Economic Policy Institute — Labor Day Series

Economic Policy Institute

Black workers endure persistent racial disparities in employment outcomes

Part of the series Labor Day 2019: How Well Is the American Economy Working for Working People? Summary: Black workers are twice as likely to be unemployed as white workers overall (6.4% vs. 3.1%). Even black workers with a college degree are more likely to be unemployed than similarly educated white workers (3.5% vs. 2.2%). When they are employed, black workers with a college or advanced degree 3h

Working people have been thwarted in their efforts to bargain for better wages by attacks on unions

Part of the series Labor Day 2019: How Well Is the American Economy Working for Working People? Summary: The share of workers represented by unions has dropped by more than half since 1979—from 27.0% to 11.7% in 2018. Not coincidentally, the share of income going to the top 10% has escalated in this period—these high earners now capture nearly half of all income. The decline of unions is not beca3h

Low-wage workers are suffering from a decline in the real value of the federal minimum wage

Part of the series Labor Day 2019: How Well Is the American Economy Working for Working People? Summary: The real value of the federal minimum wage has dropped 17% since 2009 and 31% since 1968. Workers earning the federal minimum wage today have $6,800 less per year to spend on food, rent, and other essentials than did their counterparts 50 years ago. Some states have raised their minimum wages 3h

Wage growth is being held back by political decisions and the Trump administration is on the wrong side of key debates

Part of the series Labor Day 2019:The fact that the unemployment rate has averaged 3.8% over the past year (its lowest 12-month average since 1970) might make one think that times are flush for American workers and that there is widespread agreement that the U.S. economy is being well managed by elected officials. But while times are better for workers today than they were 10, five, or even three years ago, a crucial ingredient for workers’ well-being—faster-growing wage growth—still hasn’t appeared. This wage failure might be why the public seems unwilling to give President Trump (and his Republican supporters in Congress) credit as good economic managers despite today’s low unemployment rate. In fact, the president and his supporters in Congress are responsible for a number of policy decisions that will reliably harm workers’ future prospects for wage growth.1

The declining labour share of income: Accounting for the main factors — Jan Mischke, Hans‐Helmut Kotz, Jacques Bughin

Since the 1980s, labour compensation relative to aggregate output has been on an inexorable downward trend across major developed economies. This column deploys a simple accounting technology to tease out the driving factors behind this, focusing on the US. The findings highlight the key role of under-appreciated factors, including supercycles and boom-bust effects and rising depreciation. The analysis suggests that while the effect of some factors may dampen or reverse, others will likely continue at an uncertain pace.…

More factors to consider. The most provocative claim is that commonly accepted major factors turn out not to be the major factors in the causal mix.

Vox.EU
The declining labour share of income: Accounting for the main factors

Jan Mischke, Hans‐Helmut Kotz, Jacques Bughin

The Great Paradox: Liberalism Destroys the Market Economy —Heiner Flassbeck

Another paradox of liberalism arising from equation of economic liberalism with capitalism and of economic liberalism as equatable with political liberalism as representative democracy. The rise of interest in social democracy now no accident of history but rather a logical progression of the historical dialectic?

Flassbeck Economics
The Great Paradox: Liberalism Destroys the Market Economy

Heiner Flassbeck

Darren Williams — «How Populism Affects Our Business»

Most important, after a 40-year period in which capital has won out decisively over labor, there is much likelihood that global economic policy is to shift back in a much less business-friendly direction. Not only will that weigh on economic growth, but it’s also likely to push inflation higher. And that’s something markets are not currently prepared for.

Finenews
Darren Williams: «How Populism Affects Our Business»

Darren Williams | Global Economic Research Group for Fixed Income

McKinsey — A new look at the declining labor share of income in the United States

Labor’s share of national income—that is, the amount of GDP paid out in wages, salaries, and benefits—has been declining in developed and, to a lesser extent, emerging economies since the 1980s. This has raised concerns about slowing income growth, inequality, and loss of the consumer purchasing power that is needed to fuel demand in the economy. The decline has been much discussed and the rising power of companies vis-à-vis workers—whether from new technology, globalization, the hollowing out of labor unions, or market consolidation—has shaped much of that discussion.

The labor share of income in 35 advanced economies fell from around 54 percent in 1980 to 50.5 percent in 2014.

In A new look at the declining labor share of income in the United States (PDF–849KB) we examine the relative importance of different factors in the United States through a focus on the complement of the labor share decline—that is, the rise in capital share of income. We decompose this into the role of depreciation, capital-to-output ratios, and returns on invested capital. Linking this decomposition with a microanalysis of 12 key sectors allows us to identify the relative importance of the factors that have contributed to the labor share decline. While our findings confirm the relevance of the most commonly cited factors, including globalization and technology adoption, they also suggest that additional trends often absent from the current debate—including boom and bust effects from commodity and real estate cycles and rising depreciation, including from a shift to more intangible capital such as intellectual property—played an even more central role.

McKinsey
A new look at the declining labor share of income in the United States

See also

Jason Hickel
HOW NOT TO MEASURE INEQUALITY

Mark Paul and Mark Stelzner — Rethinking collective action and U.S. labor laws in a monopsonist economy

Discussions today are pervasive among economists and policymakers about the increasing rise of firms’ market power and the potential negative effects of that power on the U.S. economy. Of particular concern is the rise of new technologies and the dominance of platform giants—such as Amazon.com Inc., Alphabet Inc.’s Google unit, Apple Inc., and Uber Technologies Inc., among others—which are not improving the U.S. socioeconomic landscape by reaping gains from potential economies of scale, but rather are throwing around their weight to suppress wages, raise prices on consumers, and enter the political arena to ensure the federal government allows the U.S. economy to continue on the path of market consolidation.

Many economists point to this disconcerting rise in market power as leading to a simultaneous rise in monopsony power—the ability of the firm to have an influence over the determination of workers’ wages—which may contribute to the persistence of stagnant wages despite relatively low headline unemployment numbers in recent times.

This is in stark contrast to decades of research and modeling in economics following the so-called marginalist revolution in the discipline, which resulted in most economists simply treating monopsony power as a special case only existing in the now long-gone company towns of Homestead, Pennsylvania, and Pullman, Illinois, of the 19th century or in highly concentrated island economies of introductory economics textbooks.4

Recent empirical investigations into U.S. labor markets no longer allow reasonable economists to bury their heads in the sand about market power and assume that workers’ wages are simply equal to the value of their marginal product or service. There’s now insurmountable evidence that monopsony power is prevalent throughout the U.S. economy, though the degree to which it may contribute to widening income inequality and underemployment remains an open question. These findings imply that employers can siphon off “rents”—economic parlance for excessive profits beyond the cost of production—from workers through the exercise of monopsony power. These findings are the complete opposite of the dynamic formulated in most current labor market models.

In our new Washington Center for Equitable Growth working paper, “Monopsony and Collective Action in an Institutional Context,” we seek to better understand the theoretical implications of this new and growing empirical literature on monopsony power and the resulting lower wages for workers

WCEG — The Equitablog
Rethinking collective action and U.S. labor laws in a monopsonist economy

Mark Paul, assistant professor of economics at New College of Florida and a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute, and Mark Stelzner, assistant professor of economics at Connecticut College

See also

Oxfam Blogs — From Poverty to Power
Book Review: New Power: How it’s Changing the 21st Century and Why you need to KnowDuncan Green, strategic adviser for Oxfam GB

Jason Smith — Unions, inequality, and labor share

The information transfer model tracks this pretty well.

Information Transfer Economics
Unions, inequality, and labor share
Jason Smith

Jason Smith — Women in the workforce and labor shar

Most stories told about this declining labor share of national income is about capital claiming it for themselves — and on the surface, that's essentially what is happening. A major surge in output in the 70s went disproportionately to capital instead of labor.

However, let's take a step back and think about the cause of that surge in output: women entering the workforce (see links here or here). If that's the cause, then the difference in the shock to NGDP and to wages could be almost entirely accounted for by the fact that women make on the order of 70% as much as men for the same job. As women entered the workforce, the same output growth would go towards more income for capital by pocketing that extra 30%. A back of the envelope calculation shows it's the correct order of magnitude (about 5 percentage points). It's not declining unions or deregulation, but rather simply adding more people that are paid less because of sexism behind the decline in labor share of national income. At least that's the hypothesis.

Information Transfer Economics
Women in the workforce and labor share
Jason Smith

David F. Ruccio — Marx ratio

First there was the Great Gatsby curve. Then there was the Proust index. Now, thanks to Neil Irwin, we have the Marx ratio.

Each, in their different way, attempts to capture the ravages of contemporary capitalism. But the Marx ratio is a bit different. It was published in the New York Times. Its aim is to capture one of the underlying determinants of the obscene levels of inequality in the United States today—not class mobility or the number of years of national income growth lost to the global financial crash. And, of course, it takes its name from that ruthless nineteenth-century critic of mainstream economics and capitalism itself....

Occasional Links & Commentary
Marx ratio
David F. Ruccio | Professor of Economics, University of Notre Dame

See also

Putting aside this rich line-up of events, what has caught our attention is the equal proliferation of pieces celebrating Marx’s birthday, for the better or for the worse. From misleading and derogatory articles such as the Rulers of the world: read Karl Marx! published by The Economist to educational short pieces such as Cooper’s It’s time to normalize Karl Marx, it is difficult to not wonder about the reasons behind such opposing views. Similarly, it is difficult to resist the temptation to add a little contribution to the debate. So here we are.…

Developing Economics
Marx’s Birthday and the Dismal Science: A Few Observations

Carolina Alves and Ingrid H. Kvangraven

David Ruccio — Their beautiful recovery

Does anyone really need any additional evidence of the lopsided nature of the current recovery?

Employers certainly don’t. They’re managing to hire additional workers, thus lowering the unemployment rate. But they don’t have to pay the workers they hire much more than they were getting before, with wages barely staying ahead of the rate of inflation. As a result, corporate profits continue to grow.

Clearly, what we’re seeing remains a one-sided recovery: employers are getting ahead—and their workers are still being left behind....

Capital (ownership) share increasing over labor (workers) share.

Occasional Links & Commentary
Their beautiful recovery
David F. Ruccio | Professor of Economics, University of Notre Dame

See also

Graph.

Real-World Economics Review Blog
Ratio between CEOs and average workers in world by country

Editor

See also

The FRED Blog
Human capital around the globe : How to measure the human input in GDP

macromon — Karl, The Comeback Kid?

Why do we think the world is about to see the resurrection of the “comrade culture club” over the next ten years? 

Make no mistake; there will be a visceral political reaction to the coming acceleration of labor disrupting technology. We got a little taste of it in the 2016 election.

Just wait until it hits the doctoring, lawyering, and accounting class....

Technology replaced the farmers. Now it is coming for the industrial workers and many types of service workers, too. Soldiers and sailors are also increasingly being replaced by robots and drones and that is set to take off.

What are the new redundant people going to do?

Global Macro Monitor
Karl, The Comeback Kid?
macromon

Sandwichman — No Other Way of Keeping Profits Up

David Ricardo.

Econospeak
No Other Way of Keeping Profits Up

Sandwichman

See also

Michael Kalecki
Political Aspects of Full Employment 
Political Quarterly, 1943 

also

Iron Law of Wages

Wikipedia

Timothy Taylor — Behind the Declining Labor Share of Income

Total income earned can be divided into what is earned by labor in wages, salaries, and benefits, and what is earned by capital in profits and interest payments. The line between these categories can be a blurry: for example, should the income received by someone running their own business be counted as "labor" income received for their hours worked, or as "capital" income received from their ownership of the business, or some mixture of both?
However, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics has been doing this calculation for decades using a standardized methodology over time. The US labor share of income was in the range of 61-65% from the 1950s up through the 1990s. Indeed, for purposes of basic long-run economic models, the share was sometimes treated as a constant. But in the early 2000s, the labor share started dropping and fell to the historically low range of 56-58%. Loukas Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman provide some perspective on what has happened, citing a lot of the recent research. in "Trends in Factor Shares: Facts and Implications," appearing in the NBER Reporter (2017, Number 4)....

The fall in the labor share of income has consequences that ripple through the rest of the global economy. For example, it contributes to the rise in inequality….

Also.

When comparing current stock prices and price-earnings ratios to historical values, it's worth remembering when the capital share of income is higher, stock prices represent a different value proposition than they did several decades ago.

Conversable Economist
Behind the Declining Labor Share of Income
Timothy Taylor | Managing editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, based at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota

Sharan Burrow — Pay people a decent wage. The economy can afford it

The rules of the global economy are rigged against those who have to work to earn a living, and in favour of multinational corporations and the ultra-rich.

It is no accident that, as Oxfam has revealed, the richest 1% own more wealth than the rest of humanity combined. This is inequality by design. The world is facing a huge decent work deficit, and the rules of the global economy need to change.

The just-so story of economic liberalism is that economics is a natural science and economics outcomes are determined by natural processes to the degree that governments do not interfere. Let to itself,  the economy will deliver optimal growth and just deserts for all based on their respective contribution.

The reality is that governments are here to stay. and the rules get written by whoever controls them.

Neoliberalism is based on the just-so story of economic liberalism being the natural state, while using social class, political power and economic wealth to capture governments and write rules favorable to capital (asset ownership) that disadvantage labor (people) and land (the environment).

 

World Economic Forum
Pay people a decent wage. The economy can afford it
Sharan Burrow | General Secretary, International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)

David F. Ruccio — Inequality and immiseration

"Immiseration" has a nice quality to it and is less emotionally loaded than "exploitation," which is now associated with "Marxism" in the pejorative sense in capitalist countries like the US.

It’s clear that, for decades now, American workers have been falling further and further behind. And there’s simply no justification for this sorry state of affairs—nothing that can rationalize or excuse the growing gap between the majority of people who work for a living and the tiny group at the top.

But that doesn’t stop mainstream economists from trying...

Are mainstream economists capitalist shills or are they just clueless about reality? Or maybe both.

American workers are getting relatively less of what they produce, which means more is available to distribute to those at the top of the distribution of income.

That’s what mainstream economists can’t or won’t understand: that workers may be worse off even as their wages and incomes rise. That problem flies in the face of every attempt to celebrate the existing order by claiming “just deserts.”

There’s nothing just about the relative immiseration and growing inequality faced by American workers. And nothing that can’t be changed by imagining and creating a radically different set of economic institutions.

Economists operate in terms of the institutional status quo and those stepping out of line are marginalized a "heterodox," or "Marxist." The economics department at Notre Dame, where David Ruccio taught for many years, was recently reorganized to diminish if not entirely excluded heterodox teaching. This is also an institutional problem and it is closely connected with the larger institutional issues in which contemporary capitalism is embedded and imposed on workers (labor) and the environment (land).

The economics profession needs to be address these issues to remain credible.

 

Occasional Links & Commentary
Inequality and immiseration
David F. Ruccio | Professor of Economics, University of Notre Dame

Noah Smith — Why Workers Are Losing to Capitalists

Back in April, I wrote about one of the most troubling mysteries in economics, the falling labor share. Less of the income the economy produces is going to people who work, and more is going to people who own things....

Mystery to morons conventional economists maybe.

Here, Noah, read this: Michal Kalecki, "Political Aspects of Full Employment" (Political Quarterly, 1943). It's even posted at Brad DeLong's site.

It's a feature of capitalism, or a bug, depending on which side one is on. The so-called labor market is rigged in favor of ownership (capital) under capitalism. Capitalism is the economic system that favors capital (ownership) and is naturally suited for oligarchy of the plutocratic sort.

No mystery at all for those not living in ivory towers.

Bloomberg View
Why Workers Are Losing to Capitalists

Noah Smith

ProMarket — The Rise of Market Power and the Decline of Labor’s Share

The two standard explanations for why labor’s share of output has fallen by 10 percent over the past 30 years are globalization (American workers are losing out to their counterparts in places like China and India) and automation (American workers are losing out to robots). Last year, however, a highly-cited Stigler Center paper by Simcha Barkai offered another explanation: an increase in markups. The capital share of GDP, which includes what companies spend on equipment like robots, is also declining, he found. What has gone up, significantly, is the profit share, with profits rising more than sixfold: from 2.2 percent of GDP in 1984 to 15.7 percent in 2014. This, Barkai argued, is the result of higher markups, with the trend being more pronounced in industries that experienced large increases in concentration.

A new paper by Jan De Loecker (of KU Leuven and Princeton University) and Jan Eeckhout (of the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics UPF and University College London) echoes these results, arguing that the decline of both the labor and capital shares, as well as the decline in low-skilled wages and other economic trends, have been aided by a significant increase in markups and market power....

ProMarket — The blog of the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
The Rise of Market Power and the Decline of Labor’s Share
Asher Schechter

Yasser Abdih and Stephan Danninger — What Explains the Decline of the U.S. Labor Share of Income? An Analysis of State and Industry Level Data

“The U.S. labor share of income has been on a secular downward trajectory since the beginning of the new millennium. Using data that are disaggregated across both state and industry, we show the decline in the labor share is broad-based but the extent of the fall varies greatly. Exploiting a new data set on the task characteristics of occupations, the U.S. input-output tables, and the Current Population Survey, we find that in addition to changes in labor institutions, technological change and different forms of trade integration lowered the labor share. In particular, the fall was largest, on average, in industries that saw: a high initial intensity of “routinizable” occupations; steep declines in unionization; a high level of competition from imports; and a high intensity of foreign input usage. Quantitatively, we find that the bulk of the effect comes from changes in technology that are linked to the automation of routine tasks, followed by trade globalization.”

IMF
What Explains the Decline of the U.S. Labor Share of Income? An Analysis of State and Industry Level Data
Yasser Abdih and Stephan Danninger

Bill Mitchell — British employers exhibit on-going greed but lie about it

One of the abiding and recurring trends, accentuated in the neo-liberal era, is the apparent ‘concern’ for the low-paid by the captains of industry. They continually warn against allowing pay increases for this cohort because they are – so the story goes – deeply concerned about the damage it will do to the employment prospects. What they really mean is that they know pay rises at the bottom end of the pay structure don’t alter employment levels significantly but have some impact on profitability. That is, they reduce profits a little. And that is the concern they are really expressing. The British Chambers of Commerce have called for a freeze on real wages for the lowest paid workers in Britain despite profitability soaring and the share of business profits in national income rising. The expression ‘where do these characters get off’ comes to mind. Although it is hardly surprising. British entrepreneurs tend to be lazy and take the easy way out when they can to further their own ends.

Bill Mitchell – billy blog
British employers exhibit on-going greed but lie about it

Bill Mitchell | Professor in Economics and Director of the Centre of Full Employment and Equity (CofFEE), at University of Newcastle, NSW, Australia

David Ruccio — Dual economies and the vanishing middle-class

Both Peter Temin and I are concerned about the vanishing middle-class and the desperate plight of most American workers. We even use similar statistics, such as the growing gap between productivity and workers’ wages and the share of income captured by the top 1 percent.

And, as it turns out, both of us have invoked Arthur Lewis’s “dual economy” model to make sense of that growing gap. However, we present very different interpretations of the Lewis model and how it might help to shed light on what is wrong in the U.S. economy—with, of course, radically different policy implications.

It is ironic that both Temin and I have turned to the Lewis model, which was originally intended to make sense of “dual economies” in the Third World, in which peasant workers trapped by “disguised unemployment” and receiving a “subsistence” wage (equal to the average product of labor) in the “backward,” noncapitalist rural/agricultural sector could be induced via a higher “industrial” wage rate (equal to the marginal product of labor) to move to the “modern,” capitalist urban/manufacturing sector, which would absorb them as long as capital accumulation increased the demand for labor.

That’s clearly not what we’re talking about today, certainly not in the United States and other advanced economies where agriculture employs a tiny fraction of the work force—and where much of agriculture, like the manufacturing and service sectors, is organized along capitalist lines. But Lewis, like Adam Smith before him, did worry about the parasitical role of the landlord class and the way it might serve, via increasing rents, to drag down the rest of the economy—much as today we refer to finance and the above-normal profits captured by oligopolies....

So, our returning to Lewis may not be so far-fetched. But there the similarity ends. 

Occasional Links & Commentary
Dual economies and the vanishing middle-class
David F. Ruccio | Professor of Economics, University of Notre Dame