Showing posts with label current account balance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label current account balance. Show all posts

Monday, January 2, 2017

Nick Edmonds — The Net Internation Investment Position and the Trade Balance

 
Paul Krugman oversimplifies the actual situation by assuming cet. par. when all things other than the independent variable almost never remain the same in the real world. It's the same kind of pseudo-argument about the future as debt and deficit hysteria based on "unfunded obligations" coming due in the future, along with eventual runaway interest on debt.

Reflections on Monetary Economics
The Net Internation Investment Position and the Trade Balance
Nick Edmonds

Wednesday, December 21, 2016

macromon — World Current Account Balances (CAB)

We have ranked the world’s 2016 Current Account Balances (CAB) by country from largest deficit to largest surplus in the ginormous table below. The data are from the October 2016 IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. Note, 2016 are IMF estimates.
Global Macro Monitor
World Current Account Balances (CAB)
macromon

Monday, March 2, 2015

JW Mason — What Has Happened to Trade Balances in Europe?

It has gradually entered our awareness that the Greek trade account is now balanced. Greece no longer depends on financial markets (or official transfers, or remittances from workers abroad) to finance its imports. This is obviously important for negotiations with the "institutions," or at least it ought to be.... 
By 2013, the large majority of the euro area is in surplus, while not a single country has an excess of imports over exports of more than 5 percent. The distance above the diagonal line indicates the improvement from 2008 to 2013; this is positive for every euro-area country except Austria, Finland and Luxembourg, and the biggest improvements are in the countries with the worst ratios in 2008. The surplus countries, apart from Finland, more or less maintained their surpluses; but the deficit countries all more or less eliminated their deficits. 
So does this mean that austerity works? Yes and no. It is certainly true that Europe's deficit countries have all achieved positive trade balances in the past few years, even including countries like Greece whose trade deficits long predated the euro. On the other hand, it's also almost certainly true that this has more to do with the falls in domestic demand rather than any increase in competitiveness..

Still, the fact remains, trade deficits have almost been eliminated in the euro area. Liberal critics of the European establishment often say "not every country in Europe can be a net exporter" as if that were a truism. But it's not even true, not in principle and evidently not in practice. It turns out it is quite possible for every country in the euro to run a trade surplus....
The Slack Wire
What Has Happened to Trade Balances in Europe?
JW Mason | Assistant Professor of Economics, John Jay College, City University of New York

My comment there:

Tom HickeyMarch 2, 2015 at 11:17 PM

Liberal critics of the European establishment often say "not every country in Europe can be a net exporter" as if that were a truism. But it's not even true, not in principle and evidently not in practice. It turns out it is quite possible for every country in the euro to run a trade surplus.

Its only impossible for every country in a closed economy to run either a positive or negative current account balance simultaneously owing to accounting identity.

What it means for the EZ as a whole to be running a current account surplus is that other counties must offset this with a deficit.

Not all countries in the global economy can offset domestic private saving desire wrt to net financial assets through the external sector, without relying on fiscal deficits. So the result is some countries running current account surpluses and aiming at fiscal balance, while other must run current account deficits and fiscal deficits in that case.

China, Japan and Germany are chronic net exporters, and the EZ project is for the entire EZ to become a net exporter too. How long is that viable politically for countries that run chronic courant account deficits before there is a reaction?

Of course, it's not really an issue economically if other countries offset the resultant importation of unemployment in the form of embedded labor by running larger fiscal deficits to maintain effective demand sufficient for full employment, but that is considered to be a off the table politically in the currency environment. 74% in the US are favorable to a balanced budget amendment, for example (without understanding the consequences).

This doesn't appear to be a sustainable course for globalization given the current mindset, even though the net importers are getting the benefit in real terms, receiving other countries resources and having foreign workers to the work, too.

But if a country the like the US were smart, it would welcome the advantage in real terms and run a fiscal deficit sufficient to offset net saving desire and manage effective demand at full resource utilization including human resources. But that seem to be too much to ask politically in the current environment.

Friday, May 11, 2012

Ramanan comments on operation reality in fx

One will always find government debt in foreign currency for a nation having external issues. After the Bretton Wood system broke down and nations freely floating their currencies, they realized it is actually difficult to just float and let the fx markets find the clearing price. Hence there is official intervention in the currency markets, issuance of debt in foreign currency, holding of foreign reserves etc. Most people look at official intervention as the central bank preventing the price from falling too much but it’s more than that. It clears markets and prevents a prophecy to build up. For example if the currency falls, it may lead to expectations building leading to further outflows. So I saw STF in the mikenormaneconomics thread saying that the government didn’t behave in an MMT prescribed way and such – but it is impossible for the Treasury of most nations to behave that way. It’s “operational reality”.
Ramanan in a comment at Modern Monetary Realism

According to MMT, there are two constraints on a currency sovereign, inflation rate and fx rate. There continues to be disagreement over the conception of the fx rate, in that the MMT position is generally understood to be that in a non-convertible flexible rate monetary system, floating rates are self-correcting so that markets will always clear for a currency the issuer of which does not take on foreign debt or fix its fx rate. While some qualifications are added, opponents do not believe they are sufficient and a more detailed analysis is necessary.

Ramanan and others dispute the MMT stance, holding that it needs to be carefully qualified with respect to the general case and specific instances, with the US being a special case that cannot be extended to many other countries, and that even the US cannot presume to enjoy its "special privilege" forever without capital flight and therefore exogenous pressure to raise interest rates to attract capital and curtail demand in order to decrease imports.

I hope I summarized both positions correctly. Please correct me if I did not.

Monday, January 9, 2012

Michael Pettis on understanding global trade in terms of current and capital account balances


Europe’s underlying problem is not budget deficits or even unsustainable debt.  These are mainly symptoms.  The real problem with Europe is the huge divergence in costs between the core and the periphery – in the past decade costs between Germany and some of the peripheral countries have diverged by anywhere from 20% to 40%.  This divergence has made the latter uncompetitive and has resulted in the massive trade imbalances within Europe.
Trade imbalances, of course, are the obverse of capital imbalances, and the surge in debt in peripheral Europe in the past decade – debt owed ultimately to Germany and the other core countries – was the inevitable consequence of those capital flow imbalances.  While European policymakers alternatively sweat and shiver over fiscal deficits, surging government debt, and collapsing banks, there is almost no prospect of their resolving the European crisis until they address the divergence in costs.  Of course if they don’t resolve this problem, the problem will be resolved for them in the form of a break-up of the euro.
The best resolution, and the one Keynes urged without success on the US in the 1920s and 1930s, is that Germany take steps to reverse its trade surplus....
Read the rest at China Financial Markets
If no trade reversal now, then when?
by Michael Pettis