Showing posts with label Russian Orthodox Church. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russian Orthodox Church. Show all posts

Monday, August 28, 2017

Gordon M. Hahn — Putin, Stalin, Orthodoxy, and Russian Traditionalism

Much Western media and many observers of Russian politics are fond of playing up an ostensible revival of Stalin – his ‘rehabilitation’ as it were – under Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rule. This is not just inaccurate — as I have written in the past, the Putin era has seen numerous anti-Stalinist and non-Stalinist state-funded projects including mass audience films, television serials, museums and monuments — but it dangerously distorts our understanding of contemporary Russia. Moreover, many of the same observers are also fond of emphasizing the powerful role of the more traditional – some would say retrograde or reactionary – Russian Orthodox Church. This is often exaggerated, but this is not the most interesting aspect of such a focus. The latter focus is often made by the very same observers who decry Putin’s alleged rehabilitation of Stalin. The more revealing phenomenon is the political tension between these two positions; something that might suggest Putin’s less than dictatorial powers and the syncretic and more inclusive nature of his somewhat moderate Russian traditionalism. Thus, anti-Stalinist, anti-communist, Tsarist, and projects of other ideological, cultural, religious, and ethnic orientations often coexist in Putin’s Russia, with the state giving space, albeit often strictly limited, for their expression. This is a function of a supra-national identity still being in development, Russia’s multi-communal character, and the interplay of various orientations and of those orientations within the state....
The US and Europe are now going through similar conflicts between traditional and liberal views and factions representing them. Every nation's character is a melding of historical forces through the historical dialectic. History is path dependent.

Furthermore, it can be argued that countries like Germany and Russia have dealt more openly and rankly with their unsavory past than countries like the US and Japan.

Russian and Eurasian Politics
Putin, Stalin, Orthodoxy, and Russian Traditionalism
Gordon M. Hahn, analyst and Advisory Board member at Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, member of the Executive Advisory Board at the American Institute of Geostrategy, a contributing expert for Russia Direct, a senior researcher at the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, Akribis Group, and; and an analyst and consultant for Russia – Other Points of View

Wednesday, January 18, 2017

Paul Grenier — Legitimate Differences — A new approach to Russia

According to the outlook that might be described as the democracy-idealism/neoconservative-interventionist school, the only way to achieve a lasting settlement is for Russia to cease being what it is at the moment and to become instead much more like the United States. Russia should become a liberal democracy. Only then—because, as many Wilsonian idealists have argued, “liberal democracies don’t fight one another”—can the relationship be stabilized for the long term.

The theory is not entirely implausible. There are indeed forces within Russia that strongly identify with American liberal democratic values. American diplomats and journalists frequently run into people who hold such sentiments. They pop up among one’s well-traveled Russian-intelligentsia friends and are widely quoted in the articles written by prominent journalists who happen to be imbued themselves with the Wilsonian sensibility.

The problem with this line of thought—aside from the impossibility of imposing it from the outside—is that the Russian version of liberal democracy differs fundamentally from the American version.
The fact is that Russia today is already in many ways liberal. But its liberalism is of a peculiarly Russian sort. It does not deny rights and freedom, but it grounds them not negatively (in terms of what government shall not do), as does the Enlightenment liberalism of Locke and Hobbes, but rather in terms of Eastern Christianity’s image of what man is. As a result, there is no Russian liberalism, or Russian politics of any other sort—including its standard semi-authoritarianism—that separates the state from religion in the way that the United States does today.
An authentically Russian liberalism, in other words, is hardly less starkly different from our secular, liberationist order than is Russia’s present political arrangement under Vladimir Putin. The fact is that there simply is not available to Russia a political order that is aligned with the present-day American version of secular liberal democracy. Both its history and its mores exclude it. And if we try to impose it anyway, in defiance of Russian history and self-understanding, then we will find ourselves repulsed in the same way Napoleon was. As Henry Kissinger wrote, “No power will submit to a settlement, however well-balanced and however ‘secure,’ which seems totally to deny its vision of itself.”….
The article is well-written and the author is very insightful in comparing and contrasting US and Russian visions and values. Worth reading the whole thing.

Americans tend to project, and this projection makes in difficult to understand others with different histories, visions and values. That sets up a conflict.

The American Conservative
Legitimate Differences — A new approach to Russia
Paul Grenier

Thursday, May 26, 2016

Katehon — Russian Orthodox Church against liberal globalization, usury, dollar hegemony, and neocolonialism

The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has published a draft of the document "Economy in the context of globalization. Orthodox ethical view. " This document demonstrates the key positions of the Russian Church on a number of issues relating to the economy and international relations.… 
Not to be outdone by the pope.

Speaking of the pope:
Katehon (not the document): The unconditional support of state sovereignty against the transnational elite is a distinctive feature of the position of the Orthodox Church. This differs the Orthodox from Catholics, who are members of the globalist transnational centralized structure, in contrast to the Orthodox Churches, which are united in faith, but not administratively.…
This document is very important because it shows that the Russian Orthodox Church not only occupies a critical position in relation to the liberal globalization, but also offers a Christian alternative to globalization processes. While Catholics and most Protestant denominations have passionate humanist ideas, and in the best case, criticize globalization from the left or left-liberal positions, the Russian Orthodox Church advocate sovereignty and national identity. The most important aspect of the Orthodox critique of globalization is the idea of multipolarity and the destructiveness of modern Western civilization’s path.
Where the two Churches agree is on distributism.

Wednesday, November 25, 2015

Christian Science Monitor — Is Russia's intervention in Syria a 'holy war'? Russian Orthodox Church: 'yes'

For many in the West, the idea that a church would take an overtly hawkish stance in the conflict in Syria is an utterly foreign concept.
But then, the Russian Orthodox Church is not of the West, says Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, the church's most recognizable spokesperson, in his spartan downtown Moscow office.
"The idea that church and state should be alienated from each other is not a characteristic of Orthodox civilization," insists the wispy-bearded senior cleric, whose eyes almost seem to burn. "It's a characteristic of the West."…
The Orthodox Church, which has deep historical connections with the dwindling Christian communities of the Middle East, was deeply alarmed by mass flight of Iraq's Christians following the US invasion of that country. When the conflict in Syria began almost five years ago, the church began lobbying the Kremlin to take a strong stand in defense of Syrian Christians, who are about 10 percent of the population. Experts say the church's insistence certainly played a role in President Vladimir Putin's decision to intervene directly in the conflict...
Christian Science Monitor
Fred Weir, correspondent

Thursday, August 20, 2015

David C. Speedie — "Soft Power": The Values that Shape Russian Foreign Policy

In the increasingly frigid environment of U.S.-Russia relations, much attention is given to what may be seen as Russia's strategic "interests." (Of course, much of the policymaking class in the West seems to suggest that Russia is entitled to no "interests" whatsoever.) Of at least equal significance for understanding Russian attitudes, however, is a grasp of the values, the moral framework for Russia's foreign policy.
A valuable resource for this understanding is found in a recent article, "Russia's Orthodox Soft Power," by the University of Rhode Island scholar Nicolai Petro, who explores the "symphonic relationship" between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state and the manner in which they both utilize the term Russky mir, or Russian World. For the discussion herein of what this entails, we are indebted to Professor Petro.
As Petro observes, the term Russky mir has been wrongly interpreted by some Western analysts as the "perverse intersection" between the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church; in reality, the term is employed differently by each party. Where the state uses it as a tool for expanding Russia's cultural and political influence, the Church views it as a spiritual concept linked to God's objective for the rebuilding of a Holy Rus.
The relationship between the two provides a popular and definable framework for Russian foreign policy. Values play a significant role in policy formulation and, throughout modern history, three constants dictate how Russia responds to Western actions: sovereignty, capability to defend that sovereignty, and loyalty to those who share Russia's sense of honor. (The 2014 conflict Ukraine exacerbated the perceived values gap between the West and Russia, yet Russia claims it occupies the higher moral ground by defending its core values of honor in the context of the unique historical, religious, and cultural bonds with Ukraine.)
In summary: The significance of religion in Russian life allows the state to garner huge social capital from having the blessing of the Orthodox Church, and likewise the Church benefits from the relationship by disseminating its message of Christianity worldwide via Russian foreign policy. For the state, Russky Mir is a political/cultural tool for strengthening domestic stability, worldwide status, and influence in neighboring states. For the Church, it is a religious foundation essential for reversing the secularization of society (which it sees as an unwelcome evolution already well underway in the West).…

Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
"Soft Power": The Values that Shape Russian Foreign Policy
David C. Speedie. director of the Council's program on U.S. Global Engagement

Friday, March 27, 2015

Nicolai N. Petro — Russia's Orthodox Soft Power

For many analysts the term Russky mir, or Russian World, epitomizes an expansionist and messianic Russian foreign policy, the perverse intersection of the interests of the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church.
Little noted is that the term actually means something quite different for each party. For the state it is a tool for expanding Russia's cultural and political influence, while for the Russian Orthodox Church it is a spiritual concept, a reminder that through the baptism of Rus, God consecrated these people to the task of building a Holy Rus.
The close symphonic relationship between the Orthodox Church and state in Russia thus provides Russian foreign policy with a definable moral framework, one that, given its popularity, is likely to continue to shape the country's policies well into the future.....
It's not possible to understand current events involving Russia, Russians, and Russophones in other countries without understanding the significant of the concept of Russky mir. Otherwise it is just projection. Religious people of the West were praying for the conversion of Russia. Well, they got it and now will have to deal with it.

Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
Russia's Orthodox Soft Power
Nicolai N. Petro | Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island

Tuesday, January 20, 2015

Tass — Russian Church trying to attract regional governors to setting up Orthodox Christian bank

The chief of Moscow Patriarchate’s department for communications between the Church and Society, Vsevolod Chaplin, has called on the governors of the Belgorod, Kemerovo and Pskov regions, the constituent republic of Mariy-El and the Stavropol territory to take part in the setting up of the Orthodox Christian financial system and an Orthodox Christian bank, Izvestia daily said on Tuesday.…

“The main distinctive feature the Orthodox Christian bank will have is that it won’t issue loans or open deposits,” he said. “Its main objective will be to act as a mediator between Orthodox investors. Hopefully, the Orthodox bankers will offer to form the banking capitals on the basis of gold in the future.”
 
Absence of interest rates should become the main principle and asset of an Orthodox banking institution. The concept proposed by Chaplin says bonuses from investments in joint projects should depend on the profitability of an enterprise. 
Along with this, the future Orthodox bank will be forbidden to engage in any operations not aimed at creating the real public wealth or to provide funding for the spheres standing at variance with the ethical principles of Russian Orthodoxy, like gambling, tobacco production, seductive entertainments, the activities related to drugs and so on, Chaplin’s letters say.

Thursday, October 9, 2014

Iben Thranholm — Putin's Christian Vision

Monasteries and churches formerly inside the Kremlin walls and destroyed by the Bolsheviks, are being rebuilt. Governors instructed to read Christian philosophers of the 19th-20th century.…

The Kremlin is both the political and historic center not just of Moscow but of Russia. By calling for the restoration of these Christian buildings Putin repudiates the Soviet legacy with its atheist ideology and its record of anti-Christianity and reaffirms Orthodoxy as the heart of Russian culture. In his own words

"Here is the idea ... to restore the historic appearance of the place with two monasteries and a church, but giving them, considering today's realities, an exclusively cultural character."

A key element of Putin’s world view is not just his commitment to the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution, but also his admiration for three 19th and 20th century Russian Christian philosophers—Nikolai Berdyaev, Vladimir Solovyov and Ivan Ilyin, all of whom he often quotes in his speeches. Russia’s regional governors were even instructed to read the works of these philosophers during their 2014 winter holidays.


The social and political importance of this about-facecannot be overestimated. It is a sea change that cements Putin as one of the historically great Russian leaders.

Vladimir Solovyov is the most significant of the three philosophers that have gained Putin's sponsorship. From Wikipedia:
Sophiolology
Solovyov compiled a philosophy based on Hellenistic philosophy (see Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus) and early Christian tradition with Buddhismand Hebrew Kabbalistic elements (Philo of Alexandria). He also studied Gnosticism and the works of Valentinus.[11] His religious philosophy was syncretic, and fused philosophical elements of various religious traditions with Orthodox Christianity and his own experience of Sophia.
Solovyov described his encounters with the entity Sophia in his works, Three Encounters and Lectures on Godmanhood among others. Solovyov's fusion was driven by the desire to reconcile and or unite with Orthodox Christianity these various traditions via the Russian Slavophiles' concept of sobornost. His Russian religious philosophy had a very strong impact on the Russian Symbolist art movements of his time.[12] Solovyov's teachings on Sophia, conceived as the merciful unifying feminine wisdom of God comparable to the Hebrew Shekinah or various goddess traditions,[13] have been deemed a heresy by ROCOR and as unsound and unorthodox by the Patriarchate of Moscow.[14]
 
Sobornost 
Solovyov sought to create a philosophy that could through his system of logic or reason reconcile allbodies of knowledge or disciplines of thought, and fuse all conflicting concepts into a single system. The central component of this complete philosophic reconciliation was the Russian Slavophile concept of sobornost (organic or Spontaneous order through integration; which is related to the Russian word for 'catholic'). Solovyov sought to find and validate common ground – or where conflicts found common ground – and by focusing on this common ground to establish absolute unity and or integral[15] fusion of opposing ideas and / or peoples.[16]
Quotes 
"As long as the dark foundation of our nature, grim in its all-encompassing egoism, mad in its drive to make that egoism into reality, to devour everything and to define everything by itself, as long as that foundation is visible, as long as this truly original sin exists within us, we have no business here and there is no logical answer to our existence. Imagine a group of people who are all blind, deaf and slightly demented and suddenly someone in the crowd asks, "What are we to do?"... The only possible answer is "Look for a cure". Until you are cured, there is nothing you can do. And since you don't believe you are sick, there can be no cure."
"But if the faith communicated by the Church to Christian humanity is a living faith, and if the grace of the sacraments is an effectual grace, the resultant union of the divine and the human cannot be limited to the special domain of religion, but must extend to all Man's common relationships and must regenerate and transform his social and political life."[17]
 
Nikolai Berdyaev is also a notable Russian philosopher. Berdyaev and Solovyov are often mentioned together and are much more significant than Ilyin.

From Wikipedia:
Berdyaev's philosophy has been characterized as Christian existentialist. He was preoccupied with creativity and in particular with freedom from anything that inhibited creativity, whence his opposition to a "collectivized and mechanized society".
According to Marko Markovic, "He was an ardent man, rebellious to all authority, an independent and "negative" spirit. He could assert himself only in negation and could not hear any assertion without immediately negating it, to such an extent that he would even be able to contradict himself and to attack people who shared his own prior opinions."[2]
********
He was a practising member of the Russian Orthodox Church, but was often critical of the institutional church. He was a Christian universalist,[5][6] and he believed that Orthodox Christianity was the true vehicle for that teaching.
The greater part of Eastern teachers of the Church, from Clement of Alexandria to Maximus the Confessor, were supporters ofApokatastasis, of universal salvation and resurrection. ... Orthodox thought has never been suppressed by the idea of Divine justice and it never forgot the idea of Divine love. Chiefly — it did not define man from the point of view of Divine justice but from the idea of transfiguration and Deification of man and cosmos.[7]
Russian Premier Vladimir Putin has instructed his regional governors to read Berdyaev's 'The Philosophy of Inequality'.[8]
In comparison with Solovyov and Berdyaev, Ivan Ilyin is considered a relatively minor philosopher, but he is still important in Russia as Russian philosopher and shaper of thought. He was a Russian nationalist and traditionalist. Hopefully, Putin will emphasize Solovyov  and Berdyaev rather than Ilyin. But Ilyin's analysis of Russia under Marxism-Leninism is revealing if this is Putin's view also.
Studying the causes of the twentieth century Russian tragedy, Ilyin wrote, “The Russian revolution is a reflection of the religious crisis we are living through now, an attempt to establish an anti-Christian public and state system thought up by Friedrich Nietzsche, and economically and politically realised by Karl Marx. The West exported this anti-Christian virus to Russia… Losing our bond with God and the Christian tradition, mankind has become morally blind, and gripped by materialism, irrationalism, and nihilism”. To overcome the global moral crisis people need to return to eternal moral values, that is faith, love, freedom, conscience, family, motherland, and nation, above all faith and love, Ilyin wrote. He trusted that “to make Russia great again, the Russian people should believe in God, and that this faith will strengthen their willpower and their mind, and will make them strong enough to overcome themselves”. Ilyin believed in the religious gift and talent of the Russian soul. He prophesied, “Russian history is all about morality triumphing over difficulties, temptation, danger, and enemies. That’s how it was, and that’s how it’s always going to be, even better…” — Ivan Ilyin: An Exceptional Twentieth Century Religious Philosopher
Putin is a frequent visitor to the isolated Valaam Monastery, where he apparently visits his spiritual mentor. Therefore, it is doubtful that this change of direction is not also accompanied by a change of heart. However, it is also politically astute.

It also explains a lot about his so-called anti-democratic behavior in enforcing traditional values rather than "freedom" when that freedom goes against traditional values. In this Putin is closely aligned with the American religious right on the drawing the line between freedom and license.

Russia Insider
Putin's Christian Vision
Iben Thranholm