Showing posts with label global governance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label global governance. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 23, 2018

Jean Pisani-Ferry — Should we give up on global governance?

Executive summary
The high point of global governance was reached in the mid-1990s around the creationof the World Trade Organisation. It was hoped that globalisation would be buttressed by a system of global rules and a network of specialised global institutions. Two decades later these hopes have been dashed by a series of global governance setbacks, the rise of economic nationalism and the dramatic change of attitude of the United States administration. From trade to the environment, a retreat from multilateralism is observable. The 2008 elevation of the G20 to leaders’ level was an exception to this trend. But the G20 is no more than a political steering body.
The reasons for this retreat partially arise from political developments in individual countries. But such factors hide series specific roadblocks to global governance: the growing number and diversity of countries involved; the mounting rivalry between the US and China; doubts about globalisation and the distribution of the associated benefits; the obsolescence of global rules and institutions; imbalances within the global governance regime; and in- creased complexity.
What, then, should be the way forward? The demand for global governance has not diminished, but support for binding multilateral arrangements has. There is a need for alter- native governance technologies that better accommodate the diversity of players, provide for more flexibility and rely less on compulsion. From competition to financial regulation, such arrangements have been developed in a series of fields already. They are often hailed as pro- viding a solution to the governance conundrum. But their effectiveness should be assessed critically. Can they overcome the free-rider curse and enforcement problems? Usual game theory suggests not. Not all games are similar, however, and some collective action problems can be tackled without recourse to coercion.
Against this background, multilateralists hesitate over the choice of a strategy. One option would be to seek to preserve the existing order to the greatest extent possible. Its downside is that it does not address the underlying problems. An alternative option is to try to redesign international arrangements, putting the emphasis on flexibility and voluntary participation. Its downside is that it risks overlooking the intrinsic problems of international or global collective action. A potentially more promising approach would be to define the minimum conditions that the multilateral framework must fulfil to provide a strong-enough basis for flexible, variable-geometry and possibly informal arrangements.
In the end, we should neither cultivate the nostalgia of yesterday’s order nor invest our hopes in ineffective international cooperation. The narrow path ahead is to establish a suf- ficient, critical multilateral base for flexible arrangements and to equip policymakers with a precise toolkit for determining, on a field-by-field basis, the minimum requirements for effective collective action.
Bruegel
Should we give up on global governance?
Jean Pisani-Ferry

Tuesday, October 11, 2016

Bill Mitchell — Reforming the international institutional framework – Part 4

This is the fourth and final part of the discussion relating to reforming the international institutional framework. In brief, the argument is that there are several essential functions that a multilateral institutional framework has to serve that need to be incorporated within any new structure. It is clear that an agency to channel development aid remains essential. Further, it is important to create an agency that will provide liquidity to nations who are unable to access essential imported resources (such as food) without invoking exchange rate crises. While these functions seem to align with the current World Bank and the IMF, a progressive approach to service delivery in these areas would not resemble the operational procedures currently in place.
Bill Mitchell – billy blog
Reforming the international institutional framework – Part 4
Bill Mitchell | Professor in Economics and Director of the Centre of Full Employment and Equity (CofFEE), at University of Newcastle, NSW, Australia

Wednesday, April 29, 2015

Zack Beauchamp — The quiet global crisis that scares the State Department

A big new State Department assessment has identified a major threat to global security. It's not ISIS or Vladimir Putin. It's not a rickety global economy or climate change or the threat of global pandemics.
Instead, the report argues, these individual problems are symptoms of a much bigger issue — namely, a slow breakdown in global governance. Many of the institutions that were created in the past century to deal with economic and security risks around the world, such as the UN and IMF, may no longer be adequate to the task. 
If the authors of the report are right, then the world's biggest problems are all really about this one big thing. 
The world's institutions are no longer adequate for today's problems
Vox
The quiet global crisis that scares the State Department
Zack Beauchamp

Monday, March 24, 2014

Andrew J. Stravers and Peter Harris — Indian Foreign Policy: The Cold War Lingers

On its face, New Delhi’s enunciation of respect for Russia’s “legitimate interests” in Crimea is a surprising blow to the prevailing U.S. policy of reaching out to India. As the largest democracy in the world, a burgeoning capitalist economy and an increasingly important military power, India has been viewed as a counterweight to China’s rise and an anchor of the U.S.-led international order.
While Pakistan is integral to regional security, India’s cooperation will be essential to sustain the American vision of global governance....
If the U.S. wants India to serve as a bulwark of the international status quo, some form of policy change will be required. By shifting India to the front and center of American foreign policy, the United States can help to assure for itself – and the wider world – a future based on prevailing global norms rather than the designs of revisionist, illiberal and undemocratic states like Russia [and presumably China].
The Diplomat
Indian Foreign Policy: The Cold War Lingers
Andrew J. Stravers and Peter Harris

The global tilt is now toward Russia, China, Iran, and India v. the EU, Japan, South Korea, and Israel led by the US. Where are the flash points?

See also, US-China Relations: Thucydidean Trap or Prisoner's Dilemma? by Shannon Tiezzi
China and the U.S. are caught in the foreign policy version of the “prisoners’ dilemma.” Both understand, on a theoretical level, that the best outcome can only be reached via cooperation. But neither country trusts the other to cooperate (for reasons outlined in detail in a report by Brookings’ Kenneth Lieberthal and Peking University’s Wang Jisi). Both sides can “win” through cooperation, but since neither Beijing nor Washington really believes that will happen, they both seek not to be the country left holding the bag when the other side inevitably turns hostile.

Win-win or zero-sum. The hardliners in both countries are projecting zero-sum and they are in positions of power.

Friday, June 14, 2013

Andrew Gavin Marshall — Global Power Project, Part 1: Exposing the Transnational Capitalist Class

The Global Power Project, an investigative series produced by Occupy.com, aims to identify and connect the worldwide institutions and individuals who comprise today's global power oligarchy. By studying the relationships and varying levels of leadership that govern our planet's most influential institutions — from banks, corporations and financial institutions to think tanks, foundations and universities — this project seeks to expose the complex, highly integrated network of influence wielded by relatively few individuals on a national and transnational basis. This is not a study of wealth, but a study of power.
Truthout
Global Power Project, Part 1: Exposing the Transnational Capitalist Class
Andrew Gavin Marshall, Occupy.com | News Analysis

I think that the term "capitalist class" is misused here. C. Wright Mills's term "the power elite" is more apt. It's not simply the owners of the means of production or the directors of finance capital that are involved in the power elite. It's an intricate web of power relationships that also involves considerable jockeying for power within the web itself.