Jeez, Noah, you need a stiff shot of (later) Wittgenstein. Now.
Exactly.
I did my dissertation on Wittgenstein's notes that were published posthumously as On Certainty. While the term "belief" has many meanings in ordinary language given different contexts, the type of belief under discussion is absolute unshakeable conviction in an assumption that is not grounded on publicly available criteria, without which there is no agreement outside that POV that the assertion is actually knowledge. See Plato on belief or opinion (doxa) v. knowledge (episteme).
Wittgenstein elucidates the logic of justification in ordinary language in contrast with formal languages where truth is deductive, being based on axioms or postulates. Wittgenstein's elucidations show how ordinary language description occurs through the lens of one's language, which is reflective of a worldview. I have been calling this a POV. Wittgenstein elucidates this using the Gestalt figure of a duck-rabbit, which can be seen as a rabbit from one POV and as a duck from another. We can conceive of two parties arguing over whether it is really a duck or a rabbit.
Certain propositions function as norms and criteria to delineate the boundary of one's worldview (POV). For example, functioning as normative they test admission and exclusion with respect to the POV.
While appearing to be descriptive propositions based on form and content, their function shows that they are not descriptive propositions in that they are not falsiable. This is, their position in the worldview privileges them from error. Their function is to assess other items in terms of inclusion or exclusion, truth and falsity.
Mises apriori method is a good example of this in economics and no evidence one adduces will falsify the priors for true believers since they are held to be "synthetic a priori" in Kant's sense. Same with religious dogmas and articles of faith. The invisible hand plays a similar normative role in conventional economics based on the neoliberal POV. But if one looks deeply enough into any POV, one will discover the boundary conditions.
We are all ideologues to one degree or another, because ordinary language use involves imposition of a POV in that there are no absolute criteria to ground general agreement. When there is general agreement, it is usually because we are talking to others who share that POV, which Wittgenstein calls "a form of life". But some POVs are more empirically based than other, hence, more "scientific." But that too involves the presumption that empirical criteria are paramount and that is in the final analysis a preference — pragmatically justified perhaps, but not known to be true in any absolute sense.
This is a quick summary and any explanation of Wittgenstein is bound to be wrong because he chose the method he did because the subject matter is ineffable. One has to see how the logic actually works since logic cannot describe itself without becoming involved in nonsense. Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Through the Looking Glass and, "The Hunting of the Snark" and "Jabberwocky" should be read by adults as nonsense in this sense. Lewis Carroll (Rev. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson) was a logician playing with logic.
Noahpinion
What does it even mean to "believe" something?
Noah Smith | Assistant Professor of Finance, Stony Brook University
Noahpinion
What does it even mean to "believe" something?
Noah Smith | Assistant Professor of Finance, Stony Brook University
18 comments:
Comment I left on Noah's blog
If I may summarize that: it's all derp at the bottom.
Also, the set of all derp includes, but is not limited to, Bayesian priors, the later Wittgenstein, praxeology, Confucianisn, and maybe all MMT blog posts.
"If I may summarize that: it's all derp at the bottom."
Has to be since no POV rests on absolute criteria that compel assent.
Certainty is either logical in terms of a formal system, or else subjective, based on a POV. Most people acquire their basic POV through psychological imprinting and therefore consider it intuitive.
POVs are like scientific theories, which are neither true nor false. Individual hypotheses can be tested for truth and falsity but not an entire theory.
The criteria are correspondence with feedback from the environment, internal coherence, economy and usefulness. Theories last until another one comes along that meet the criteria more successfully and so gains more acceptance.
Similarly POVs are in evolutionary competition with each other, and groups rise and fall based on the relative success of the POV, among other things, of course.
Frankly, this all is well above my pay grade, but let's see if I at least understood this:
narris said: "it's all derp at the bottom."
Tom said: "[It all] Has to be [derp at the bottom] since no POV rests on absolute criteria that compel assent"
But then, as marris said, "Bayesian priors, the later Wittgenstein, praxeology, Confucianisn, and maybe all MMT blog posts are also derp".
Is that a reasonable conclusion? I mean, can I conclude from the above that "later Wittgenstein" is also derp?
I think Tom's post may not emphasize the social nature of belief or the anthropology in Wittgenstein's philosophy.
People show their beliefs in their actions in a certain community. At a given time, you just cannot coherently formulate certain doubts in a language that that members of that community will understand. Belief and meaning are not a state of an individual mind, whether grounded or not. They are expressed in behavior.
In what practical context could you ask somebody, "How do you know you have never been on Mars?" or "How do you know the world existed before you were born?"
(I am currently reading Adelman's biography of Hirschman, and I am struck with parallels with Wittgenstein. Hirshman talked about, "Proving Hamlet wrong" in his youth. He would be willing to formulate doubts about political programs, but still engage in aggressive praxis to overthrow fascism. Beliefs are seen in praxis.)
Lovers of sophistry are entitled to their beliefs, without which their book sales might dry up. I prefer facts. Beliefs, opinions, and suppositions are poor substitutes.
When I'm not trying to make sense of the world, or forced to make a decision, I'm in no need of factual (or any other kind) of knowledge. I can simply live and let live.
A practical example of belief can be found in some religions, where having faith is the challenge in of itself.
I don't begrudge people developing a POV out of boredom, or because it's popular or fun. These are somewhat practical reasons, as long as the benefits to the believer outweigh the negatives.
Bob, you are assuming that "the facts" are some absolute criterion that everyone must agree about based on evidence. But even in science, there is disagreement over evidence even within a experiment. Moreover, facts are theory laden, so that the theory contributes to shaping the evidence.
Wittgenstein would likely say you are thinking of simple cases of "fact" and generalizing from them, whereas the range is much greater. He would then cite examples that show the special cases are not the general case.
In addition, what is important is not so much the evidence but the interpretation of it. Different reasoning can explain the evidence even when there is agreement over the facts of the case.
As Robert Vienneau points out above, Wittgenstein drew on example from anthropology, as well as imagined cases, to illustrate the logical point he was attempting to elucidate. However, Wittgenstein was not doing social science or linguistics, but rather philosophy of logic.
In Wittgenstein's view, it's a matter of seeing how signs function as symbols when used in context. Confusion results when we misunderstand the logic and draw not so much erroneous conclusions as nonsensical ones.
Wittgenstein has been mistaken for a positivist (early Wittgenstein) and a nominalist (later Wittgenstein), but he denied being either. In his later years, he developed a unique method for showing how the logic of sign use functions using illustrative examples, it seems influenced by his Cambridge colleague Piero Sraffa that got Wittgenstein thinking about a broader approach than he had taken in the Tractatus.
It seems that the last area in which Wittgenstein was working was the question of certainty and the logic of justification. His analysis might be compared with a systems view, in which key components of the system, here symbolic system that convey information, not only determine the behavior of the system but also are system dependent.
Formal language are systems that are constructed and can therefore usually be understood as whole. But informal systems like ordinary language are highly complex adaptive emergent systems that humans live within and cannot stand above, as it were and observe.
We can only examine ordinary language from our own case and attempt to see how the logic works. One cannot then describe this others, logic it is the basis of communication. It must be elucidated in a way that others see it, as apparently happened to Wittgenstein in his interaction with Sraffa.
Another dimension of this is brought out in The Social Construction of RealityThe Social Construction of Reality by Peter L. Berger andThomas Luckmann (1966).
The central concept of Social Construction of Reality is that persons and groups interacting in a social system create, over time, concepts or mental representations of each other's actions, and that these concepts eventually become habituated into reciprocal roles played by the actors in relation to each other. When these roles are made available to other members of society to enter into and play out, the reciprocal interactions are said to be institutionalised. In the process of this institutionalisation, meaning is embedded in society. Knowledge and people's conception (and belief) of what reality is becomes embedded in the institutional fabric of society. Reality is therefore said to be socially constructed.
If there is disagreement about A, then A is not a fact.
There is much information about the world that can be derived from standards of measurement. Calibration and quality control are major components of this approach. When done correctly, these pieces of information can also be accepted as facts.
Facts don't have to be theory laden. Theories that merely give 'explanations' can be dispensed with. Theories that yield predictable outcomes are usually what I'm looking for.
Theories that merely describe the past, such as anthropology, are not factual.
How we interpret and understand the world around us goes beyond the use of factual knowledge. If it is not necessary to my survival, I see no purpose in creating extraneous narratives. It is also futile to challenge the narratives I disagree with - there are too many of them.
What does the ability to manipulate others say about our capacity to understand 'reality'?
"If there is disagreement about A, then A is not a fact."
hear, hear.
To use Wittgenstein's famous analogy, the fly is stuck in the fly bottle and keeps banging up against the boundaries, unable to see the way out.
"If there is disagreement about A, then A is not a fact."
IN that POV.
That POV is based upon a dictionary definition. I see no reason to make it less strict.
The dictionary gives possible uses of words, and the specific meaning is only determinable from use the term in context.
Lets look at an example. An anthropologist is visiting a so-called primitive tribe deep in the Amazon jungle. He learns that they "believe" in spirits. They correct him, saying that that don't believe in spirits but actually see them. The anthropologists regards that as fanciful. so they tell him that if one doesn't see spirits one cannot live in this environment with the simple technology they have. One of the tribe says to the anthropologist, "If you don't see spirits and you say you don't, I'll bet you that you can't survive more than three days out here living the way we do." Does the anthropologist take them up on the bet? of course not. And he or she rationalizes it not in terms of seeing spirits but of education, training, etc. Who is right? How would you decide on a way that doesn't involve you own cultural, linguistic, and institutional POV? You can't. The anthropologist believes that the tribe is just "primitive." The tribe thinks that the anthropologist is blind.
"Noah Smith - What does it mean to "believe" something?"
It means you don't 'know'.
Like you know how to ride a bike; or if you stay out in the sun too long it will burn you; or, in your life you want to feel fulfilled - or conversely - you 'don't know' who you are! Knowing is better than believing, speculating or imagining.
There are two ways to know: one is through feeling; the other is through thought.
In this universe, some things can only be known through feeling: the Self, love, happiness, peace ..... these cannot be described in language, song, dance, art although people try.
That which is known through thought has one over-riding condition: everything has evolved from the (universal) Self. Everything in this universe is dependent upon everything else, except for the Self. All selves are little puppets dancing on the strings of SELF. So - scientists, philosphers, believers .... will never never know if they never never go (find the Self). The one Law that binds all laws! The mind will speculate. And describe things in language etc.
The heart has no curiousity - the heart wants to know.
This is why Kabir laughed a lot ....!!!
One of the tribe says to the anthropologist, "If you don't see spirits and you say you don't, I'll bet you that you can't survive more than three days out here living the way we do." Does the anthropologist take them up on the bet?
It would be foolish not to explore this statement further. The anthropologist and the tribe could carry out an experiment and learn from the experience.
jrbarch:
I have wondered if some people have a strong need to 'know' rather than accepting more ambivalent feelings. A need that would compel them to make assumptions just so they can sleep at night.
"It would be foolish not to explore this statement further. The anthropologist and the tribe could carry out an experiment and learn from the experience."
Actually, this has been happening of late and scientists are now starting to look at things that their theories ruled out as either impossible or superstitious, taking ancient wisdom traditions seriously instead of regarding them primitive. Started happening back in the Sixties.
I have been involved in this pretty much since then, and what I have found is that some are open-minded and others close-minded. IN the beginning days, the open-minded ones were often in the closet, so to speak, and did not surface their genuine attitude publicly for fear of loss of reputation. I read some privately circulated papers marketed "confidential - do not share without permission." Thankfully that is pretty over now in psychology but not in some other disciplines.
POVs are not fixed but often in flux, and as information and communication technologies spread and deepened, the pace of change picked up. But there has always been the phenomenon of conversion as radical change of heart and mind based on as yet empirically unexplainable factors that religions call "grace."
People with a rigid mindset that is resistant to change regardless of factors that seem to call for it, such as even the need to adapt to survive, are called ideologues or closed-minded. Those who are flexible are called open-minded.
"I have wondered if some people have a strong need to 'know' rather than accepting more ambivalent feelings. A need that would compel them to make assumptions just so they can sleep at night."
This is a reason that people cling to their POV as "reality." They resist facing up to the fact that human beings don't know for the most part and are an evolutionary experiment in an uncertain world. The structure of a rigid POV provides psychological security.
What JR Barch is saying is that there are dimensions of knowledge that transcend ordinary knowing in gross consciousness, which is the state of most people. Perennial wisdom is replete with testimony about this and this has been my area of specialization for decades.
I would take issue with JR on attributing knowledge in alterate states of awareness to "feeling" however. That conveys the impression that this is less clear and distinct, and more subjective than perception and reasoning based on empirical evidence. As awareness expands knowledge becomes not only wide in scope but also deeper and clearer in quality.
We know from cognitive science that all human knowledge is apparently cognitive-affective. Reason and passion, thought and feeling, etc, can only be distinguished intellectually not practically, owing to brain functioning.
It is also becoming clear that the intellectual distinction between subjective and objective is also not real distinction, that subject and object are poles of conscious that are magnified in gross consciousness and dissolve in unified consciousness.
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