Showing posts with label Charles A. E. Goodhart. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Charles A. E. Goodhart. Show all posts

Monday, December 26, 2016

Matias Vernengo — History of Central Banks Tutorial - Before Central Banks


Short account of the conditions that led to the development of central banking.

First in a series on central banking.

Naked Keynesianism
History of Central Banks Tutorial - Before Central Banks
Matias Vernengo | Associate Professor of Economics, Bucknell University

Monday, August 17, 2015

Yanis Varoufakis — A New Approach to Eurozone Sovereign Debt – op-ed in Project Syndicate

The eurozone is unique among currency areas: Its central bank lacks a state to support its decisions, while its member states lack a central bank to support them in difficult times. Europe’s leaders have tried to fill this institutional lacuna with complex, non-credible rules that often fail to bind, and that, despite this failure, end up suffocating member states in need. One such rule is the Maastricht Treaty’s cap on member states’ public debt at 60% of GDP. Another is the treaty’s “no bailout” clause. Most member states, including Germany, have violated the first rule, surreptitiously or not, while for several the second rule has been overwhelmed by expensive financing packages.
The problem with debt restructuring in the eurozone is that it is essential and, at the same time, inconsistent with the implicit constitution underpinning the monetary union. When economics clashes with an institution’s rules, policymakers must either find creative ways to amend the rules or watch their creation collapse.…
Yanis Varoufakis
A New Approach to Eurozone Sovereign Debt – op-ed in Project Syndicate

Also

My question to Christine Lagarde, Eurogroup 25th June 2015 – as narrated by Landon Thomas in the NYT

Greece’s Third MoU (Memorandum of Understading) annotated by Yanis Varoufakis

Tuesday, January 6, 2015

JW Mason — German Unification as Proto-Europe?

What this passage makes me wonder is: Has anyone ever written about European integration in the light of German unification in the late 19th century? The claim in the Reichsbank pamphlet that customs union was the easy first step, and that monetary union followed only later and with difficulty, certainly suggests some parallels. So does the suggestion that monetary union was the biggest economic benefit of political union. It would be interesting to ask, what were the concrete problems that monetary union was understood to be solving? And how did it fit into the larger political agenda of German unification? 
Of course there are fundamental differences -- most importantly that German unification took place under the aegis of a sovereign political authority, whereas the central political-economic fact about Europe is that the monetary authority stands above the various national governments. But it still seems like the comparison could be illuminating. 
The US faced a similar situation in the process of going from colonies, to a confederation, to a federation, which was then organized financially under the aegis of Alexander Hamilton as the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.

There were controversies during those times that are long forgotten by most other than scholars of the period. But had it not been for acceptance of Hamilton's plan for centralization, things might have gone differently, and in different periods the US operated sometimes under a central bank and at other  times under free banking, at times under a gold standard and at times under a fait system. The US was even operated under a money-financed system at the time of the Civil War instead of the debt-financed system that Hamilton has established initially, even through there was no specific provision for a particular financial system and arguing for which Hamilton proposed the doctrine of implied powers that became accepted instead of enumerated powers based on the necessary and proper clause.

So what the EZ is going through now is not uncharacteristic. But they seem to be having difficulty from learning from the past. The eurocrats need to get more creative before their experiment implodes with potentially dire results not only for Europe but the world.

The Slack Wire

Monday, August 29, 2011

Charles Goodhart on Banking Reform

The calls for better bank regulation are many. This column argues that regulators have the concepts right, but the mechanisms are in need of repair.

Goodhart's chief point is that to accomplish its purpose, bank regulation needs to be designed in a way that gives regulators an early enough indicator for timely intervention, before the situation has deteriorated to the point at which a fiduciary institution with characteristics of a public utility is insolvent or nearly so.