RIA — Breedlove: US Ready To "Fight and Defeat" Russia in Europe

The U.S is ready "to fight and defeat" Russia in Europe, if necessary, said the commander of European command U.S. General Philip Breedlove.

"We are ready, if necessary, to fight and win," — said Breedlove at a hearing of the Committee on armed services of the U.S. house of representatives, to discuss measures to counter "Russian aggression" in Europe.

Fort Russ
Breedlove: US Ready To "Fight and Defeat" Russia in Europe
RIA
Translated by Ollie Richardson for Fort Russ

Putin has already warned that Russia will use nuclear weapons if NATO crosses its red lines.

Ultimately, in pursuing Russia’s goals, Putin is a pragmatist, and we should be too. In figuring out how to deter the United States and NATO, Russia does not have the military or economic resources for the 20th century mass-army, total mobilization approach to defending its interests. As Clifford Gaddy and I outlined in the Coda of our book (in the appendices), Putin has to combine conventional, nuclear, and non-conventional, non-military—so-called “hybrid” methods—to secure an advantage. Putin and his security team aim to intimidate us. They have to demonstrate that Russia has the capacity to act, and is willing to escalate on all fronts to deter the United States and NATO from considering taking any military action against Russia—in Ukraine, Syria, or elsewhere.

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent. Russia’s unclassified national security strategy states that Russia will use nuclear weapons only in response to an attack with weapons of mass destruction on Russia or on a Russian ally, or in the event of an attack on Russia with conventional forces in which the existence of the Russian state is at stake. But Moscow has now put the nuclear option on the table for lesser circumstances, and Putin seeks to make us believe that he will use nuclear weapons if any of the current conflicts seem likely to draw in the United States or NATO against Russian forces. It is no good for Putin to just suggest that he might use nuclear weapons. This is the “escalate to de-escalate” contingency that so many observers are currently concerned about at the non-strategic level (See Steven Pifer’s piece in The National Interest in the appendices). Putin is clearly drawing up a contingency for deploying nuclear weapons if he feels he needs to—but his goal is to push the United States and Europe away from Russia and out of its neighborhood, not to actually engage in a nuclear exchange. Nonetheless, we are now back in a similar frame to the nuclear war scare of the 1980s, which only ended with the Reagan and Gorbachev summitry that led to the conclusion of the 1987 INF Treaty.

Understanding And Deterring Russia: U.S. Policies And Strategies
Dr. Fiona Hill, Senior Fellow,
Director, Center On The United States And Europe
Testimony To The House Armed Services Committee Wednesday, February 10, 2016 

Back to the Cold War, only this time with "the crazies" running US policy.

Update regarding "Russia does not have the military or economic resources for the 20th century mass-army, total mobilization approach to defending its interests."

FIRST GUARDS TANK ARMY. I attended many meetings with the Russian military. Always – always – we were told that the Russian army was being re-structured into brigade group formations: all-arms formations of 5-6 thousand men. Such formations are suitable for fighting in places like Chechnya and, indeed, the first two were formed about 20 years ago in the south. At the same time there were no serious forces deployed along the tradition western invasion route. The old Soviet divisions – pretty well empty of soldiers at this time – were gradually eliminated. It was clear then – the 1990s and early 2000s – that Moscow was not expecting an attack from the west and neither did it expect to attack west: it was planning for smaller operations, mostly counter-terrorist. The old Soviet structure of divisions-armies-fronts which was applicable to really big wars against first-class enemies was no longer necessary; the smaller, nimbler brigade group structure was more appropriate. But, at the same time they warned that NATO’s relentless expansion, ever closer, was a danger (опасность), although they stopped short of calling it, as they did terrorism, a threat (угроза); “dangers” require attention; “threats” a response. NATO of course didn’t listen, arrogantly assuming NATO expansion was doing Russia a favour and was an entitlement of the “exceptional nation” and its allies. Well, we have reached another stage on the road. 

The 1st Guards Tank Army is being re-created. It will likely have two or three tank divisions, plus some motorised rifle divisions, plus enormous artillery and engineering support, plus helicopters and all else. This is a formation to fight a really big war against a first class enemy; designed to deliver the decisive counter-attack (see Stalingrad, Kursk). It will be stationed in the Western Military District to defend Russia against NATO (yes defend! otherwise why didn’t they have it all along?). It will likely be the first to receive receive the new Armata family of AFVs and be staffed with professional soldiers. This is what the light-hearted decision to expand NATO has brought us to. I need hardly say that NATO’s piddling little reinforcement is below the noise level of a tank army. (And pointless, too: a brigade more-or-less is meaningless in a real war and the trip-wire already exists. But NATO is working itself up to a real case of the screaming meemies.) I will probably write more on the significant of this, which is clearer to those with a military background, but here’s something to go on from Southfront. 

Russia Observer
RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP 25 February 2016
Patrick Armstrong

See also

US set on regime change in Russia and will pursue this goal to the bitter end.

Sic Semper Tyrannis
Why is the US so hostile to Russia? Biil Herschel and PL