Thursday, April 6, 2017

William Craddick — Evidence Calls Western Narrative About Syrian Chemical Attack Into Question


One of the first attempts to produce evidence regarding the alleged gas attack in Syria. William Craddick has an undergraduate degree in international relations from Wheaton and a law degree from Pepperdine.

Disobedient Media
Evidence Calls Western Narrative About Syrian Chemical Attack Into Question
William Craddick | Editor-in-Chief and founder of Disobedient Media

3 comments:

Salsabob said...

Evidence? Somebody said something on Twitter? Assad couldn't have held back chemical stores but somehow the rebels got a hold of it and did? And, of course, White Helmet trashing really proves something, right?

What hogwash.

Check this Tweet from a Guardian reporter on scene -
https://twitter.com/kshaheen/status/850065642791284737

"I visited in Khan Sheikhoun the warehouse that Russia said manufactured chemical weapons. Nothing but empty grain silos, dust and rubble."

And another with video -
https://twitter.com/HadiAlabdallah

- that crater in the pavement is exactly what a chemical munition impact would leave behind; blown up factory, not so much.

Salsabob said...

Nice front page photo of the munition crater -
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/05/syria-chemical-weapons-attack-what-we-know-khan-sheikhun

Maybe it was a micro-factory/warehouse with very tiny Oompa-Loompas that specialize in Sarin?

Your MMT bonafides are awesome. The Putin fanboys crapola, not so much.

Salsabob said...

More from the Guardian -

Russia has denied that Syria launched a chemical weapons attack. Does their argument have any credibility?
Syria’s military has “categorically denied” responsibility for the attack. Russia, which is heavily backing the Assad government, said a Syrian government airstrike had hit a “terrorist warehouse” holding “toxic substances”.

That claim does not fit with facts on the ground, for several reasons. An airstrike on a weapons depot with high explosives would have destroyed much of the sarin immediately, and distributed any that survived over a much smaller area.

“The pattern of casualties isn’t right for the distribution of materials that you would get if you had a location with toxic materials breached by an airstrike. It’s more consistent with canisters that have distributed [chemical weapons] over a wider population,” Guthrie said.

While it is impossible to assess the exact amount of chemical agent used immediately, the extent and distribution of the casualties are consistent with the use of hundreds of kilos.

Sarin is too complicated and expensive for rebels to have manufactured themselves, and while they might potentially have obtained some supplies of stolen nerve agents or other gas, it is very unlikely to be more than a few kilos.

“If they have [sarin], it would be in minute quantities, maybe a kilo or so,” said De Bretton Gordon. The high numbers of woman and children among the casualties was not consistent with a military depot, he added.

Finally, the Syrian manufacturing process for sarin involves creating and storing two key components, both far more stable than the nerve agent itself. They are mixed to create sarin hours – or at most days – before it is used, said Dan Kaszeta, a chemical weapons expert and former officer in the US Army’s chemical corps.

So an airstrike on a storage facility would be unlikely to release sarin itself. And because one of the two components is highly flammable isopropyl alcohol, or rubbing alcohol, you would expect a fireball, which has not been observed.