Friday, November 8, 2013

Simon Wren-Lewis — Defending rational expectations


This post by Professor Wren-Lewis seems to indicate that mainstream proponents of REH don't understand the heterodox critics of REH.

Economic models are not replicas to scale. They are simplifications, that is to say, approximations and estimates rather than general descriptions as in physics.

Based on the laws of planetary motion, the position of a planet can be predicted with great accuracy at any point in time. This is due to the nature of the system being modeled.

Social systems are not like physical systems. They are complex adaptive systems that involve reflexivity and emergence. They are determined as much by cultural and institutional factors as individual inputs. Social systems resemble biological systems more than physical systems. They are non-ergodic, whereas physical systems are ergodic. This means that while relative certainty applies in physical systems, uncertainty rules in social systems.

Statements about models describe the model, not reality. There are criteria for assessing the quality of a model, such as formal consistency and rigor, but the model is determined by the assumptions. Assumptions can be empirically based, arrived at through induction based on data, or they can be postulated. Other than in very simple models, assumptions that are empirically derived are more likely to yield a model that is representational.

Proposition cannot establish their own truth, and models cannot guarantee that they are representational of facts. This involves judgement that links the conceptual to the real. Judgments can be true or false. This is established empirically.

Mainstream economists claim that REH is useful in macroeconomics and ask what alternative is better. Heterodox economists say that there is nothing inherently wrong with assuming REH as a heuristic provided that one recognize and take into account its limitations and refrain from interpreting the model as providing knowledge of the future or giving forward guidance where it is incapable of delivering. Heterodox economists accuse mainstream economists of over-promising results to the point of misrepresenting, which can have disastrous results in the economy and society, since macroeconomics is considered a policy science, hence, useful if not indispensable in policy formulation and assessment.

Much more can be said specifically, but this is the kernel of the issue. I think that the ball is in the mainstreamer's court on this one, especially after the crisis, where mainstream modeling failed miserably, yet some heterodox approaches warned about the gathering storm and explained why. Mainstream economists complain that heterodox economists did not use an econometric model so they were just lucky. But do macroeconomic models have to be econometric? Why so? (Keynes on Tinbergen: ""Newton, Boyle and Locke all played with alchemy. So let him continue.")

As an outsider looking in on economics, but as one familiar with the history of thought and philosophy of science, it appears to me that the mainstream and heterodox camps are having difficulty communicating with each other since they are operating in terms of different frames of reference and different criteria. The challenge is get enough to being on the same page as to be able to talk across the table. But when the mainstream holds that methodological questions are now settled, that seems unlikely to happen.

mainly macro
Defending rational expectations
Simon Wren-Lewis | Professor of Economics, Oxford University

One of the big problems, as every traders knows from experience, that acting based on "rational expectations" does not preclude acting stupidly. For example, people using the conventional model of monetary economics rationally expected that when the Fed greatly increased the monetary base through QE that rampant inflation would ensue. Some of the supposedly most astute financial advisors recommended taking such positions, e.g., shorting US Treasury securities. Top money managers took such position. On the other hand, heterodox economists using a different approach to monetary economics warned that this trade was misguided. It was. Those that took it got creamed. Their expectations were perfectly rational. They just had the wrong model.

20 comments:

Ramanan said...

Very nice essay.

"Mainstream economists claim that REH is useful in macroeconomics and ask what the alternative is that is better"

h/t UnlearningEconomics this one describes best:

http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?db=comics&id=3161

Tom Hickey said...

Right. That cartoon sums it up, and Wren-Lewis says as much.

Lars Syll posted a story of a military weather forecaster who realized that sending the customary 30 day report was not only a waste of time but also misleading since the quality of a forecast approaches zero by that time. So he let the command know.

The answer came back from the general staff. "Keep sending the 30 day report. We need it for planning."

Matt Franko said...

"Newton, Boyle and Locke all played with alchemy."

Revealing!

circuit said...

Agree with Ram: very nice post!

Anonymous said...

One of the big problems, as every traders knows from experience, that acting based on "rational expectations" does not preclude acting stupidly. For example, people using the conventional model of monetary economics rationally expected that when the Fed greatly increased the monetary base through QE that rampant inflation would ensue. Some of the supposedly most astute financial advisors recommended taking such positions, e.g., shorting US Treasury securities. Top money managers took such position. On the other hand, heterodox economists using a different approach to monetary economics warned that this trade was misguided. It was. Those that took it got creamed. Their expectations were perfectly rational. They just had the wrong model.

I don't believe that is consistent with the way economists use the term "rational expectations" in contemporary theory.

It's frustrating, because economists use "rational" in a way that seems very different that in other fields. For example, in philosophy, when we talk about rationality in the context of decision theory, we don't assume that an irrational agent is an omniscient. That is, perfect rationality is not identical to perfect knowledge. Rationality is viewed as the maintenance of certain kinds of coherence conditions on belief holding at any given time, and also across time; and also posits a certain kind of coherence between action and belief. But maintaining that coherence is logically consistent with being very ignorant of all sorts of things. It is a model of "doing the best you can" cognitively in response to a world in which human beings have limited knowledge.

But the rational expectations hypothesis as used in economics is stronger. It assumes that economic agents have expectations of the future that closely track the actual future, varying from the equilibrium only by a small random factor.

Matt Franko said...

"perfect rationality is not identical to perfect knowledge."

WE have knowledge (gnoseos) that most others do not imo...

rsp,

Tom Hickey said...

Dan, rational expectations the way that economists use it assumes that the past will resemble the future very closely, that is, that (cet. par.) trends continue so that it is rational to expect utility from the same sources as utility was gained in the past.

What this means is that agents acting within a model assume that the assumptions of the model are valid and there are only random fluctuations, so that stochastic analysis holds.

The counter to that is what about the turkey on the day before Thanksgiving?

The modelers say, well, no one can predict external shocks that do sometimes happen. But for the most part the model is correct.

The opponents say, don't bet your life on it. The turkey was operating out of the wrong model.

People do this all the time, which is why winners and losers is not just a matter of luck. Some people have better analytical abilities and construct better models.

But no model is complex enough so far to account for change in trend. But an experienced person should realize that trends to change, that is, that cet par no longer applies.

Some types of behavior are rather rigid and can be modeled quite accurately. Other types of behavior, not. We haven't yet got a good handle on modeling complexity, but pretending that it doesn’t exists just gains false confidence in simple models that don't account for all the inputs.

Then there is the way of looking that is used to select assumptions. The assumptions that led to missing the financial crisis and not taking steps to avoid it were of this type, as Bill Black has shown. The modeling assumed a system different from the system in place. So Alan Greenspan could dismiss the FBI warnings about massive fraud in the mortgage industry, and then Ben Bernanke could just repeat the error.

Rational expectations just means acting rationally within a given model. Acting rationally just means following the implications of the model's assumptions.

But if the model is the wrong model for the situation, then those rational expectations turn out like the turkey. As Bill Gross found out and so did the clients of those advisors recommending shorting tsys to take advantage of the rampant inflation that QE would produce. Hey, they were probably reading Greg Mankiw's text book.

Being rational in a broader sense means critiquing the model to prevent over-relying on an inadequate of grossly wrong one. In this sense, neoclassical and neo-Keynesian models are either inadequate or wrong for , e.g., policy formulation.

Tom Hickey said...

"perfect rationality is not identical to perfect knowledge."

WE have knowledge (gnoseos) that most others do not imo...


Knowledge is context dependent, and the context is given through conceptual models. We think in terns of conceptual models, which cognitive scientists call frames. All thinking and reasoning is in terms of conceptual models that are cognitive-affective, that is, subjective. Whether the model corresponds to objective experience is a matter of applying models and observing outcomes. Unless someone is daft, illogical or innumerate, everyone applies conceptual models "rationally."

Everyone is also continually discovering that conceptual models sometime fail or even often fail and the smarter people learn from their mistake and adjust their models iaw feedback. It's called learning. For the most part static models that presume ergodicity are doomed to fail in the social sciences.

Unknown said...

"rational expectations the way that economists use it assumes that the past will resemble the future very closely, that is, that (cet. par.) trends continue so that it is rational to expect utility from the same sources as utility was gained in the past."

I think that's 'adaptive expectations', not rational expectations.

Matt Franko said...

"Knowledge is context dependent"

Where does it say that Tom?

rsp,

Matt Franko said...

PS I ordered that Greek Philosophy Lexicon this week but it hasnt come in yet... in this instance I'd be interested to see if gnoseos is in there and how they looked at it....

rsp,

Unknown said...

"Hey, they were probably reading Greg Mankiw's text book."

The Fed wouldn't have done QE if they thought it would result in rampant inflation or hyperinflation as some predicted. So clearly they were using a different model.

Tom Hickey said...

Knowledge is context dependent"

Where does it say that Tom?


Matt, meaning is context-dependent. It's basic in the study of logic. There are not free-floating signs with inherent meaning that can be deduced from the sign alone. Not even arrows. Sign use is not natural (inborn, innate). It is learned.

Sign-use is rule-based. The expression 2 + 2 = 4 only has the customary meaning in decimal arithmetic. Children learn the rules not by studying axioms and formulation and transformation rules as such. They recite tables until they know them by hear, just like learning piano requires playing scales or guitar playing chords.

Then one has to learn how to correctly apply the rules of a game to the particular game. Then one can extend the rules to more complicated games, like extending arithmetic to algebra by increasing the level of abstraction.

As a result most of us are unaware of the conceptual models we are using or the rules, unless we study some subject that requires reflection on this. But mostly people are blissfully ignorant of what's actually happening beyond the rote learning and enculturation.

Tom Hickey said...

OK, y, you are correct. I didn't make that clear.

The idea of rational expectation as I understand it is that it modified adaptive expectations by seating expectations in a broader model including all relevant data.

The idea is that there is one model and that the model defines it.

This is the fundamental issue as I see it. That assumption is wrong in that there are many models that can claim to encompass the data. The REH assumes one model based on omniscience, which is clearly a false assumption.

There is controversy over modeling and the mainstream rules it out because they have declared the methodological issue settled in that they have the "right" model. Why. Because it is formally explanatory and predictive very accurately cet par, shocks excluded. The heterodox people say, you are making shit up in your head. Look at what your "perfect knowledge" is ignoring.

Tom Hickey said...

PS I ordered that Greek Philosophy Lexicon this week but it hasnt come in yet... in this instance I'd be interested to see if gnoseos is in there and how they looked at it....

Short summary. Plato held that knowledge is innate, the essence of things being mental, while Aristotle held that the mind is a blank slate and the active intellect abstracts the essence of things and imposes it on the passible intellect as the basis for concepts.

There is a further theory called nominalism, which holds that meaning is a function of signs and words are labels.

Contemporary logic, linguistics and cognitive science is attempting to approach this more rigorously based on new methods of research.

Anonymous said...

Anyway, Wren-Lewis's argument is that it doesn't matter whether the rational expectations assumption is realistic in isolation. All that matters is whether or not theories incorporating that assumption are successful at predicting outcomes. To which I say, "OK show us examples of successful predictions of these theories."

Tom Hickey said...

Right, but they leave themselves an out by way of exogenous shocks that "no one could foresee." When it is pointed out that people did foresee things they didn't, they respond, but not using a rigorous (formal) model comparable to ours, so how do we know they weren't just lucky. In other words, their theory is not testable, since whatever evidence that is mounted against it can be rejected based on the methodological assumptions.

Brian Romanchuk said...

Adaptive expectations within a model corresponds to taking an exponential moving average of the past history. For example, one could use 95% of the previous estimate plus 5% of the current value of inflation to get the new estimate. This technique sort of worked when inflation was stable, but it doesn't when inflation rose steadily during the 1970s (the estimate is always lower, instead of higher than current inflation).

Also, policy worked within the models by "tricking" model entities.

Rational expectations is an attempt to remove these problems; model entities use the model dynamics to make decisions.

In principle, what they are doing makes sense, if the objective is to get a model that is closer to observed behaviour. The problem is that the problem is probably too complex, and their simplifying assumptions make the models of debatable value. I will probably make a short reply in a post I will be publishing soon.

Matt Franko said...

"Sign-use is rule-based. The expression 2 + 2 = 4 only has the customary meaning in decimal arithmetic. Children learn the rules not by studying axioms and formulation and transformation rules as such. They recite tables until they know them by hear, "

Tom I submit we know that MMT is 'true' thru 'rote' like this and NOT by "studying axioms and formulation and xformation rules..." which is a different way to "learn" and imo is NOT working with those who remain outside of the MMT truths....

So when WE just "know" that the statement "we're out of money!" is false and that we always have unlimited "money", WE know this thru some sort of 'rote' process and WE did not learn this thru a process of under which the old 'mathetai' used to learn at the Academy which is thru 'creative thinking' or something along the lines you describe here as "by studying axioms and formulation and transformation rules as such."

We yes 'learned' MMT, but by rote not by "creative thinking"... or at least I did not 'learn' MMT thru "studying axioms and formulation and transformation rules as such" there is NO WAY at least I learned MMT this way imo...

So when I hear someone say "We're out of money!" my first inclination is NOT to get out the calculus equations to prove them wrong somehow... it is to just respond: "you're a f-ing moron!" as to me they just dont have the 'rote knowledge'. They simply dont have it... the calculus is just not going to help here (and hasn't imo)

The MMT academe seems to be trying to make the case thru "studying axioms and formulation and transformation rules as such" imo it doesnt look like it can be successfully/widely 'taught' that way...

I think this problem we face with acceptance of MMT is one of a problem of 'knowledge xfer' if you will and not that we are not doing a good enough job with "studying axioms and formulation and transformation rules as such" ... its never going to work that way imo...

We have to figure out how to "transfer our knowledge" not figure out how to do a better job of "studying axioms and formulation and transformation rules as such"...

imo the statement 'we are out of money" is false period... I guess if what you mean by 'context dependent' that the 'context' is 'being under a FFNC state currency regime' then I see what you mean by 'context dependent'... as if we were still under the metals then we at some point could indeed be 'out of money'...

but in the current 'context' of a FFNC, then we have the true knowledge now, nobody else does.

We have to figure out how to xfer this knowledge then this thing could start to REALLY turn around... it has to work thru 'rote' imo...

rsp



Jerry Cornelius said...

I once took it upon myself to compare the "long-term plans" of competitor oil companies with what eventually went down. After a period of five or ten years all those plans stop been "confidential" and move around rather openly. What I found was amusing and as expected: Their projections were more or less linear extensions of next year's plan, while the reality was all over the place. One should ask oneself, if we cannot do it for one company, could we do it for a whole economy? But one doesn't, it seems.