Monday, November 7, 2011

The Austrian View of "Destructive Inflationism"


I was struck last week by a question posed by CNBC’s Simon Hobbs to Marc Faber - investor, analyst and financial writer extraordinaire:  “In Steve Jobs’ new autobiography, Walter Isaacson talks about a conversation that he had with Rupert Murdoch, and Steve Jobs says that for commentary and analysis the axis today is not liberal versus conservative.  The axis now is constructive versus destructive.  Which side of that line do you think you fall on?”
I’ll assume that Mr. Hobbs sees Marc Faber residing more in the “destructive” camp – and I presume many would consider my analysis “destructive” as well.  We’re now in this strange and uncomfortable period of heightened angst, anger and vilification, whether it is in Athens, throughout Europe, or across the U.S. from New York City to Oakland, California.  European policymakers have been keen to blame short-sellers and speculators for their bond market woes.  The rating agencies are under attack on both sides of the Atlantic.  And analysts such as Mr. Faber and myself are generally viewed with contempt by those determined to view the world through rose-colored glasses.

From Websters:   “Destructionist:  One who delights in destroying that which is valuable; one whose principles and influence tend to destroy existing institutions; a destructive.”

I tend to view the recent use of “destructionist” in similar light to the vilification of the so-called “liquidationists” and “Bubble poppers” (a Bernanke term) from the spectacular “Roaring Twenties” boom and bust cycle.  There are those who believe that enlightened policymaking can implement an inflationary cycle and successfully grow out of debt problems.  And then there are others that see failed policy doctrine and Credit Inflation as the root cause of a dangerous dynamic that risks a catastrophic end.  Revisionist history has been especially unfair to Andrew Mellon and other “Bubble poppers” that warned of the impending dangers associated with the runaway monetary, Credit and speculative excess in the years immediately preceding the 1929 crash.

I am of the view that inflationary policy doctrine (“inflationism”) is in the process of impairing the Creditworthiness of the financial claims that constitute the foundation of the global financial system.  Massive issuance of non-productive debt and central bank monetization have irreparably distorted the global pricing of finance and the resulting allocation of financial and real resources.  This backdrop has nurtured destructive speculative dynamics.  From my perspective, it is the “destructionist” forces of “inflationism” that today pose grave risk to global Capitalism.  And, to be sure, the “socialism” of Credit risk is at the heart of the monetary and economic quagmires imperiling Europe, the U.S and nations around the world.

From Wikipedia:  “Destructionism is a term used by Ludwig Von Mises, a classical liberal economist, to refer to policies that consume capital but do not accumulate it. It is the title of Part V of his seminal work Socialism. Since accumulation of capital is the basis for economic progress (as the capital stock of society increases, the productivity of labor rises, as well as wages and standards of living), Von Mises warned that pursuing socialist and statist policies will eventually lead to the consumption and reliance on old capital, borrowed capital, or printed ‘capital’ as these policies cannot create any new capital, instead only consuming the old.”

From the “Austrian” perspective, runaway Credit booms destroy wealth instead of creating it.  There is as well an important facet of inequitable wealth redistribution that returns to haunt the system come the unavoidable bursting of the Bubble and the associated devaluation of “printed capital.”  I believe the current course of reflationary policymaking is doomed specifically because the ongoing massive expansion (inflation) of financial claims is not associated with a corresponding increase in capital investment and real wealth-creating capacity.  Governments around the world are – and will be in the future – required to issue massive amounts of new debt to sustain maladjusted financial and economic structures, in the processes prolonging wealth-destructive over-consumption and destabilizing global imbalances.  The “Austrians” use the apt analogy of consuming one’s furniture for firewood....
Read the rest at The Prudent Bear
Destructive, Destructionism And Inflationism
Commentary by Doug Noland

Noland summarizes the contemporary Austrian approach typified by economist Marc Faber. MMT assignment: Pick out the similarities and differences in the Austrian and MMT approaches to Minsky's Ponzi finance.

6 comments:

Anonymous said...

If I understand Minsky correctly, he did not think that a credit bubble had to be driven by a policy of monetary "inflation" (the Austrians just use the word "inflation" to refer to an increase in the money supply). He thought it was part of the normal trend of a capitalist financial system that - unless the system is very well regulated - financiers would gradually move over time first into speculative lending and then Ponzi lending. The unregulated system is inherently unstable and tends toward fragility.

There is nothing that prevents a person in need of cash from making a promise and selling it to someone - money supply or no money supply. And there is nothing that prevents a buyer with visions of dollars dancing in his head from buying a promise with a weak foundation. The buyers of promises might then make other promises to other people. At each stage in the chain of leverage, some information is lost, some integrity is lost and some prudence is lost. Large and important players begin to suspect the shoddiness and underlying weakness of the promises they have purchased, and that increases their incentive to trade on their still-existing reputations to dump those promises onto yet others. Eventually you have a very unstable tower of leverage with each floor heavier, but more flimsily constructed than the floor beneath it. The fragility of the structure becomes an open secret. At that point almost any kind of shock can cause it to collapse.

marris said...

> The buyers of promises might then make other promises to other people. At each stage in the chain of leverage, some information is lost, some integrity is lost and some prudence is lost.

I don't think you can build leverage this way. Each purchase just pushes dollars around.

To get leverage, you need money substitute creation in credit markets. Traditionally, this is banks issuing loans which are much larger than their cash reserve. It could also occur through the heavy use of margin accounts. Bubbles occur when this "new money" is used to bid up prices.

Anonymous said...

"I don't think you can build leverage this way. Each purchase just pushes dollars around."

Hi Marris,

I don't see why you need actual money - even endogenously created bank money - to bid up the prices. You can swap debt liabilities for other debt liabilities, which can in turn be exchanged for further liabilities. The new promises themselves can bid up the swap prices for the old promises.

marris said...

If you have offsetting credit creation, then you can get high leverage. For example, a market maker in some credit market can issue offsetting swap contracts.

However, I think you'd still need "net money" to provide the net cash flows. If I'm the short side and the asset value drops, I'm going to need to pay some money.

Maybe you're saying that the short holders can postpone this by selling new debt to the long holders? Maybe...

Oliver said...

To loosely quote Minsky from 'Stabilizing an Unstable Economy' he says: 'maybe inflation is the price we must pay for stability'. He also coined the phrase 'big government' in that book, I believe. His definition of the term 'big' is of purely financial (quantitative), not interventionist (qualitative) nature. My own interpretation is that what Austrians call 'bad debt' should be left to 'drop off the top', whereas NEW good debt must be financed from the bottom through 'big government'. The common ground in the analysis is that what has happened hitherto does not satisfy the above quality standards. It's qualitative aspects as well as underlying social norms that set the Austrian and MMT analyses apart. Minsky would say they're making 'bold assumptions' that may hold on paper but are far to harsh to be politically feasible or even humane.

Calgacus said...

From later in the article: And, importantly, the markets perceive that the Fed, ECB, People’s Bank of China, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, and other global central bankers will continue to monetize (accumulate) this debt – in the process ensuring stable valuation and abundant liquidity in the marketplace (“moneyness”).

One of these things is not like the others,
One of these things just doesn't belong,
Can you tell which thing is not like the others
By the time I finish my song?