiological development. There is even a long standing Teratology Society., dedicated to study of "terata," or abnormalities [Terata-ology, from Greek, = "monster-study"]. A newer term developmental toxicity includes all manifestations of abnormal development, not only obvious terata.

What does this - and similar examples from other fields - imply for all aspects of policy? Quite obviously, that we already have tremendous experience in studying and managing complex development processes, and are simply not applying that knowledge base to the complexity and tempo of group policy development.

New Ideas for Tuning a Continuously Developing System.

A culture is a constantly developing system. It's up to us to notice when our development is proceeding abnormally vs satisfactorily. We know the stakes, for ourselves and our children. How can we best manage our own, incessant cultural development? Hint, we won't get there without discussing key, emerging concepts accurately, widely & frequently enough.

Yet we have not even coined analogous terms for abnormal development of other known developing systems. Why? Obviously because distributed appreciation for those systems is lagging. Study & understanding of scalable, sustainable development methods lags when we do not appreciate a given development process enough to name and adequately discuss it.

What shall we call abnormalities of cultural development? Cultology? (suggestions?)

What shall we call abnormalities of market development? eConology? (suggestions?)

What shall we call abnormalities of ecological development? Stupidology? (suggestions?)

What shall we call abnormalities of political development? Political Parties? (suggestions?)

Once we name more specific examples of abnormal development, we can expand the discussion of identifying better social catalysts (education?) that will accelerate adoption of better methods which exist but are unused (MMT?).