Andrew Gelman — Our hypotheses are not just falsifiable; they’re actually false.

On the practical side of philosophy of science. Adding nuance to Karl Popper on falsification.

Further argument for the view that theories are useful but not "true." This may seem to contradict the realist view that theories are general descriptions of causal relationships. But I don't think that this is what is is implied. Rather, useful theories can be viewed as fitting the data because they reveal underlying structures that are not observed directly but only indirectly. 

There is a often a tendency to transfer simple analogies too complicated and complex situations and events. Some causal relationship are observable, as it a hammer driving a nail, with the physical theory explaining it in terms of simple variables related in a function. 

But most interesting issues are much more complicated and nuanced and may be complex, e.g., subject to emergence owing to synergy. There may a constellation of factors involved, and this may be difficult to order in a hierarchy. Some factors may be catalysts that are necessary for an operation but do not themselves enter into it. These may be presumptions that are hidden assumptions.

In addition, statistics is by definition "inexact" in that it deals with probabilities, unlike deterministic functions in which the variables are all known and measurable, and are expressible in terms of a simple function.

While physics is mostly tractable other than at the edges, life sciences are less so, and social sciences and psychology even less. Economics combines social science and psychology, especially macroeconomics and political economy. Economic sociology and economic anthropology take this into account, global economic history also demonstrates it.

This is coming to the fore now as some critics of MMT, the Green New Deal, and "socialism" demand to see data-based model that "prove" proposed solutions have worked in the past. Of course, the record is important, but the demand for "proof" requires a degree of stringency that is not applied in social science and psychology because it is unattainable. Nor is this standard applied to conventional economics either, its econometric approaching being based on formalism rather than being empirically based.

Another important point that Andrew Gelman makes is the futility of pitting theories against each other. That is a recipe for disagreement in that the party that determines the framing wins. Whose assumptions are going to set the criteria? Why?

And, no, I don’t think it’s in general a good idea to pit theories against each other in competing hypothesis tests. Instead I’d prefer to embed the two theories into a larger model that includes both of them.

This is a good suggestion but it is general. Often, the disagreement is over fundamental criteria that determine a frame of reference. This should be obvious in the different approaches to economic theory and economic practice., e.g., econometric and institutional, static and dynamic, simple and complex, natural and historical.

Obviously, a short post like this can only suggest matters that need deeper reflection, open inquiry and sincere debate aimed at solutions to pressing design problems. This is no long just "theoretical." Humanity has to get this right to survive, let alone prosper. We have seemingly dug ourselves into a hole based on policy that is has turned out to impractical in the extreme, such as socializing negative externalities that have led to environmental degradation and threaten ecological collapse if not addressed successfully in a timely fashion. So, let's get with it.

Statistical Modeling, Causal Inference, and Social Science
Our hypotheses are not just falsifiable; they’re actually false.
Andrew Gelman | Professor of Statistics and Political Science and Director of the Applied Statistics Center, Columbia University

Bill Storage — Science vs Philosophy Again

Interesting post and I get a shout out.

The Multidisciplinarian — Bill Storage on engineering, innovation, and interesting problems
Science vs Philosophy Again

Bill Storage | Visiting Scholar in Science, Technology, Medicine & Society, UCAL, Berkeley, and vice-president of LiveSky, Inc.

Lord Keynes — Karl Popper on the Paradox of Tolerance

Can liberalism be illiberal in self-defense?

The 21St Century: Social Democracy For Post Keynesian Perspective
Karl Popper on the Paradox of Tolerance
Lord Keynes

This drama is presently being played out in Europe.

Sputnik
Erdogan Dreaming to 'Revive New Ottoman Caliphate'… in Europe

Lord Keynes — Human Consciousness, Artificial Intelligence and Popper’s Three World Ontology

Jesper Jespersen (2009) uses Popper’s three worlds ontology in his Critical Realist methodology for Post Keynesian economics, and it is highly relevant for the ontological and epistemological basis of economics.

Social Democracy For The 21St Century: A Post Keynesian Perspective
Human Consciousness, Artificial Intelligence and Popper’s Three World Ontology
Lord Keynes

Jason Smith — Waiting for a philosophy of economics

More dialogue.

Information Transfer Economics
Waiting for a philosophy of economics
Jason Smith

Andrew Gelman — If Karl Popper edited the New York Times

As a matter of logic, scientific theories are never "confirmed," although they are "corroborated" by evidence.

Statistical Modeling, Causal Inference, and Social Science
If Karl Popper edited the New York Times
Andrew Gelman | Professor of Statistics and Political Science, and Director of the Applied Statistics Center at Columbia University

Invisible hand-waving — Is economics a science?

Laktos v. Popper in philosophy of science applied to econ. First on a series on economics as science by two grad students at Oxford.

I think that rather than seeing science as just the sum of all scientific statements, we should view science as a web of research programmes, such as quantum mechanics or evolutionary biology. This is the view put forward by Imre Lakatos. Research programmes are essentially comprised of three parts: certain fundamental views and baseline assumptions which are unfalsifiable (the ‘hard core’), some rough rules of how and how not to go about solving scientific problems (‘positive and negative heuristics’), and a set of hypotheses which scientists use to generate and test predictions (the ‘protective belt’). For example, in the Newtonian research agenda, the ‘hard core’ consists of unfalsifiable baseline theoretical assumptions such as ‘every action has an equal and opposite reaction’. There is a ‘positive heuristic’ towards mechanistic, materialistic explanations of natural phenomena (hence Newton’s problems explaining gravitational forces). The ‘protective belt’ would include hypotheses like the predicted motion of the planets.

For Lakatos, the hallmark of a ‘progressive’ scientific research programme is not whether it is falsifiable. In fact, the ‘hard core’ is unfalsifiable, and much of the protective belt is often falsified as scientists puzzle over how to accommodate various pieces of evidence. Rather, the hallmark of a progressive scientific research programme is whether or not the theory makes successful novel predictions. In other words, is the theory is able to successfully predict new phenomena which it was not originally built to explain?….

Invisible hand-waving
Is economics a science?

ht Mark Thoma at Economist's View

Also

Argues for Friedman's instrumentalism.

I think this grossly overlooks the motivation for pursuing knowledge in the first place. This putting forward the most reasonable explanation of change that answers the questions, how and why. In philosophy, this is based on self-evident first principles, which are called assumptions in economics. In science, the answers are tentative on testing through hypothesis testing. Friedman's instrumentalism is not science but philosophy.

In philosophy, the why question is answered by reasons, e.g., in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason. In science, on the other hand, the answer is expected to be in terms of causes, that is, answering the questions both why and how.

Correlation does not prove causation, and satisfactory explanation is about causation unless one accepts Hume's metaphysical assertion that causation is only constant correlation since human knowledge does not extend to causal mechanism. That is a philosophical position that is dogmatically asserted rather than a scientific one, and it is a contested one in theory of knowledge.

Causation is one of the deep issue of human intellectual history, debated for millennia. It is still unresolved. Friedman's instrumentalism is hand-waving. If this is the best that economists can do, they should just hang it up.

Assumptions, Milton Friedman and wise trees

George Ellis and Joe Silk — Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics

Attempts to exempt speculative theories of the Universe from experimental verification undermine science, argue George Ellis and Joe Silk.

Nature
Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics
George Ellis, professor emeritus of applied mathematics at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, and Joe Silk, professor of physics at the Paris Institute of Astrophysics, France, and at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, USA

ht Steve Keen retweeting Noah Smith

David Glasner — Another Complaint about Modern Macroeconomics

Philosophy of economics, philosophy of science, philosophy of logic and mathematics, and philosophy of language, showing that the foundations of conventional macroeconomics rest on sand.

Uneasy Money

Another Complaint about Modern Macroeconomics
David Glasner

David Glasner — Two Cheers (Well, Maybe Only One and a Half) for Falsificationism

Philosophy of science. Mostly on Popper v. Logical Positivism. Good comments, too.

Uneasy Money
Two Cheers (Well, Maybe Only One and a Half) for Falsificationism
David Glasner

Tao Jonesing — Capitalism Isn't a Failure, It's a Lie

I view everything that Popper has written as highly suspect due to his role as a founding father of neoliberalism. My views of neoliberalism have morphed over time. While I still abhor it, I no longer view it as a repudiation of classical liberalism and finally accept it for what Popper, Hayek, Friedman and Mises described it to be: the intellectual and moral successor to classical liberalism merely stripped of its communist fiction. That is, neoliberalism is everything classical liberalism was designed to be without the alleged "flaw" of collectivism that gave rise to socialism, communism and fascism.

Neoliberalism, known in the US as "libertarianism," is not anti-State. Indeed, Popper, Hayek, Friedman and Mises were all Statists, only their perfect state does not serve the collective, it only keeps the collective in check. The purpose of the neoliberal State is to control the collective from which it draws its power so as to benefit the true elite. The collective serves the neoliberal State, not the other way around.

Capitalism Isn't a Failure, It's a Lie
Tao Jonesing

Good post, with which I generally agree. But I disagree with the modern interpretation of Plato about the guardians. Plato was talking about rule by the truly wise, not an elite that acquires status by power, wealth, or privilege.

But this post explains the whining of the elite about how disadvantaged they are becoming, based on their belief that their privileged status is deserved.

Noah Smith — "Science" without falsification is no science

So as things stand, macro is mostly a "science" without falsification. In other words, it is barely a science at all. Microeconomists know this. The educated public knows this. And that is why the prestige of the macro field is falling. The solution is for macroeconomists to A) admit their ignorance more often (see this Mankiw article and this Cochrane article for good examples of how to do this), and B) search for better ways to falsify macro theories in a convincing way.

Of course, if people also read heterodox macroeconomists, then they would know that some macroeconomists actually did get it right, and they also explain why mainstream economists get it wrong.

See James K. Galbraith, Who Are These Economists, Anyway? And it is not like Prof. Galbraith is an unknown upstart, either. Don't these people go outside, once and awhile at least.

Read it at Noahpinion
"Science" without falsification is no science

by Noah Smith | PhD candidate in economics at the University of Michigan. (In the fall he will start as an assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook.)

Noah Smith is an economist with a background in physics.

I left this comment there:

Tom Hickey 11:48 PM
Actually, some macroeconomists did get it right and explained why the mainstream was getting it wrong. Notably, the late Wynne Godley. For his approach to macro using stock-flow consistent modeling and sectoral balances, see Godley and Lavoie, Monetary Economics (Elgar, 2007, 2nd ed. 2012). See James K. Galbraith for some economists who did get it right — "Who are these economists anyway?"

UPDATE:

Simon Wren-Lewis has an equally uniformed post at mainly macro

What microeconomists think about macroeconomics

I left this comment there:

Tom Hickey 29 June 2012 21:24

Simon, have you read much Wynne Godley, especially Godley and Cripps, Macroeconomics (182) and Godley and Lavoie (2007, 2nd ed. 2012)? Or did you see James K. Galbraith, "Who are these economists anyway?" I am afraid your comments reflect the ignorance of the profession about Post Keynesianism. OK, you are an Oxford prof, and Cambridge was the citadel of PKE, and Godley there. But to miss or dismiss major economists since Keynes, really now.

Matias Vernengo— Shift happens indeed

Matias Vernengo contrasts Popper's premise that falsification of hypotheses is paramount in science, and Kuhn's view that it is the explanatory and predictive power of theories that is basic. I see them as complementary. Normal science is conducted along Popperian lines, while Kuhnian paradigm shift, in which the normal paradigm is replaced by another, is institutional and pragmatic rather than being based chiefly on testing specific truth-value.

Read it at Naked Keynesianism
Shift happens indeed
by Matias Vernengo