Showing posts with label asset prices. Show all posts
Showing posts with label asset prices. Show all posts

Sunday, November 10, 2019

Morgan Stanley — "Climate Will Be A Key Driver Of Asset Prices In The Months And Years Ahead"


Anecdotally, several acquaintances have altered their view of future real estate prices and prospects, affecting their decisions on RE purchases and sales to reduce risk in view of expected or demonstrated location exposure. A very small sample, but it seems this could already be happening.

If so, this is where the rubber hits the road.

Zero Hedge
Morgan Stanley: "Climate Will Be A Key Driver Of Asset Prices In The Months And Years Ahead"
Tyler Durden

Sunday, November 2, 2014

Steve Randy Waldman — Some thoughts on QE

I really dislike QE because I have theories about how it actually does work. I think the main channel through which QE has effects is via asset prices. To the degree that QE is taken as a signal of central banks “ease”, it communicates information about the course of future interest rates (especially when paired with “forward guidance”). Prolonging expectations of near-zero short rates reduces the discount rate and increases the value of longer duration assets. This “discount rate” effect is augmented by a portfolio balance effect, where private sector agents reluctant (perhaps by institutional mandate) to hold much cash bid up the prices of the assets they prefer to hold (often equities and riskier debt). Finally, there is a momentum effect. To the degree that QE succeeds at supporting and increasing asset prices, it creates a history that gets incorporated into future behavior. Hyperrationally, modern-portfolio-theory estimates of optimal asset-class weights come to reflect the good experience. Humanly, momentum assets quickly become conventional to hold, andmanagers who fail to bow to that lose prestige, clients, even careers. So QE is good for asset prices, particularly financial assets and houses, and rising asset prices can be stimulative of the economy via “wealth effects”. As assetholders get richer on paper, they spend more money, contributing to aggregate demand. As debtors become less underwater, they become less thrifty and prone to deleveraging. Financial asset prices are also the inverse of long-term interest rates, so high asset prices can contribute to demand by reducing “hurdle rates” for borrowing and investing. Lower long term interest rates also reduce interest costs to existing borrowers (who refinance) or people who would have borrowed anyway, enabling them spend on other things rather than make payments to people who mostly save their marginal dollar. Whether the channel is wealth effects, cheaper funds for new investment or consumption, or cost relief to existing debtors, QE only works if it makes asset prices rise, and it is only conducted while it makes those prices rise in real and not just nominal terms.
I think that the asset prices the Fed was targeting was residential housing. A price correction that wiped out the gains from the bubble would have left many bank insolvent and greatly exacerbated the crisis. So the purpose of QE was to prevent liquidation. This had the collateral effect of driving the price of risky assets such as equities higher than they would have been otherwise, adding to the wealth effect. However, I think that supporting housing price was the real aim of the program rather than a broader wealth effect, which the Fed did not mind since it would likely add to spending as a counter to deleveraging.

Interfluidity
Some thoughts on QE
Steve Randy Waldman

Monday, July 14, 2014

Cameron K. Murray — Krugman vs Bank of England (or QE bails out the rich)

Here’s how the Bank of England summarises the effects on wealth from quantitative easing. 
"By pushing up a range of asset prices, asset purchases have boosted the value of households’ financial wealth held outside pension funds, but holdings are heavily skewed with the top 5% of households holding 40% of these assets."
Which is the exact opposite of Krugman’s point, since he overlooks the prices of assets altogether. And now the BoE’s take on how QE and low interest rates have affected bond holders. 
"By pushing down gilt yields, QE has reduced the annuity rate. But the flipside of that fall in yields has been a rise in the price of both bonds and equities held in those pension pots. Another way of explaining this is that the income flows from a pension pot (dividends in the case of equities and coupons in the case of bonds) will not be reduced by QE. Indeed, if the pension pot contains equities, then the flows could even be higher as a result of increased dividend payments from the boost to the wider economy from QE." 
There you have it. Low interest rates and asset purchases bail out the rich. I hope Krugman reads this and thinks more carefully, because he has a very wide influence in the public debate about these issues.

Fresh Economic Thinking
Krugman vs Bank of England (or QE bails out the rich)
Cameron K. Murray

Thursday, March 28, 2013

Ashwin Parameshwaran — House Prices, The Wealth Effect And Crony Capitalism

As I illustrated in a previous post, “a significant proportion of the balance sheet of wealthy Americans is made up of real assets – real estate, stock and business holdings”. Therefore “what wealthy Americans, businesses and banks share is a common interest in supporting asset prices (real and nominal), a lack of interest in seeking full employment unless it is a prerequisite for supporting asset prices, and an aversion to any policies that can trigger wage inflation”. The fact that our dominant macroeconomic policy doctrine depends upon the ‘wealth effect’ simply reflects the fact that our economy is driven by wealthy special interests. 
The real question again is why there isn’t more mass opposition to such a blatantly regressive policy regime. In previous posts(1, 2), I have argued that crony capitalism achieves broad-based support by piggybacking upon broad-based programs aimed at the middle class. But they also achieve this support due to the absence of a safety net that breeds middle-class insecurity. This carrot-and-stick approach ensures middle-class support for the same stabilising policies that transfer wealth to the one percent.
Got that? Read the rest to see how it is done.

Macroeconomic Resilience — towards a more resilient macroeconomy
House Prices, The Wealth Effect And Crony Capitalism
Ashwin Parameshwaran