Daniel Little — George Herbert Mead on the self

The title [of Mead's book,Man, Self and Society,] is entirely descriptive; the core issue is how to characterize the "me" -- the personal, the conscious individual, the intentional actor, and to theorize about how the self is related to the social world. Mead's fundamental view is that the tradition of philosophy has gotten the relationship backwards; philosophers have built the social from the individual, but actually the self is in some important way the sum of its social relations.

The difference between the social and the individual theories of the development of mind, self, and the social process of experience or behavior is analogous to the difference between the evolutionary and the contract theories of the state as held in the past by both rationalists and empiricists. The latter theory takes individuals and their individual experiencing—individual minds and selves—as logically prior to the social process in which they are involved, and explains the existence of that social process in terms of them; whereas the former takes the social process of experience or behavior as logically prior to the individuals and their individual experiencing which are involved in it, and explains the existence in terms of that social process. (222).

Mead favors the "social first" approach. This doesn't rest on some kind of spooky Durkheimianism about irreducible social wholes, but rather the point that individuals always take shape within the ambit of a set of social relationships, language practices, and normative cues.

Our contention is that mind can never find expression, and could never have come into existence at all, except in terms of a social environment; that an organized set or pattern of social relations and interactions (especially those of communication by means of gestures functioning as significant symbols and thus creating a universe of discourse) is necessarily presupposed by it and involved in its nature. (222)

Mead's theory postulates that the self is built up out of imitative practices, gestures, and conversations over time. The individual forms a reflective conception of his / her self that derives from example and engagement with specific other actors within his / her social space.

Read it at Understanding Society
George Herbert Mead on the self
Daniel Little | Chancellor, University of Michigan-Dearborn

This view that humans are social animals goes back to Aristotle:

The notion of man as a social animal may have originated with Aristotle: "Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature and that man by nature is a political animal." -Politics, I

The adjective that Aristotle used to describe man in Greek is 'politikos' which is where we get the English word political. For this reason, 'politikos' is often translated as political, however the actual Greek meaning was a little deeper. 'Politikos' came from the Greek word 'polis' meaning city-state. To be 'politikos' was to be a member of the 'polis' or a citizen. Being a citizen, while certainly implying participation in various political responsibilities, was more about being a part of society; contributing to the good of the whole. In this way, the meaning of 'politikos' more resembles the English word social than political. ed that "man is by nature a social animal" in regards to human nature. [source]

This view is the basis for institutionalism, which sees the values, norms and institutional arrangements in general, both formal and informal, as shapers of behavior. This stands in opposition to ontological individualism, which views the individual as an autonomous actor, and methodological individualism, which represents the autonomous individual as the foundation for more complex behavior. The notion of a representational rational agent is an example of methodological individualism in economics.