Racism is a framework, not a theory — Andrew Gelman

I am posting this for its relevance to philosophy of logic and philosophy of science rather than specifics. It draws a useful distinction between frameworks that generate theories and which are themselves not testable (hence falsifiable) and the theories a framework is used to generate.

This is obviously relevant to philosophy of science, but why philosophy of logic? In his later work, Ludwig Wittgenstein sought to show that the overarching frameworks of a culture as a way of life are deeply embedded in the structure and function of ordinary language.

Such frameworks are "world pictures (Weltbilden) that function as a world view. Although many of the propositions they generate appear to be descriptive, many are normative in operation. For example, the fundamentals of a world views are criteria for valuation and judgment, hence, they are stipulations that cannot be falsified from within that world view. For example, in doing science methodological naturalism is fundamental.

As a result many make the illogical jump from a methodological assumption to a metaphysical assertion (materialism) in neoclassical economics methodological individualism, microfoundations, rational maximization, market forces and equilibrium are key fundamentals that are assumed as criteria. This is a reason that neoclassical economists reject "heterodox economics" out of hand.

World views and ideologies are similar and need to be distinguished. A world view is a way of seeing the world that is embedded in ordinary language based on interpretation of context. They are subconscious and very difficult to articulate since they are the basis for using a language to communicate. This applies even to formalizations to the degree that assumptions are stipulated that link that symbols to life. (Pure math says nothing about the world. It is about how the rules for sign-use work in a particular syntactical system.)

Conversely, ideology is articulated at least in outline and people within a single world view can recognized differences of expression based on competing ideologies. Politics functions in this way, for instance. American liberals and conservatives degree but they function within the same framework.

So the application of the point that statistics professor Andrew Gelman is making goes far beyond the context of racism.

Statistical Modeling, Causal Inference, and Social Science
Racism is a framework, not a theory
Andrew Gelman | Professor of Statistics and Political Science and Director of the Applied Statistics Center, Columbia University

Mark Buchanan — Explaining How Economists Explain

…Itzhak Gilboa and a group of economists … recently tried to understand why their profession operates so differently from most sciences. Academic economists, they say, use the term "explanation" in a way that other scientists never would. Instead of developing realistic and testable theories like those in biology or physics, they often aim only to develop "theoretical cases" -- imaginary mathematical worlds with their own rules of cause and effect.

Formalism versus realism, rationalism versus empiricism. Mainstream economists venture into the ivory tower of the mind much further than most philosophers have been willing to tread for fear of becoming lost in their own musings. Talk about being out of touch. It's full-on bonkers as far as explanation is concerned and is purely syntactical without semantic import, that is, mathematical. I guess they know how to develop cool model of possible worlds though. Just not this one.

Bloomberg View
Explaining How Economists Explain

Mark Buchanan
ht Mark Thoma at Economist's View

Noah Smith — Should theories be testable?

I don't see why we should insist that any theory be testable. After all, most of the things people are doing in math departments aren't testable, and no one complains about those, do they? I don't see why it should matter if people are doing math in a math department, a physics department, or an econ department.

I think testability starts to matter when you start thinking about applying theories to the real world. This is why I get annoyed when people ignore the evidence in business cycle theory, but not when they do it in pure theory.

Suppose you're studying the properties of repeated games. Who cares if those games represent anything that really exists today?… 

But when you start making models that claim to be about some specific real thing (e.g. monetary policy), you're implying that you think those models should be applied. And then, it seems important to me to have some connection to real data, to tell if the theory is a good one to use, or a crappy one to use. That's testability.

Anyway, this sort of seems very college-freshman-dorm-discussion-level when I write it out like this, but I think there are a surprising number of people who don't seem to agree with it...

Exactly.

Science is not a thing but an activity. It's what scientists do. There are three major areas in doing science: 1) theoretical science (aka pure science) focusing chiefly on formalization, 2) experimental science, heavily involving design of experiments, and 3) applied science, e.g., engineering and technology, medicine, policy science, which apply general principles to specific conditions. These are separate fields, notably physics, where theoretical physics is advanced math, and experimental and applied physics are about not only formal knowledge but also practical skill. The three fields require development and use of different knowledge and skills. All are essential the scientific enterprise that results not only in expansion of the knowledge base but also in technological innovation.

What is so difficult to understand about this?

Noahpinion
Should theories be testable?
Noah Smith | Assistant Professor of Finance, Stony Brook University

Lars Syll — Economic models and the relevance of evidence

Neoclassical economics has since long given up on the real world and contents itself with proving things about thought up worlds. Empirical evidence only plays a minor role in economic theory, where models largely function as a substitute for empirical evidence. Hopefully humbled by the manifest failure of its theoretical pretences, the one-sided, almost religious, insistence on axiomatic-deductivist modeling as the only scientific activity worthy of pursuing in economics will give way to methodological pluralism based on ontological considerations rather than formalistic tractability. To have valid evidence is not enough. What economics needs is sound evidence.

Lars P. Syll's Blog
Economic models and the relevance of evidence
Lars P.Syll | Professor, Malmo University