In our last post, we discussed pirate democracy, based on Peter Leeson’s The Invisible Hook, a great and thought provoking read.
Our main argument was that democratic elections and checks on leaders that emerged in pirate ships illustrate a more general point: if we want to understand democracy, we should think not about the idea of democracy extending back to the Ancient Greeks, but about the incentives that democracy creates and the distribution of political power among different groups in society that underpins democracy.
We also questioned Peter Leeson’s interpretation, which explains the emergence of pirate democracy solely on the basis that this was the efficient arrangement for pirates — a specific instance of what we have dubbed elsewhere “the efficient institutions view”.
Peter Leeson has now followed up with a post, providing additional arguments supporting the idea that pirate democracy emerged because it was the efficient organization, and more generally defending the efficient institutions view.
Of course Leeson wrote the book on the subject, so we cannot disagree with the facts he presents.
Nevertheless, our interpretation differs.Why Nations Fail
Efficient Organization among Pirates?
Daron Acemoglu And James Robinson
