Daniel Little — Is ontology an apriori field of knowledge?

The question I am raising here is one of philosophical methodology: what kind of epistemic basis is available for formulating and defending a theory of ontology? How can we claim to know various truths about the nature of reality?

There seem to be three possibilities.

• Apriori philosophical argument: derive conclusions about the necessary structure of the world from apriori philosophical principles. This is traditional metaphysics, and few philosophers would advocate for it today. (foundationalist theory) 

• Transcendental philosophical argument: arrive at conclusions about what the world must consist of, in order to make sense of our cognitive abilities. This is Kantian metaphysics, which attempts to do without foundational assumptions and to derive conclusions from the prerequisites of epistemic achievements we are known to have. (internalist theory)

• Generalized empirical theorizing: all substantive representations of the world are hypothetical, justified by the contribution they make to our ability to formulate good, empirically supported scientific theories. This is the approach taken by naturalistic philosophers, who maintain that there are no apriori truths and the only vehicle we have for discovering the nature of the world is through scientific imagination and observation. (coherence theory)

Ontology appears to be about the world; but equally it might be considered to be about a set of particularly fundamental concepts and conceptual structures. The question, "What does the world consist of?" can also be presented as the question, "What concepts serve best to represent the hypothetical structure of the world underlying observations?" Concepts are the intellectual tools or schemes through which we analyze the world; and if they refer to unobservable entities, they are unavoidably hypothetical constructs.

As "knowing beings", it has been necessary for human beings to use their imaginations to come up with concepts in terms of which to analyze the world. Some conceptual systems are defective because they lead to expectations about the world that are not born out; other systems are more complex than necessary; yet others postulate entities or processes that we may have reason to want to avoid: magical forces, divine intervention, action-at-a-distance. And when we arrive at a conceptual scheme that appears to serve well as a durable basis for a range of scientific theories, we may want to conclude that the world actually has the properties attributed to it by the scheme....  [emphasis added] 

The philosophical debate is not over such approaches but also the final sentence quoted above. When if ever is it justified to conclude that reality has the characteristics attributed to it in a conceptual model? This involves criteria and unless criteria can be adduced that transcend conceptual modeling, how could such criteria be used to decide questions involving more than one model? In essence this is asking whether there are absolute criteria that are universally compelling? But then would not some other criteria be needed to justify the supposedly absolute criteria? Logically, this leads to either an infinite regress, a vicious circle, or postulating.

If the postulation is not to be arbitrary, however, it must be justified. The rationale is a philosophical position. The foundations of knowledge in general are not only at stake but that in various disciplines. Thus, there is a philosophy of each discipline that examines the foundations.

Economics is no exception, although most conventional economists dismiss both philosophy of economics and the study of methodology as already "decided" by the mainstream, since they take their conceptual framework as most suited to economic realities and their preferred methods as best adapted to the subject matter. Here the criterion is agreement, especially among the dominant members of the field.

Those not agreeing are deemed heterodox. And within heterodoxy, there are different foundational assumptions and methodological approaches.

Understanding Society
Is ontology an apriori field of knowledge?
Daniel Little | chancellor of the University of Michigan-Dearborn, Professor of Philosophy at UM-Dearborn and Professor of Sociology at UM-Ann Arbor

This may appear a bit wonkish if philosophy has not been your thing. But it's worthwhile working through this stuff if you want to understand the foundational nature of the much of the debate on key issues in other fields, including politics and policy. It's also fundamental to understanding framing.