Showing posts with label interest rate. Show all posts
Showing posts with label interest rate. Show all posts

Friday, October 25, 2019

J. W. Mason — The CBO Just Handed Us Two Trillion Dollars

In their most recent 10-year budget and economic forecast, the CBO made a big change, reducing their long-run forecast of the interest rate on government bonds by almost a full percentage point, from 3.7 to 2.9. 
Most directly, the new, lower interest rate reduces expected debt payments over the next decade by $2.2 trillion. It also significantly reduces the expected debt-GDP ratio. Under the assumptions the CBO was using at the start of this year, the debt ratio under existing policy would reach 120 percent by 2040. Using the new interest rate assumption, it reaches only 106 percent. With one change of assumptions, a third of the long-run rise in the federal debt just disappeared....
The narrative shifts.

J. W. Mason's Blog
The CBO Just Handed Us Two Trillion Dollars
JW Mason | Assistant Professor of Economics, John Jay College, City University of New York

Sunday, April 28, 2019

Lars P. Syll — The interest rate fallacy


Another quote from the recently published MMT textbook.

Lars P. Syll’s Blog
The interest rate fallacy
Lars P. Syll | Professor, Malmo University

Tuesday, November 21, 2017

John Heltman — Fed interest payments to banks are here to stay, Yellen says

Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen said Tuesday that the central bank should continue to use interest payments on member bank reserve balances as its primary means of affecting short-term interest rates, rebuffing calls to return to more conventional monetary policy tools....
American Banker
Fed interest payments to banks are here to stay, Yellen says
John Heltman

Tuesday, September 19, 2017

Bill Mitchell — When relations within government were sensible – the US-Fed Accord – Part 1

The topic centres on an agreement between the US Federal Reserve System (the central bank federation in the US) and the US Treasury to peg the interest rate on government bonds in 1942. What the agreement demonstrated is that a central bank can always control yields on government bonds, which includes keeping them at zero (or even negative in the current case of Japan). What it demonstrates is that private bonds markets, no matter how much they might huff and puff about their own importance or at least the conservatives who are ‘fan boys’ of the bond markets), the government always rules because of its currency monopoly….
Bill Mitchell – billy blog
When relations within government were sensible – the US-Fed Accord – Part 1
Bill Mitchell | Professor in Economics and Director of the Centre of Full Employment and Equity (CofFEE), at University of Newcastle, NSW, Australia

Monday, January 16, 2017

J. W. Mason — What Does Crowding Out Even Mean?


In terms of a model, "crowding out" means that increasing the value of one variable diminishes the value of another or other variables.

This occurs in a model of an idealized or stylized world. If the claim is the the ideal or stylized world corresponds to the real world with respect to the factors involved, then it becomes an empirical question that requires examination of data and measurement.

So the first questions are about the model. What assumptions does it depend on?

The next question is whether the assumptions apply to the real world that the model putatively represents. Do the functions adequately represent actual transmission mechanisms?

The question after than is whether is too simplistic to be useful in assessing the real world situation(s) involved in the debate that are in question, e.g., relating to policy formulation or decision making.

This involves distinguishing between general case and specific cases. A general case model may not hold locally owing to institutional arrangements, for example, voluntary political imposition of a debt ceiling limits the general case based on operational analysis of a general system by limiting fiscal space arbitrarily.
Below, I run through six possible meanings of crowding out, and then ask if any of them gives us a reason, even in principle, to worry about over-expansionary policy today. (Another possibility, suggested by Jared Bernstein, is that while we don’t need to worry about supply constraints for the economy as a whole, tax cuts could crowd out useful spending due to some unspecified financial constraint on the federal government. I don’t address that here.) Needless to say, doubts about the economic case for crowding-out are in no way an argument for the specific deficit-boosting policies favored by the new administration.
This is definitely a should-read for people interested in MMT and policy.

I don't want to provide a spoiler — the points are summarized after the explanation — but it may be easier to grasp the points by knowing them beforehand.
So now we have six forms of crowding out:
1. Government competes with business for fixed saving.
2. Government competes with business for scarce liquidity.
3. Increased spending would lead to higher inflation.
4. Increased spending would cause the central bank to raise interest rates.
5. Overfull employment would lead to overfast wage increases.
6. Increased spending would lead to a higher trade deficit.
The next question is: Is there any reason, even in principle, to worry about any of these outcomes in the US today? We can decisively set aside the first, which is logically incoherent, and confidently set aside the second, which doesn’t fit a credit-money economy in which government liabilities are the most liquid asset. But the other four certainly could, in principle, reflect real limits on expansionary policy. The question is: In the US in 2017, are higher inflation, higher interest rates, higher wages or a weaker balance of payments position problems we need to worry about? Are they even problems at all?
J. W. Mason's Blog
What Does Crowding Out Even Mean?
JW Mason | Assistant Professor of Economics, John Jay College, City University of New York

Wednesday, December 28, 2016

Noah Smith — Why Low Rates Failed to Boost Business Investment

This type of research is fraught with difficulties, and causality is very hard to determine, so it’s important not to read too much into this. But one conclusion seems clear -- if we want to increase business investment, policies to promote access to capital seem more promising than policies to reduce interest rates. The latter approach has been tried, and it didn’t work. We might want to give the former a chance. That would mean encouraging venture capital, small-business lending and more effort on the part of banks to seek out promising borrowers -- basically, an effort to get more businesses inside the gated community of capital abundance.
"Causality is very hard to determine."

There are several issues surrounding causality. The first is the identifying the relevant assumptions and avoiding hidden assumptions. This determines the relevance of the endeavor by targeting the relevant causal factors and their relationship. These are the variables in equations.

The second is parameter specification that determines the scope and scale of the endeavor. The parameters are the constants. They can be thought of as positions on dials that controls the output. Moving the dial affects the function and its output without affecting the variables.

In a function, inputs determine outputs in accordance with a rule. Dependent variables are affected by independent variables in accordance with the function as rule.

In the simplest situation, a single independent variable is used along with holding other factors equal, which is called ceteris paribus, abbreviated as cet. par.

Many if not most "narrative economics" is based on a simple model like the one Noah Smith employs in the post, first assuming the interest rate as a policy lever and then switching to credit standards as a factor.

However, a society and its economy are not only complicated, that is, multiple factors (variables) are relevant. But they also complex, that is, conditions change owing to feedback.

Causal systems (functions) are based only in past and present inputs, with no future inputs.

As a result it is difficult to construct a set of equations that specify the condition of the economy overall, that is, from the point of view of macroeconomics. Simple models are rarely sufficient where there is no dominant causal factor, and they are useless when they identify the wrong factor as being dominant.

Noah Smith points out shifting credit standards as a factor. This has been observed previously by Post Keynesian and MMT economists, as well as others that pay attention to institutional factors. Demand for credit is affected by the creditworthiness of potential borrowers and credit standards shift with changing financial and economic conditions.

The problem with interest rate based models is the assumption that the interest rate is a lever that always acts the same way. But shifting credit standards imply that the interest rates operates differently in different financial environments.

Conventional economic models don't take this into consideration and therefore see causality when the system is non-causal in this respect. The result is "pushing on a string."

While the interest rate seems to be completely specified by the nominal value, from which the real value can be computed by subtracting the inflation rate, it is not specified completely with respect to lending owing to shifting credit standards that adjust creditworthiness and therefore determine the potential pool of customers.

Interest rates are low during contractions. This correlation results from the mechanism a central bank employs to increase lagging investment by lowering the cost of borrowing and increasing the interest rate to cool the economy as inflation pressure rises, based on the assumption that the interest rate acts similarly across time as lever influencing leverage.

In some cases the interest rate is sufficient to produce a desired result, but in other cases it is insufficient. Simplifying, the difference is usually between ordinary business cycles in which firms' financial position does not change appreciably and economic conditions suggest that loans will be repaid with improving conditions, and financial cycles in which the financial position of firms is adversely affected.

During contractions, the central bank lowers the target rate, which is the baseline rate, resulting in interest charged by lenders declining. However, owing to economic conditions, lenders also tighten credit standards so that creditworthiness declines. Even though there may be notional demand for loans, many desire loans cannot qualify for them.

Noah Smith proposes this as a causal factor and seems to suggest that it may be a dominant one.

But this doesn't seem to be the case, since many of the largest US firms are in a strong financial position, with high retained earnings. Moreover, when these firms borrow to take advantage of low rates, they use the funds for equity buy-backs rather than new investment, indicating a low rage of return on existing opportunity and a lack of confidence in foreseeable economic expansion.

While agreeing that credit standards are causal factors in lending, Keynesians would dispute that credit standards are a dominant factor. Credit standards tighten for the same reason that liquidity preference rises in "bad times," when "animal spirits" are depressed with good reason —lack of sales.

Keynesians would argue that the dominant causal factor here is lagging effective demand, so that the solution is not trying to force or cajole lenders to loosen credit standards when their business is setting credit standards correctly with respect to conditions. The primary solution indicated is to augment effective demand.

"Money" enters the economy in three ways, from the activity of the private sector, the government sector and the external sector. When the private sector is underperforming, relief must therefore come from 1) increasing private sector lending for investment and consumption or disgorging private sector savings, 2) government spending, or 3) increasing exports.

The chief means for increasing private sector borrowing is lowering the interest rate or (inclusive) loosening credit standards. while there is a mechanism to lower interest rates, there is no mechanism to loosen credit standards, which many would regard as a dangerous solution. Moreover, liquidity preference increases in "bad times," prolonging the contraction. So even looser credit standards might not be effective either and loosening might exacerbate the financial issues the economy is facing.

The conventional thinking is that exports can be increased by lowering the exchange rate relative to other countries. This is a beggar thy neighbor strategy and it cannot be used universally, since the surplus of one country must be offset by other countries. This seems to be a preferred strategy, which is not working either.

That leaves the government sector to increase spending, which a currency sovereign is always in the position to do. The only constraint is the availability of real resources to purchase, which is never an issue during a contraction, when the economy can expand to meet increased demand.

Increased demand draws forth increased supply (production) when the economy is under-producing, that is, when there is an output gap and idle labor.

Put most simply, the world economy is capable of producing much more than is demanded. The reason is not lack of notional demand but lagging effective demand. While there is some leakage to saving owing to increased liquidity preference, the major factor seems to be lack of income, other than at the top tier, and top tier spending is not sufficient to break the cycle.

The Keynesian antidote is for government to use its purchasing power as currency issuer to put idle resources to use, both capital goods and labor, simultaneously increasing output and effective demand in order to spur economic expansion and thereby to create opportunity for private investment.

The current conventional predilection for fiscal austerity based on the disproved assumption that this will increase business confidence and spur investment is misguided.

Noah Smith's solution seems to be based on the assumption that the key fundamental of capitalism is capital formation and this is a result of a combination of technology, innovation and investment, so that capital formation must be stimulated artificially since it is not taking place "naturally."

The question is how to do this as effectively and efficiently as possible.

His solution seems to be "encouragement." To be persnickety, "Where's the model?"

Well, at least his moving off interest rates as the lever.

The Keynesian solution is to decrease demand leakage to saving and increase effective demand using the power of the currency issuer. See monetary economics based on sectoral balances and application of functional finance in policy for the model.

Bloomberg View
Why Low Rates Failed to Boost Business Investment
Noah Smith | Bloomberg View columnist

Sunday, September 25, 2016

Brian Romanchuk — Primer: Endogenous Versus Exogenous Money

One of the long-running debates within economics is the question whether money is endogenous or exogenous. Those who follow internet economic debates can expect this argument to flare up periodically. This debate should largely be considered dead and buried; and abolishing money from economic theory would put the final nail in the coffin…
Bond Economics
Primer: Endogenous Versus Exogenous Money
Brian Romanchuk

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

Brian Romanchuk — Interest Rate Cycles: An Introduction

Monetary policy has increasingly become the focus of economists and investors. This report describes the factors driving interest rates across the economic cycle. Written by an experienced fixed income analyst, it explains in straightforward terms the theory that lies behind central bank thinking. Although monetary theory appears complex and highly mathematical, the text explains how decisions still end up being based upon qualitative views about the state of the economy.
The text makes heavy use of charts of historical data to illustrate economic concepts and modern monetary history. The report is informal, but contains references and suggestions for further reading.

This report is currently available in eBook format only. The text is around 27,000 words, and is richly illustrated.….
Bond Economics
Interest Rate Cycles: An Introduction
Brian Romanchuk

Friday, June 5, 2015

Alexander Mercouris — Russia's Recession: A Necessary Re-Balancing

...the Central Bank ever since 2012 has made it clear that its priority is inflation reduction over growth, with a medium term inflation target of just 4%. The Central Bank has also repeatedly made it clear that it will pursue a tough interest rate policy to achieve it however hard that is and however long it takes.
Experience of other economies with chronic inflation problems (such as Britain in the 1970s to 1990s) suggests that for inflation to be squeezed out of the system economic policy must be geared to that objective. This inevitably reduces growth, at least in the short term.

That seems to be the situation Russia is in now. It has been clear since 2012 that the Russian authorities have prioritised inflation over growth....
Russia Insider
Russia's Recession: A Necessary Re-Balancing
Alexander Mercouris

Tuesday, December 9, 2014

Cory Hoffman — Have the Bond Vigilantes Really Arrived in Russia or is the market simply following the lead of the Russian Central Bank?

So, I suspect that these recent rate hikes are not the result of the Russian Bond Market Vigilantes protesting Russian policies and the Russian Central Bank losing control but rather an example of the market rationally responding to the forward guidance of the Russian Central Bank.
Overlapping Consensus
Have the Bond Vigilantes Really Arrived in Russia or is the market simply following the lead of the Russian Central Bank?
Cory Hoffman

Wednesday, January 29, 2014

Cardiff Garcia — A new call for rev-repo to become the new policy rate

To those who have been watching the developments in the Fed’s fixed-rate full-allotment repo facility*, it won’t come as a bracing shock that the facility’s interest rate might eventually be synced with the interest rate paid on reserves and supplant the federal funds rate as the Fed’s new policy rate.

A short paper by Joseph Gagnon and Brian Sack arguing in favour of such a framework has been eagerly awaited and is now live (hat tip Real Time Economics). Sack’s authorship is especially notable given that he was head of the New York Fed’s markets desk until June 2012, when he was replaced by Simon Potter.
The Financial Times — FT Alphaville
A new call for rev-repo to become the new policy rate
Cardiff Garcia

Sunday, January 12, 2014

Matthew Boesler — A New Fed Study Destroys One Of The Central Tenets Of Monetary Policy


Mike Sankowski observed some time ago that monetary policy acts chiefly through the housing channel with a lag of several years:  Since housing is a major aspect of the US economy, interest rate setting is not without effect, but it is pretty slow and inefficient, involving a lot of unintended consequences as savers are favored over borrowers and vice versa, depending on direction of rate changes.

Business Insider
A New Fed Study Destroys One Of The Central Tenets Of Monetary Policy
Matthew Boesler

Thursday, January 2, 2014

JW Mason — Debt and Demand

It is customary to see rising debt as the result of private choices to finance higher expenditures by issuing new credit-market liabilities. But historically, it is equally correct to see rising debt as the result of political choices that increase the real value of existing liabilities.
The Slack Wire
Debt and Demand
JW Mason

Wednesday, January 1, 2014

Another Lost Voice: Silvio Gesell

   (Commentary posted by Roger Erickson)

Clearly an early proponent of fully fiat currency, zero interest rates, and that a citizenry needs to grant itself enough income to purchase and consume all that it can produce.

Video about economist Silvio Gesell. A currency system & economic order are dependent variables.

Wikipedia entry on Silvio Gesell

The Natural Economic Order, Silvio Gesell, 1929 (full text)




Monday, December 23, 2013

Scott Sumner — How many economists can answer this question?


What Scott sumner illustrates is that he cannot. This post makes absolutely clear how Prof. Sumner is clueless about about monetary economics and monetary operations, and how monetarism is bonkers.

The Money Illusion
How many economists can answer this question?
Scott Sumner | Professor of Economics, Bentley University

Friday, December 20, 2013

Michael Pettis — Monetary policy under financial repression

In order to understand much of what is happening in China I believe it is crucially important to understand how financial systems operate under condition of financial repression. Because most of what we know about economics is derived from economists whose operating environment is the classical “anglo-saxon” economies (I stress “classical” because for much of the 19th Century, operating under the so-called “American System”, the US itself was not, in my opinion, a classic anglo-saxon economy), there is a tendency to assume that what happens in those economies is somehow the default position in economics, and this not only causes us to underrate important economists that don’t follow this tradition, like the German Freidrich List or the American Albert O. Hirschman, but it also leads us into mistaken assumptions, like the belief that higher interest rates lead automatically to higher savings rates.
We do know some things about financial repression. Two of the first important texts to discuss financial repression comprehensively are Edward S. Shaw,Financial Deepening in Economic Development and Ronald I. McKinnon,Money and Capital in Economic Development. There is, however, a lot more to it than what is generally known, and even this is largely ignored by most economists. It seems to me that many of the mistakes we make when we think about the relationship between cause and effect, for example the impact of monetary policy on China’s economy, arise because we assume that relationships that hold in the US economy are universal and must hold in the Chinese economy too. So to return to the assumption that higher interest rates must lead to higher savings rates, I would argue that this is true mainly under two unstated assumptions, neither of which holds for China.
China Financial Markets
Monetary policy under financial repression
Michael Pettis | Professor of Finance at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management

Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Brad DeLong — Malinvestment In The Recession?

I think Daniel Kuehn mistakes Evan Soltas's point. Soltas is arguing not against the fundamentalist Austrians and their claims that the depression is caused by previous malinvestment in the boom. Soltas is arguing against the Martin Feldstein's who claim that interest rates need to be high during the bust in order to guard against additional malinvestments committed then.
Grasping Reality
Malinvestment In The Recession?
J. Bradford DeLong | Professor of Economics, UCAL Berkeley