John O'Day — When India Tries to Regulate Amazon, US Media Qualms About Monopoly Disappear

Double standard.

FAIR
When India Tries to Regulate Amazon, US Media Qualms About Monopoly Disappear

John O'Day

Mark Paul and Mark Stelzner — Rethinking collective action and U.S. labor laws in a monopsonist economy

Discussions today are pervasive among economists and policymakers about the increasing rise of firms’ market power and the potential negative effects of that power on the U.S. economy. Of particular concern is the rise of new technologies and the dominance of platform giants—such as Amazon.com Inc., Alphabet Inc.’s Google unit, Apple Inc., and Uber Technologies Inc., among others—which are not improving the U.S. socioeconomic landscape by reaping gains from potential economies of scale, but rather are throwing around their weight to suppress wages, raise prices on consumers, and enter the political arena to ensure the federal government allows the U.S. economy to continue on the path of market consolidation.

Many economists point to this disconcerting rise in market power as leading to a simultaneous rise in monopsony power—the ability of the firm to have an influence over the determination of workers’ wages—which may contribute to the persistence of stagnant wages despite relatively low headline unemployment numbers in recent times.

This is in stark contrast to decades of research and modeling in economics following the so-called marginalist revolution in the discipline, which resulted in most economists simply treating monopsony power as a special case only existing in the now long-gone company towns of Homestead, Pennsylvania, and Pullman, Illinois, of the 19th century or in highly concentrated island economies of introductory economics textbooks.4

Recent empirical investigations into U.S. labor markets no longer allow reasonable economists to bury their heads in the sand about market power and assume that workers’ wages are simply equal to the value of their marginal product or service. There’s now insurmountable evidence that monopsony power is prevalent throughout the U.S. economy, though the degree to which it may contribute to widening income inequality and underemployment remains an open question. These findings imply that employers can siphon off “rents”—economic parlance for excessive profits beyond the cost of production—from workers through the exercise of monopsony power. These findings are the complete opposite of the dynamic formulated in most current labor market models.

In our new Washington Center for Equitable Growth working paper, “Monopsony and Collective Action in an Institutional Context,” we seek to better understand the theoretical implications of this new and growing empirical literature on monopsony power and the resulting lower wages for workers

WCEG — The Equitablog
Rethinking collective action and U.S. labor laws in a monopsonist economy

Mark Paul, assistant professor of economics at New College of Florida and a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute, and Mark Stelzner, assistant professor of economics at Connecticut College

See also

Oxfam Blogs — From Poverty to Power
Book Review: New Power: How it’s Changing the 21st Century and Why you need to KnowDuncan Green, strategic adviser for Oxfam GB

Jonathan B. Baker — Market Power or Just Scale Economies?

In this post, which is based on my FTC testimony, I explain why growing market power provides a better explanation for higher price-cost margins and rising concentration in many industries, declining economic dynamism, and other contemporary US trends, than the most plausible benign alternative: increased scale economies and temporary returns to the first firms to adopt new information technologies (IT) in competitive markets.

The benign alternative has an initial plausibility because the efficient size of firms has likely grown over time in many industries. That is the natural consequence of the high fixed costs of investments in information technology, the growing importance of network effects, and an increased scope of geographic markets. Under such circumstances, firms could grow larger, concentration could rise, and price-cost margins could increase even if markets are competitive. In addition, the first firms to invest in new information technologies may earn substantial rents. The rents should be temporary if those investments don’t confer market power and rivals follow suit with investments of their own.

Yet six of the nine reasons I gave for thinking market power is substantial and widening in the US in my testimony cannot be reconciled with the benign alternative. I set forth evidence showing that anticompetitive coordination, mergers, and exclusion are underdeterred, that market power is durable, that increased equity ownership of rivals by financial investors softens competition, and that governmental restraints on competition have grown. As I explained in my testimony, none of the reasons is individually decisive: there are ways to question or push back against each. But their weaknesses are different, so, taken collectively, they paint a compelling picture of substantial and widening market power over the late 20th century and early 21st century....

The bottom line is that growing market power is a better explanation for declining dynamism, rising concentration and markups in many industries, and the other reasons for concern, taken as a whole, than the alternative of increasing scale economies and early-adopter rents in competitive markets. The benign alternative may be a partial explanation for some trends, but increasing market power is a key part of the story.

ProMarket — The blog of the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Market Power or Just Scale Economies?

Jonathan B. Baker | Research Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law,  former chief economist at the FTC and the FCC,  and author of The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a Competitive Economy, forthcoming from Harvard University Press.

See also

WCEG — The Equitablog
Understanding the importance of monopsony power in the U.S. labor market
Kate Bahn

Kate Bahn — Understanding the importance of monopsony power in the U.S. labor market

With the launch of our new website, we are reintroducing visitors to our policy issue areas. Informed by the academic research we fund, these issue areas are critical to our mission of advancing evidence-based ideas that promote strong, stable, and broad-based economic growth. Through June and continuing in July, expert staff have been publishing posts on our Value Added blog about each of these issue areas, describing the work we do and the issues we seek to address. The following post is about Wages. For previous posts on other issue areas, please go to our Value Added home.

WCEG — The Equitablog
Understanding the importance of monopsony power in the U.S. labor market

Kate Bahn

ProMarket — The Rise of Market Power and the Decline of Labor’s Share

The two standard explanations for why labor’s share of output has fallen by 10 percent over the past 30 years are globalization (American workers are losing out to their counterparts in places like China and India) and automation (American workers are losing out to robots). Last year, however, a highly-cited Stigler Center paper by Simcha Barkai offered another explanation: an increase in markups. The capital share of GDP, which includes what companies spend on equipment like robots, is also declining, he found. What has gone up, significantly, is the profit share, with profits rising more than sixfold: from 2.2 percent of GDP in 1984 to 15.7 percent in 2014. This, Barkai argued, is the result of higher markups, with the trend being more pronounced in industries that experienced large increases in concentration.

A new paper by Jan De Loecker (of KU Leuven and Princeton University) and Jan Eeckhout (of the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics UPF and University College London) echoes these results, arguing that the decline of both the labor and capital shares, as well as the decline in low-skilled wages and other economic trends, have been aided by a significant increase in markups and market power....

ProMarket — The blog of the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
The Rise of Market Power and the Decline of Labor’s Share
Asher Schechter