Showing posts with label market efficiency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label market efficiency. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 8, 2017

Brian Romanchuk — Defining Market Efficiency Properly

The concept of market efficiency has attracted a considerable amount of debate over the decades. The issue is that the definition is problematic; efficiency is more an attribute of the investors in the market, rather than the market itself. If we turn the focus to the role of investors, most of the mysteries associated with the concept evaporate.
(Note: This article is in a preliminary state. I started thinking about how to write up the role of market efficiency in the context of breakeven inflation rates. I realised that I was unhappy with the existing definitions used, and this article represents my initial thoughts on the matter. It is quite possible that I will again revise my thinking.)
Bond Economics
Defining Market Efficiency Properly
Brian Romanchuk

Thursday, April 2, 2015

Greg Mankiw — California should raise the price of water

Sometimes the market solution is the right solution to public goods and utilities like water provision. While privatizing water, which had been a free good and then a regulated public utility, would not be a good solution, putting a higher price on water for bulk users and subsidizing other users would increase efficient use.

For example, households could be allocated a free or very low cost monthly water allowance and this could be varied by household size. This is in place in some areas already. There could also be a differential cost between residential use and commercial use and also an incremental cost for commercial use.

This would probably be more successful in a water-deprived state like California than the across the board 25% reduction in use just imposed.

The advantage of the 25% cut is that it is universal and so no one can say that their ox is being selected politically to be gored. All oxen just get less of a ration to drink. But as critics have noted it's difficult to enforce and avoidance is likely. Price is much more difficult to avoid, but water is a necessity of life, so a purely market solution with a single price is too regressive.
Some may worry about the distributional effects of a higher price of a necessity. But the revenue from a higher price could be rebated to consumers on a lump-sum basis, making the whole system progressive. We would end up with more efficiency and more equality.
This involves political decisions in addition to economic factors, so implementing anything in California will be difficult, given a divisive political climate and the political strength of commercial interests.

This is an increasingly pressing that the whole world is facing and we had better get on it instead of imposing ad hoc solution, i.e., shooting from the hip, after facing an imminent crisis and not having prepared for it. The alternative is lose the use of a lot of land, which will displace a lot of people, which will then result in migration to more resource-rich areas, causing problems there.

This is a supply issue that can't be fixed by just throwing public money at it. Moreover, this is a problem that faces only certain states, and states are budget-constrained since they are currency users. The low hanging fruit in supply problems is efficiency, and with respect to natural resources, conservation and recycling. The opportunity here is private investment in solutions to inefficiencies and public investment and regulation to address relevant externalities.

Greg Mankiw's Blog
California should raise the price of water
Greg Mankiw | professor and chairman of the economics department at Harvard University

Thursday, June 12, 2014

Robert Waldmann — Thoughts on Brad’s Thoughts on Economic Theology

Brad DeLong: Why this is the case I do not know. I am trying to think about it…
It is an important question and commenters are invited to try to help Brad. I try after the jump.

So why is the Keynes-Friedman-Samuelson position unstable ? I note that on the questions of public policy where they all agreeed, I tend to agree with them. However, I definitely do not believe in the neoclassical synthesis as described by Stiglitz. I don’t think that, even given full employment, markets are efficient. I tend to advocate leaving the market alone except for 1) redistribution from rich to poor 2) mandatory insurance is market insurance is prevented by the adverse selection death spiral 3) Pigouvian taxes to internalize externalities 4) aggregate demand management 5) Anti discrimination legislation and 6) I’m sure there are lots of other exceptions which don’t come to mind.

But that’s because I think the market is the worst possible way to organize economic interactions except for all of the others that have ever been invented. My inclination to leave markets along (except for 1-6) is based on mistrust of the state not trust in markets. I am sure that meddling will lead to interest group gridlock, advantages for the well connected (that is rich) captured regulators and so forth and so on.
So I have purely pragmatic reasons to consider aggregate demand management better than many other interventions.....
Angry Bear 
Thoughts on Brad’s Thoughts on Economic Theology
Robert Waldmann


Friday, July 26, 2013

John Carney — Why insider trading should be legal


I tend to agree that this would end the silly myth that markets are perfect, information is symmetrical and institutional power is irrelevant to markets, driving a nail in the heart of neoclassical equilibrium based on perfect markets, symmetrical information, and equal players pursuing maximum utility rationally. Then the truth would be obvious that financial markets are biased.

It's already obvious that final goods markets are not competitive markets due to fixed instead of flexible (negotiated) pricing, along unequal market power that leads to artificially imposed scarcity. That in turn takes down the myth on which the neoliberal narrative of market capitalism is based.

And anyone can easily see that the simplest way to reduce crime is make it legal. Think of all the money that could be saved by eliminating security, oversight, and accountability.

CNBC NetNet

Why insider trading should be legal
John Carney | Senior Editor