Showing posts with label Mandarinism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mandarinism. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 14, 2015

Daniel A. Bell — Democracy's dying days?


A Chinese-speaking Western political theorist living in China analyses the Chinese political system.

While the West regards electoral freedom as foundational, it does not guarantee by any means that someone qualified for the position will be selected. This can be disastrous when the country invested the leader with enormous power and few restrictions on "the decider."
I agree that the power to throw out leaders is an important reason to support electoral democracy. But is it the only, or even the most important, reason? 
Surely it also matters what democratically elected leaders do with their power? For the sake of argument let us imagine that voters repeatedly elect corrupt rulers of below average intelligence who enact policies that serve a tiny group of rich people, wreck the economy and the environment for future generations, and poison social relations.…
My point is there are few if any meritocratic checks in the selection process of top decision-makers. Stein claims that even lawmakers in democratic systems are put through long competitive processes that "ideally" filter out those not motivated for public service and those not competent, but even “ideally” it is possible for top decision-makers to be elected even without any previous experience in government, and in practice many first class duds have been elected by the people.
The Chinese system of governance addresses this deficiency of liberalism.
If it’s a matter of comparing ideals, clearly the method of selecting political leaders in meritocracies via examinations and decades long performance evaluations at lower levels of government has advantages compared to democratic systems that elect leaders in regular competitive elections: only those with an excellent record of past performance at lower levels of government are likely to make it to the highest levels of government, meritocratically selected leaders are less likely to make beginner's mistakes, they can engage in long term planning that considers the interests of future generations without worrying about the next election, and they have more time to think about sensible policies rather than wasting time raising funds and giving the same campaign speech over and over again.…
This is important because China has instituted a meritocratic system of governance based on its own longstanding tradition of Mandarinism where governance is considered to be both a science and an art, hence, to be practiced at the highest levels by those most suitable for the task. It is similar to rising up the corporate ladder in the West. This is a far cry from the dictatorial Communist Party apparatus pictured fancifully in the West, which may have been true at one time but no longer is.
But Ringen claims that political meritocracy is nothing more than a "detail" in China's political system. Political meritocracy may be central to China's history and I marshal extensive evidence to show that the system has been (re)established over the last three decades, but Ringen is committed to the view that the Chinese Communist Party seeks to perfect the power of control. But other "details" — including the workings of the powerful organization department of the CCP that decides on the criteria for the selection and promotion of public officials — are precisely what political thinkers who want to make sense of the Chinese political system should be focused on. If all that can be said is that the CCP is no different in essence than in Mao's day and that the Chinese political system is similar in nature to that of other autocratic systems, it's not just "details" that will be missing from China's political story. Of course the CCP is not likely to enact political reform that leads to its demise, but the fact it has decided to (re)establish a political meritocracy distinguishes China from other non-democratic political systems and it is central to its success over the last three decades.
Liberalism is not only strongly committed to perpetuating its mode of government where it exists but also exporting it where it does not, even at the cost of violent aggression or subversion. This is not an undertaking of "the people" either. It is a policy of the liberal ruling elite.
If Chinese-style political meritocracy continues to innovate and reform, while democracies do nothing more than rest on their laurels and cast aspersion on political alternatives, democracies will eventually lose their hold on people's "hearts and minds" and political meritocracy will become the globally dominant political system. Perhaps one hundred years from now, it will seem blindingly obvious that top political leaders should be selected by means of examinations and performance evaluations at lower levels of government, and we will wonder how it is that human beings ever came to think that one person, one vote was the only legitimate way of selecting political leaders.
The view that the "top-heavy" and "dictatorial" Chinese and Russian governments are going to collapse of their own weight or be overturned by a liberal populist revolt are not tuned to the big picture in either China or Russia.

Countries develop systems of government that are suitable for their particular circumstances and challenges based on historical traditions, present conditions and future expectations. Even the neoliberalism of the United States and the United Kingdom are significantly different from the Ordoliberalism of Germany.

Open Democracy
Democracy's dying days?
Daniel A. Bell | Chair Professor of the Schwarzman Scholar Program at Tsinghua University in Beijing and director of the Berggruen Institute of Philosophy and Culture