Bill Mitchell – billy blog
Prime Minister Corbyn should have no fears from global capital markets
Bill Mitchell | Professor in Economics and Director of the Centre of Full Employment and Equity (CofFEE), at University of Newcastle, NSW, Australia
An economics, investment, trading and policy blog with a focus on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). We seek the truth, avoid the mainstream and are virulently anti-neoliberalism.
Asian economies are commended for improving their external balances and building self-insurance by accumulating large amounts of reserves. However, whether these would be sufficient to provide adequate protection against a reversal of capital flows is contentious. After the Asian crisis external vulnerability came to be assessed in terms of adequacy of reserves to meet short-term external dollar debt. However, short-term debt is not always the most important source of drain on reserves. Currencies can come under stress if there is a significant foreign presence in domestic markets and the capital account is open for residents. A rapid exit could create significant turbulence even though losses from declines in assets and currencies fall on foreign investors and mitigate the drain of reserves.
In all four Asian countries directly hit by the 1997 crisis, international reserves now meet short-term external dollar debt. But they do not always leave much room to accommodate a sizeable and sustained exit of foreigners from domestic markets and capital flight* by residents.* "Capital flight" in an environment of free capital flow means selling the domestic currency in the foreign exchange market for a foreign currency and depositing this in foreign financial institutions. This depresses the exchange value of the domestic currency and lowers the price of the domestic assets being sold. In volume ("rushing for the door"), this puts pressure on domestic economies owing to existing commitments. It does not mean taking the domestic currency out of the country.
Zhang Yuting lives and works in Shanghai, has only visited the United States once, and rarely needs to use foreign currency. But that hasn’t stopped the 29-year-old accountant from putting a slice of her bank savings into the greenback.
She is not alone. In the first 11 months of 2016, official figures show that foreign currency bank deposits owned by Chinese households rose by almost 32 percent, propelled by the yuan's recent fall to eight-year lows against the dollar.
The rapid rise - almost four times the growth rate for total deposits in the yuan and other currencies as recorded in central bank data – comes at a time when the yuan is under intense pressure from capital outflows. The outflows are partially a result of concerns that the yuan is going to weaken further as U.S. interest rates rise, and because of lingering concerns about the health of the Chinese economy.Reuters
Everyone knows that 2015 was a terrible year for emerging markets – but exactly how bad it was has become clear only recently. Not only was it an annus horribilis in terms of net exports of goods and services, which declined sharply and even turned negative for some previously buoyant exporters, but it was also a time when capital flows reversed course. The downturns in both indicators have been much more widespread and substantial than they were initially expected to be, and even greater than mid-year assessments suggested.…Naked Capitalism
Chinese officials insist solemnly that the new basket rate is the “decided policy of China” and will be upheld come what may, but concerns are mounting that they may be overwhelmed by market forces.The Telegraph
The crucial question is whether the exodus of money is chiefly a one-off move by Chinese companies and investors to pay off dollar debt - and to unwind "carry trade" positions in dollars – as the US Federal Reserve raises interest rates and drains liquidity. If so, the outflows are largely benign and should make the world’s financial system safer.
Mark Tinker, head of equities for AXA Framlington in Asia, said the bulk of the outflows are to pay off liabilities. “Chinese corporates are issuing corporate bonds in record quantities and using the capital to restructure their balance sheets, both onshore and offshore. This is not capital flight, it is asset liability matching, both duration and currency. It is a good thing being presented as a bad thing,” he said.…
What Xi is running up against is what international economists call the trilemma, or the impossible trinity. It says that a country can’t have all three of the following things at once: a flexible monetary policy, free flows of capital, and a fixed exchange rate. They fight one another. As soon as China started allowing free (or at least freer) flows of capital, it was inevitable that it would have to give up on one of the other two objectives. If it wanted to keep the yuan from falling, it would have to raise interest rates higher than is good for the domestic economy, essentially giving up on setting an appropriate monetary policy. Or, if it wanted to set interest rates as it pleased, it would have to allow the yuan to sink.Drop the dollar peg and let the yuan float, like Russia did.
Due to sanctions instead of rolling over their debt like everyone else does Russian companies are forced to repay it. Also means that unlike everyone else they're going to have very little debt.
Countries in the euro area periphery such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain saw large-scale capital flight in 2011 and the first half of 2012. While events unfolded much like a balance of payments crisis, the contraction in domestic credit was less severe than would ordinarily be caused by capital flight of this scale. Why was that? An important reason is that much of the capital flight was financed by credits to deficit countries’ central banks, with those credits extended collectively by other central banks in the euro area. This balance of payments financing was paired with policies to supply liquidity to periphery commercial banks. Absent these twin lifelines, periphery countries would have had to endure even steeper recessions from the sudden withdrawal of foreign capital.Federal Reserve Bank of New York — Liberty Street Economics
In the last issue of my newsletter much of the first half was dedicated to a discussion of recent events in Spain and Italy and why they reinforce the argument that several countries will be forced to leave the euro and restructure their debt. The most worrying, but expected, fact was the amount of capital fleeing the afflicted countries. I cited an article in Spiegel that claims that in the past year an amount equal to nearly 30% of Spain’s GDP had left the country. Flight capital is both a major result of declining credibility and a major cause of further declining credibility, and because it is so intensively reinforcing it is a major warning signal.
This matters for China for at least two reasons. First, a worsening Europe will make it harder than ever for China to rebalance growth away from investment, and second, China itself is experiencing capital flight.China Financial Markets
Capital flight from Greece continues, €5bn in May, not counting orders to buy foreign bonds. The exodus now includes cashing out time deposits as reported by the Financial Times in Greek banks see steady deposits outflow.Read it at Mish's Global Economic Trends Analysis
The discussion of a corralito in Spain has reached the newspapers. EL PAIS has published an article about the government renouncing the idea today. A corralito limits the amount of cash that you can withdraw from bank accounts. (Later, the corralón translated your dollar-backed pesos into free-floating peso denominated government bonds.) The discussion is part of the problems that would come with a break-up of the euro. In theory, a break-up would see national currencies reinserted. The easiest way to do this is by converting bank accounts back to, say, the nueva peseta. The nueva peseta would be worth less than the equivalent amount of euros since this is the whole point of the exercise. The currency must depreciate in order to regain competitiveness.Read the rest at econoblog101
Therefore, if people would move their euros abroad in expectation of a corralito – which was introduced shortly before Argentina lifted the dollar peg – these euros would keep their value. Once people realize this, a bank run is what is next.
One will always find government debt in foreign currency for a nation having external issues. After the Bretton Wood system broke down and nations freely floating their currencies, they realized it is actually difficult to just float and let the fx markets find the clearing price. Hence there is official intervention in the currency markets, issuance of debt in foreign currency, holding of foreign reserves etc. Most people look at official intervention as the central bank preventing the price from falling too much but it’s more than that. It clears markets and prevents a prophecy to build up. For example if the currency falls, it may lead to expectations building leading to further outflows. So I saw STF in the mikenormaneconomics thread saying that the government didn’t behave in an MMT prescribed way and such – but it is impossible for the Treasury of most nations to behave that way. It’s “operational reality”.Ramanan in a comment at Modern Monetary Realism
“We are caught, it seems, in one of those self-reinforcing loops that almost always presage a collapse.”– Michael Pettis, China Financial Markets
Germany’s “failed” bund auction on Wednesday was a real gamechanger. It means that Europe’s biggest and most powerful economy will not escape the contagion that’s swept across the south. Germany’s borrowing costs will rise and it’s finances will be put under a microscope. But that’s just the half of it. What’s roiling the markets is that investors are now pricing in the probability of a eurozone breakup. That’s what all the commotion is about; the nightmare scenario is beginning to unfold....