History and statistics serve a common purpose: to understand the causal force of some phenomenon. It seems to me, moreover, that statistics is a simplifying tool to understand causality, whereas history is a more elaborate tool. And by “more elaborate” I mean that history usually attempts to take into account both more variables as well as fundamentally different variables in our quest to understand causality.
To make this point clear, think about what a statistical model is: it is a representation of some dependent variable as a function of one or more independent variables, which we think, perhaps because of some theory, have a causal influence on the dependent variable in question. A historical analysis is a similar type of model. For example, a historian typically starts by acknowledging some development, say a war, and then attempts to describe, in words, the events that led to the particular development. Now, it is true that historians typically delve deeply into the details of the events predating the development – e.g., by examining written correspondence between officials, by reciting historical news clippings to understand the public mood, etc. – but this simply means that the historian is examining more variables than the simplifying statistician. If the statistician added more variables to his regression, he would be on his way producing a historical analysis.
There is, however, one fundamental way in which the historian’s model is different from the statistician’s: namely, the statistician is limited by the fact that he can only consider precisely quantified variables in his model. The historian, in contrast, can add whatever variables he wants to his model. Indeed, the historian’s model is non-numeric.[1]Econolosophy
There are advantages and disadvantages of quantitative, numeric methods and qualitative, non-numeric methods. In the first place, qualitative, non-numeric methods can incorporate qualitative, non-numeric methods, but the reverse does not apply, since quantification is limited to that which can be reduced to quantity without sacrificing anything that is relevant.
This is clear in equating price with value, for example. Value is qualitative and price is quantitive. The key assumptions on which conventional economics rests involve the quantification of economic value independent of other values in terms of price discovered in markets, as well as the quantification of utility. These are simplifications that eliminate from consideration a great deal that is both qualitative and also relevant. While a calculus of utility is an arbitrary construct, there is no moral calculus at all.
On the other hand, history is able to view context holistically in terms of both quantity and quality. Whereas power other than market power is irrelevant in conventional economics, it is central in history. It is also central in economics as Marx and institutionalists recognize.