This post is a selective look at Paul Feyerabend, called the worst enemy of science by a 1987 Nature essay. The topic relates directly to the preceding posts on Postmodernismand Thomas Kuhn and is aimed at a discussion of how misunderstood science and misunderstood criticism of science has impacted business and technology.Feyerabend’s direct influence outside of the extended world of philosophy might be seen as fairly limited. But his indirect influence may exceed that of Thomas Kuhn. Unlike Feyerabend, Kuhn was never quoted by a pope.Read it at The Multidisciplinarian
Paul Feyerabend – The Worst Enemy of Science
William Storage | Visiting Scholar, UC Berkeley Center for Science, Technology, Medicine & Society
See also — Paul Feyerabend - "Science's Greatest Enemy" Attacks From The Grave by Hank Campbell at Science 2.0
This is reminiscent of the Chomsky-Derrida kerfuffle at Harvard, as well as analytic philosophers vs. Derrida.
The fact is that all parties are correct within their established universe of discourse and its context. This establishes the frame and in academic disciplines actually can institutionalize a particular frame. Feyerabend and other postmodernists and post-structuralists assert that human knowledge is inherently institutional. This shows up as the distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in all fields, e.g., economics.
In his later work, Ludwig Wittgenstein explored the logic of ordinary language to elucidate how different worldviews erect different logical frames. Cognitive scientists are now discovering the corresponding brain functioning.
26 comments:
I do not see Paul as an enemy of science at all. In my understanding of what he said put in simpler words was that scientific progress comes from "out of the box thinking" and not from "digging the same hole deeper."
I do not see Paul as an enemy of science at all. In my understanding of what he said put in simpler words was that scientific progress comes from "out of the box thinking" and not from "digging the same hole deeper."
Yes, the criticism comes from the "digging the same hole deeper" crowd and the true believers.
Feyerabend and Wittgenstein are interesting cases in point. Both operated within a frame in their earlier work, and what they did then was correct in that frame. Later in their lives, they both came to see how human knowledge is frame dependent, a fact that cognitive science is now corroborating biologically in terms of brain functioning. There is a lot of resistance to this recognition.
great stuff, Tom. I need to start dusting off all the stuff I read in grad school--heterodox economists actually learn this stuff when they are in training.
The worst enemies of science are those that distort original critiques for their own purposes (maybe the pope or people like creationisms).
This indeed is a proof that human perception (not true knowledge, ie. knowledge of truth) is context dependant. We deform truth to the point that backs up our own preconceptions.
This falls under the general heading of what biologists call "phenotypic persistence" - aka, institutional momentum - "IM".
The more interesting issue is the constant dribble of subtle, highly distributed system catalysts that slowly select one mix of IMs over some other permutation.
In complex systems, that's called multi-level selection, and it's progress & speed depends upon what we call novel or altered enzymes in biochemistry, or novel/altered social catalysts in human groups.
In daily practice, it really does "boil" down to the distributed connectivity between people. Winning connectivity patterns are selected by trial & error, through what the DoD calls "Outcomes Based Training" - aka, total group practiced. OBT distributes feedback on what is/isn't adequate upkeep of "new tactics" plus "adequately distributed NEW situational awareness."
Any culture or market really is a melting pot. Progress depends on the factors affecting multiple diffusion gradients. It seems rather magical, but can be usefully modeled with network models.
Some Libertarians, unfortunately, have an ideological block about being part of a dynamic network. If we can get over that part, we'd all be in agreement.
Roger: "Some Libertarians, unfortunately, have an ideological block about being part of a dynamic network. If we can get over that part, we'd all be in agreement."
Yes, left libertarians by and large get this. As a matter of fact following upon the Sixties fairly large numbers recognized that the system was not going to change quickly enough to suit them, so they create an underground culture that has pioneered (literally in many cases) the way, for instance, in green innovation and decentralization.
The fact is that all parties are correct within their established universe of discourse and its context.
Not when their thought "universes" are grounded in the reality of practical action. Then a filtration process occurs and certain thought universes that were originally immunized from refutation, can be revealed as contradictory.
True believers of relativism make a fundamental error.
"The relativistic impression is due to the fact that Kuhn and Feyerabend, typical of empiricists since Locke and Hume, ultimately misconceive of scientific theories as mere systems of verbal propositions and systematically ignore the foundation of these, or of any, propositions in a reality of action and interaction. Only if one regards observations and theories as being completely detached from action and cooperation, not only does any single theory become immunizable, but any two rival theories whose respective terms cannot be reduced to and defined in terms of each other must then appear completely incommensurable and no rational choice is possible. If statements are merely and exclusively verbal expressions hanging in midair, what reason could there be for any one statement to ever give way to another? Any one statement can perfectly well stand alongside any other one without ever being challenged—
unless we simply decide otherwise for whatever arbitrary reason. It is this that Kuhn and Feyerabend demonstrate. But this does not affect the refutability of any one theory and the commensurability of rival theories on the entirely different level of applying these theories in the reality of action, of using them as instruments of action. On the level of mere words, theories may be irrefutable and incommensurable, but practically they can never be. In fact, one could not even state that any single theory was irrefutable or any two theories were incommensurable and in what respect, unless one were to presuppose a common categorical framework that could serve as a basis for such an assessment or comparison. And it is this practical refutability and commensurability of theories of natural science that explains the possibility of technological progress..." - Hoppe, In Defense of Extreme Rationalism, The Review of Austrian Economics, Volume 3, pgs 190-191.
@ Major Freedom
Yes, that is one POV among many.
If a view is self-evident, then it should be universally agreed to across time and cultures. If it is not, then it is not self-evident.
There are no absolute criteria independent of a universe of discourse. Criteria are a subset of the norms that define the boundaries of POV expressed in terms of a universe of discourse and its context.
Tom Hickey:
Yes, that is one POV among many.
You are degrading it when you call it merely a point of view among many.
If a view is self-evident, then it should be universally agreed to across time and cultures.
Should be, yes.
If it is not, then it is not self-evident.
Who says humans are forced to accept true propositions? Humans can choose to accept or reject any proposition. The fact that a certain proposition is accepted or not accepted by everyone, does not in any way detract from its truth.
There are no absolute criteria independent of a universe of discourse.
Except that absolute right there, am I right? Haha.
"Only a sith deals in absolutes" Oops, you're a sith now!
Criteria are a subset of the norms that define the boundaries of POV expressed in terms of a universe of discourse and its context.
Um, yeah, people agree to definitions. So what? That statement you just made presupposes an objective common ground, or else you could not even claim to be saying anything true to others.
For some reason or another, you are antagonistic towards the idea of apodictic knowledge, and in the process of your evading it, you contradict yourself.
Except that absolute right there, am I right? Haha.
No. It is purely analytic. It's truth is logical truth, i.e., logical necessity.
Criteria are rules and rules are context-specific. All these statement are purely analytic, i.e., about definitions and sign-use.
Tom Hickey:
There are no absolute criteria independent of a universe of discourse.
I would like to focus on this statement a little more, because it is highly important.
First, I actually agree with it. Discourse is an action, i.e. it is purposeful behavior. People engaged in discourse are seeking to achieve something (win an argument, find truth, learn more, refure falsehoods, and so on), using scarce means (computer, paper, one's body, time, and so on). The action will generate a profit (actually win, actually find truth, actually learn, actually refute falsehood, and so on), or loss (lose argument, not learn, fail to refute falsehood, and so on).
By the same token, recognizing what we have just recognized, itself requires discourse (even if to oneself). So in this sense, discourse is more fundamental than action. Thus discourse and action are inextricably linked categories that constrain all knowledge.
Moreover, since it is only through action that the mind makes contact with reality, we have a realistic epistemology on our hands! It doesn't say much, but we can be sure it's true.
Second, if you really do hold that there are no absolute criteria independent of a universe of discourse, then you are actually making an apodictic, a priori claim about the real world, that is not merely a verbal definition or floating concept, but a real world practical constraint. This is actually a far cry from Feyerabend's philosophy, which denies such rationalist propositioning, and is essentially epistemological anarchism of anything goes.
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When did you accept the statement: "There are no absolute criteria independent of a universe of discourse"? It doesn't sound like you.
Tom Hickey:
No. It is purely analytic. It's truth is logical truth, i.e., logical necessity.
What about that statement you just made there? Is it saying something about the real world, or is it yet another analytic statement?
If it's another "purely analytic" statement, then I can simply define it differently and call it an empirically false statement.
At what point will you be doing something other than defining terms, and telling me something about the real world? Or is that something you never intended to do in the first place, in which case I should take everything you say as nothing but symbols and letters that are not intended to say anything at all?
Criteria are rules and rules are context-specific. All these statement are purely analytic, i.e., about definitions and sign-use.
What about that statement right there? Is that only a rule of symbol manipulation as well? When will you be using those definitions and symbols to say something about the real world?
Or are we going to stay in thought land, whereby you and I can say anything we want, and none of us can say anything wrong vis a vis reality, and we can only be "wrong" according to a list of agreed to rules and norms? What if we don't agree to your rules or norms? Obviously in order to say anything meaningful, words have to be grounded in something other than mere words.
if you really do hold that there are no absolute criteria independent of a universe of discourse, then you are actually making an apodictic, a priori claim about the real world, that is not merely a verbal definition or floating concept, but a real world practical constraint.
In my view it is a logical constraint, like the "laws" (rules) of identify, non-contradiction, and excluded middle. These are the criteria of inclusion and exclusion in ordinary language ("common sense") universes of discourse. All POV's expressed in ordinary language follow these basic rules, or they are not translatable among those that follow the rules of common sense. Not to follow the rules of common sense is considered nonsense.
There are, of course, nonsense universes of discourse like Alice in Wonderland, and we find amusement in them. Lewis Carroll (pseudonym of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson) was a mathematician and logician having fun.
When did you accept the statement: "There are no absolute criteria independent of a universe of discourse"? It doesn't sound like you.
When I studied logic in grad school.
When I studied logic in grad school.
I guess you must have missed the class where they teach you about the law of non-contradiction then, because you have on many occasions on this blog ridiculed and belittled a priori propositioning as 18th century philosophizing that is not taken seriously anymore by the "experts", and yet now you're espousing an a priori proposition!
Not saying you should not have changed your mind, just saying you seem to have changed your mind, if what you said prior is to be taken seriously.
Tom Hickey:
In my view it is a logical constraint, like the "laws" (rules) of identify, non-contradiction, and excluded middle. These are the criteria of inclusion and exclusion in ordinary language ("common sense") universes of discourse. All POV's expressed in ordinary language follow these basic rules, or they are not translatable among those that follow the rules of common sense. Not to follow the rules of common sense is considered nonsense.
OK, but if we remain in analytic world, then you can't say that anything anyone says is wrong vis a vis reality. You could only ever, at best, say "Hey, what you're saying is not consistent with some unnamed standard that may change over time, and oh, let's just call it "common sense", but bear in mind that "common sense" is not meant to mean fidelity with reality, or truth, or apodictic certainty.
What does "common sense" mean exactly? Accepted by the majority of people? Truth isn't determined by majority vote you know. A trillion people cannot vote square circles into existence.
There are, of course, nonsense universes of discourse like Alice in Wonderland, and we find amusement in them. Lewis Carroll (pseudonym of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson) was a mathematician and logician having fun.
Nonsense according to what standard? If we stay in analytic land, then there is no such thing as nonsense vs common sense propositions. Every proposition would be as equally valid as any other. No proposition can be said to be "wrong" vis a vis reality, and yet it is reality where common sense and nonsense derive.
Major Freedom, as long as I am speaking analytically, then it is about rules governing the use of signs in particular context, e.g., some formal language or ordinary language. This says nothing abut the world.
If I say something about the world, it is within a universe of discourse and context that is bounded by rules. Those sharing the same POV agree on the basic rules.
We are not operating in the same universe of discourse, since I reject some of your rules and you reject some of mine. We are not arguing about facts but over criteria, and that is undecidable since there no over-arching criteria to appeal to.
I can say you are wrong from my POV and you can say I am wrong from yours. There is no higher authority to appeal to.
What does "common sense" mean exactly?
Generally speaking the boundary is acceptance of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle.
Of course there are also vying common sense perspectives based on other rules as defining criteria. The epistemological position of most common sense POV's is naive realism, for example.
There's the analytic-synthetic distinction and the a priori and a posteriori distinction.
I said that the analytic apriori and synthetic a posteriori distinctions are universally accepted, but not the synthetic apriori or the analytic a posteriori. The latter two are "idiosyncratic," and only accepted by a few.
There are rules that look like synthetic a priori propositions from that POV, but the logical analysis of them from the analytic POV is that they function as norms, e.g., criteria for judging the truth of other propositions. They are stipulations in a universe of discourse in which they play a normative role.
I can say you are wrong from my POV and you can say I am wrong from yours. There is no higher authority to appeal to.
Yes, there is: REALITY. POVs can be consistent or inconsistent with reality. Reality is the final judge. You being wrong or me being wrong will be judged by reality. If I believe I can fly, and say that I can fly, and I jump over a cliff, and then die, then this is reality judging my claim to be wrong.
If there is nothing like truth based on common, objective ground, then all of what you said cannot be claimed as true.
Since you seem to be trying to sa something true, since you seem to be presenting your claims as true, then you are falsifying the content of your own statement.
If you are not intending to say anything true, then there is no reason for me to accept what you are saying at all. Indeed, I could not even say that you are definitely saying anything meaningful at all, because that would be a claim to some truth of reality. So I'd have to consider your words as nothing but random symbols that just so happened to form a meaningful statement in my mind, like a million monkeys sitting at typewriters randomly producing Shakespeare.
What you are presenting is extreme intellectual permissiveness.
Tom Hickey:
"What does "common sense" mean exactly?"
Generally speaking the boundary is acceptance of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle.
OK, how about specifically?
Can physical reality violate these laws?
Of course there are also vying common sense perspectives based on other rules as defining criteria. The epistemological position of most common sense POV's is naive realism, for example.
Have we not learned from Wittgenstein that language understood by only one individual is incoherent? That language is a manifestation of objectivity inherent in the interaction between actors, and not merely a person's subjective POV?
There's the analytic-synthetic distinction and the a priori and a posteriori distinction.
I said that the analytic apriori and synthetic a posteriori distinctions are universally accepted, but not the synthetic apriori or the analytic a posteriori. The latter two are "idiosyncratic," and only accepted by a few.
Well to be fair, you did say a bunch of disparaging remarks about "apriorism" without distinction.
There are rules that look like synthetic a priori propositions from that POV, but the logical analysis of them from the analytic POV is that they function as norms, e.g., criteria for judging the truth of other propositions.
There are rules that look like analytic norms, but the praxeological analysis of them show that they are really objective and necessary ones. It is what explains technological advancements and economic progress, as opposed to the stagnation inherent in quibbling and discourse divorced from real world practical affairs.
They are stipulations in a universe of discourse in which they play a normative role.
You already said that, which I responded with:
Not when these thought "universes" are grounded in the reality of practical action. Then a filtration process occurs and certain thought universes that were originally immunized from refutation, can be revealed as objectively false vis a vis reality.
Major Freedom, here is how I got to my present position. When I entered grad school in philosophy in a school that emphasized the historical approach, I was a committed neo-Thomist (after Jacques Maritain)— a position which is based on an Aristotelian view as developed by Thomas Aquinas. The crux of the issue is how we know reality, the basis in this view is through intellectual intuition as well as sense intuition, which is similar to Kant's view excepting that one is directly in contact with "things in themselves" instead. One the other hand, Kant rejected intellectual intuition like most moderns and so he substituted the structuring of "transcendental" conditions and categories. It is the "transcendental" aspect of mental function that provides a priori apodicity rather than judgment informed by intellectual intuition.
I approached my studies this why and was pretty dogmatic about my position. Well, it didn't take long for my profs to let me know that this what not what they want on a papers having to do with major philosophers in history, One had to get into their POV and show that one understood how the logic worked instead of picking points to criticize
I soon came to realize that there are a lot of ways to look at the world, and the historical philosophers were really providing an articulation of these POV's and how they worked.
When I first read Hume I thought his work was was puerile in comparison, but in the end I came to see that Hume was correct about logic and sense experience providing the only publicly available criteria — and even they are infected to a degree with subjectivity when one looks at the nuance. Kant picked up on that in elaborating the theory of knowledge in the Critique.
I aslo came to see that each system set up norms in terms of which the POV was "irrefutable." But I also found that there are no overarching criteria for deciding which is correct.
There are two criteria that just about every well-educated person accepts, however. Logic and science, which is basically "positivism." Positivism is position, too, that holds the this is all humans are capable of knowing. But that doesn't follow either. Their could be a correct position that cannot be shown to be true based on either a logical proof or an empirical warrant.
(continued)
(continuation)Just about everyone who is reflective develops a position that they regard is at least highly likely to be true, although they cannot show this based on any generally accepted criteria. Others just buy into an existing position and are convinced that it is absolutely certain. But this is belief or opinion and not knowledge.
You say reality will decide. But how? Suppose a philosophy should conquer the world and be forced on everyone in it as some fundamentalists in the various religions think will inevitably happen. If it did, would that prove them correct?
No POV can be shown to be correct theoretically because all POVs are based on norms and norms are relative to POV's and different norms establish different POV's. And because all POV's are norm-based none are purely objective, norms being inherently subjective. There are even different analytic systems, like modal and multi-value logics, and non-Euclidian geometries that find use in scientific description of events.
This position is not really controversial among historians of philosophy or logicians, but it seems counter-intuitive to most people because they believe that there is an absolute truth — and that they have it.
I hold to a particular POV that I think is largely correct, but I also reserve the right to change it, or even change my mind altogether. Even scientists admit that scientific truth is tentative wrt future discoveries, and science is supposedly the most secure knowledge of the world that humans have developed. If science is not absolute, why should any POV be absolute based on criteria relative to it.
Dogmatists do not do that. Changing the POV is heresy and leaving it for another is apostasy.
I can also look at the world though different lenses if I choose to do so. In fact, when I write here I very seldom reveal my actual POV but speak within the prevailing universe of discourse relevant to policy today.
Can physical reality violate these laws?
This was a problem with quantum mechanics, as a matter of fact.
Have we not learned from Wittgenstein that language understood by only one individual is incoherent? That language is a manifestation of objectivity inherent in the interaction between actors, and not merely a person's subjective POV?
LW show that there cannot be a private language for lack of stable criteria. He also showed how people sharing a similar POV construct a universe of discourse reflective of that POV, which he called a "worldview."
There can be overlapping worldviews, but any sharing of worldviews is only possible among the same or similar "forms of life." Other organism apparently share linformation, but humans can only guess about it from outside.
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