Sunday, September 10, 2017

David Harvey — The value of money [excerpt]

Value is a social relation. As such, it is ‘immaterial but objective.’ The ‘phantom-like objectivity’ of value arises because ‘not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values’. Their status as values contrasts with ‘the coarsely sensuous objectivity of commodities as physical objects. We may twist and turn a single commodity as we wish; it remains impossible to grasp it as a thing possessing value.’ The value of commodities is, like many other features of social life – such as power, reputation, status, influence or charisma – an immaterial but objective social relation that craves a material expression. In the case of value, this need is met through what Marx calls the ‘dazzling’ form of money.
Marx is very careful with his language. He refers to money almost exclusively as the ‘form of expression’ or as the ‘representation’ of value. He scrupulously avoids the idea that money is value incarnate, or that it is an arbitrary symbol imposed by convention on exchange relations (which was a widespread view in the political economy of his time). Value cannot exist without money as its mode of expression. Conversely, however autonomous it may seem, money cannot cut the umbilical cord that ties it to what it represents. We should think of money and value as autonomous and independent of each other but dialectically intertwined. This kind of relationship has a long history....
OUPblog
The value of money [excerpt]
David Harvey | Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the City University of New York Graduate School

2 comments:

Matt Franko said...

More of trying to specifically define a non specific figure of speech...

Tom Hickey said...

One aspect of philosophy, in addition to being the method of rational inquiry using logical argumentation, is logical clarification of terminology.

Narratives are either naive or technically specified. Scientific reasoning is technically specified. Most other argumentation is not, being phrased in ordinary language. Philosophical analysis is about clarifying these narratives by exposing errors in logic and adding specificity.

A lot of what Marx did can be viewed as philosophical analysis in this sense. See Marx's Inferno: The Political Theory of Capital by William Clare Roberts, Chapter One.

Subsequently, neoclassical economists tried to turn economics into a science through formalization and technical specificity and then conveying those results in ordinary language, e.g., for policy advice and formulation — with decidedly mixed results.

The attempt at technical specificity and formalization has led conventional economics down the rabbit hole, where nonsense is given the appearance of logic.